
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SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS

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THE FACTS OF SOCIAL LIFE AS THE SOURCE OF SOLUTIONS FOR THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF ETHICS

BY

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TO
MY THREE SONS

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"These [writings of Comte, Spencer, Schaeffle, etc.] are of course incomplete attempts, but nevertheless they are the most important supports for an empirical ethics, and indispensable aids for solving the common problems of the special social sciences. Thus if one places the emphasis chiefly upon synthesis or upon the particular investigation of those problems which all of the special social sciences have in common one will not be able to deny the right of this sociology—which in fact is only a sort of developed empirical ethics—to an established place among the sciences."—GUSTAV SCHMOLLER, *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre.*

"Religion is an unselfish enthusiasm uniting vast bodies of men in aspiration toward an ideal, and proving the source of heroic virtues."—W. E. H. LECKY, *History of Rationalism in Europe.*

"What do I care whether all things are composed of atoms, or of similar parts or of fire and earth? For is it not enough to know the nature of the good and the evil, and the measures of the desires and the aversions, and also the movements toward things and from them; and, using these as rules, to administer the affairs of life, but not to trouble ourselves about the things above us? For these things are perhaps incomprehensible to the human mind: and if any man should even suppose them to be in the highest degree comprehensible, what then is the profit of them, if they are comprehended? And must we not say that those men have needless trouble who assign these things as necessary to the philosopher's discourse?"—Fragment attributed to EPICTETUS.

PREFACE

This essay skirts the entrance to vistas which it does not penetrate. But it suffices to convey the main idea of sociology as the scientific ethics, an idea which I hope will fructify in many minds. Most of the manuscript has lain in a drawer for years; other years and the labor of other minds must be expended before the treatment of this theme will be complete.

What is here presented is an attempt to lift into its proper prominence one phase of sociology, and of course it cannot at the same time give equal emphasis to its other phases. On pages 31 to 33 there is emphatic warning against going too far toward identifying sociology and ethics. At the same time it is not forgotten that with both Comte and Spencer sociology began as a philosophy of life. And it would cause the writer no distress of mind if in some universities the teaching of sociology should be assigned to the department of philosophy.

I am fully aware that the way to secure great vogue for a book upon ethics is to invent a plausible argument, or even one that is not very plausible, for believing that which most people already believe, while, on the other hand, only comparatively few readers are hospitable to any modification in popular beliefs on this subject. If some find it hard to tolerate the treatment of ethical problems as within the scope of matter-of-fact science and as belonging to the realm of cause and effect, still I

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hope that they will nevertheless find the treatment as a whole not destructive but decidedly constructive. If I am somewhat venturesome in handling the accepted beliefs, it is not for mere love of adventure, nor from disregard of the values affected, but because I hold the theory that in the end thought helps life more when thought is true than when thinking is prostituted to serve preferences. And even if this theory, or faith, should prove erroneous some may choose to spend their mental life on a cold and arid plateau of unclouded sincerity, rather than in any steaming valley of tropical illusion. It is far too early in the day to conclude that an unflinching and objective-minded sincerity will lead us only into barrenness and cold, and that it may not lead us into the temperate zone of belief where mankind can thrive best.

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SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS

CHAPTER I

THE CREED OF THE INCREDULOUS

A philosophy is almost as necessary to civilized society as a language. The philosophy that civilized society must have is an ethics—not this or that particular ethics but some ethics or other—that is to say, some generally accepted idea or ideas adapted to give direction and momentum to life.

The ethics of yesterday was largely based on legalistic religion, on the thought of divine law enforceable by rewards and punishments here and hereafter. Its ideals were too individualistic. Instead of aiming at the establishment of a "kingdom of righteousness" on earth it despaired of that triumph [1] and looked mainly to the future salvation of the individual soul. Nevertheless the religion of the last generation was of incalculable value as a source of guidance and power. To-day the fear of Hell and hope of Heaven and belief in the intervention of "special providence" in behalf of the good man and in disfavor of the bad man play greatly diminished

[1] The substitution of a mystic doctrine of the "second coming" for the practical purpose for which the founder of Christianity lived and died is the most pathetic of all perversions of a noble teaching.

rôles in the control of life. Moreover, deeply as we may regret it, we cannot fail to observe that the sense of divine companionship, which so refines and ennobles many lives and develops so much staunch ethical reliability, tends to fade out of the social consciousness as anthropomorphic conceptions of God are being replaced by philosophic pantheism or agnosticism. Religious ethics was reinforced for a time by "moral philosophy"; but moral philosophy like that of Kant was unscientific and is now discredited and for most minds dead.

Look at Germany! Neither the religion of Luther nor the philosophy of Kant [2] guides her life. Her national policy has exhibited a thoroughly barbarous unmorality. And moral disintegration is by no means peculiar to Germany. A large part of our own popular fiction consists in the subtlest advocacy of a pseudo-scientific unmorality. If a critic raises his voice in defense of the "mid-Victorian" decencies and sanctities he is greeted with a chorus of scoffs and jeers. We are assured that nothing is wrong that is "natural," that in nature there is no higher and no lower, that altruism is only a form of selfishness, and that reason has no precedence over the instincts that we share with the beasts. Among the "intellectuals," "the emancipated," "the enlightened youth," the leaders and makers of our future, great numbers are moving rapidly and with gathering momentum toward an abyss not wholly unlike that into which the aristocratic party in Germany has fallen. The abyss is no less deep and dark and noisome because hitherto with us un-

[2] Kant taught the absolutism of moral law and Professor Dewey thinks that his influence degenerated into a prop for the unmoral absolutism of the Prussian monarchy.

morality has taken the form of private, rather than national, individualism.

Now, if this doctrine of "the emancipated" is a true statement of the facts of human existence, and if the moral distinction between right and wrong is an old wives' nursery fable designed to scare a juvenile and timorous humanity, but outgrown by the men of a scientific age, or if it is an invention devised and perpetuated in the interest of the many weak in order to bind the strong, and is an insult to the right and might of supermen, if moral restraints are only an attempt to curb the "natural" current of full, free and rich life, then we cannot hide the fact from an adult and scientific world, and may as well plunge at once into the *mêlée* of ravening beasts, and let nonsurvival take the hindmost.

But does that "doctrine of the emancipated" present a true or a false conception of human life? That is the sole question. It is a comprehensive question and includes the following:

Are ravening individualism and ruthless war of groups the method of survival for creatures capable of rational social organization?

Are the characteristic values of human experience obtainable by the unregulated operation of instincts which we share with animals that have not evolved to the level of gregarious life?

Are these values obtainable by the operation of any instincts undirected by reason, or do instincts, stimulated and guided by the conclusions of reason, yield a richer life than irrational impulses do?

If so, what are the conclusions of adequately enlight-

ened reason that afford the necessary guidance to instinctive promptings?

Does the realization of the biggest net total of human values require the subordination of this or that particular instinct to the harmonious totality of experience?

Does it even require the organization of the activities of individuals into a regulated system of coöperation?

And is it required by the nature of the situation that men and women, in order to be capable of the richest individual life and capable of a social coöperation on which the greatest net total of individual good depends, must have developed personalities that are products not only of biological, but also of social, evolution?

None of these questions can be finally answered by any kind of dogmatizing or conceptual philosophizing, but only by a genuinely unbiased study of the facts of life as it is lived by men in society.

Will the next generation have an ethics? It will not get its ethics by going backward to mid-Victorian dogmas and speculations. If it has an ethics fit for the demands of social order and progress it will discover it by going forward along the path of science—not along the path of *a priori* speculation or mystic faith, but along the path of science. And the only science that can equip us with an ethics is the scientific study of human life, that is to say, of *social* life, for man's life becomes human in the significant and distinctive sense only in society and by the methods of causation involved in the cumulative effects of association. Such study, whether it is called sociology or by some other name, is our only hope for an adequate ethics.

The physicists tell us that the chair in which I am

comfortably seated is a stable balance of ionic action, and that if this ionic action were released from the orderly system in which it proceeds it would blow me and my whole environment to less than atoms. Similarly, the instinctive action of human individuals is correlated into a comfortable social order, but if the energies of unsocialized instinctive action were released from orderly and systematic control society would pass into decay and dissolution or chaotic explosion. Primitive men could live together only in little hordes. Beyond the horde was war. The organized coöperation of millions is the supreme product of social evolution, an evolution that has been largely unplanned and uncomprehended. That evolution is not complete. The possibilities of social organization and of individual experience for the masses of mankind are as yet unrealized. In every age men of insight and deep human interest have declared the shortcomings of the society to which they belonged and assured us that we live only along the margin of the fields of realization we might enter. Even savages and barbarians have had their Messianic hopes and prophecies. Unrealized good is always within view and barely beyond our reach. It is beyond us only because there is nowhere a society that has developed an adequate ethics. Reliable ethics is a knowledge of the method of realizing our human possibilities, discovered by scientists or seers, and inwrought in the common sense and common sentiments of a society.

Ethics is always founded on an understanding, a theory or a faith. Change men's ideas and thereupon their sentiments and conduct change. As a man dozing by the fireside is roused to a fury of action if his wife announces

that upstairs the attic is in a blaze, so an ambitionless idler may be converted into a zealot, or a stagnant and decadent society may arise to heights of achievement, if sufficiently propulsive ideas are adopted. If the sentiments radiated throughout society arose from apprehension, or even a remote approach toward apprehension, of the human values at stake and of the way in which commonplace conduct fits into a scheme of things on which the realization or forfeiture of these values depends, men would be aroused to a joy in zestful endeavor and a constancy in sentiment and purpose known only to the most fortunate. We should have an enthusiasm of generous motive in time of peace not inferior to that evoked by war. An individual, to be happy and powerful, and a society, to be progressive and constructive, must have ideas that are both propulsive and exalted. If there are no such ideas that are true, then individuals and society are doomed to disappointment, disillusionment, and decay. If there are such ideas, then their discovery and promulgation till they are embodied in the common sense of the masses of mankind is the profoundest of all human needs.

The ideas by which individual and social life has been organized during the nineteenth century are fading out from many minds. The mind of man will learn all that it can learn. That is inevitable and we must take the consequences. We cannot permanently protect faith by any ignorance that science can dispel. First the teachers and then the taught, gradually and increasingly, will discard all illusions and faith that cannot survive in the presence of all the knowledge that we possess or can acquire. As yet many have neither received the existing

knowledge that will ultimately become common property nor come under the influence of teachers who have received it; but this is only a temporary condition. Others, who are among the enlightened, are so deeply under the influence of the teachings of their youth and the prestige of organized systems of thought that they are able to close their eyes to the implications of their scientific knowledge. A few boldly declare: "My science and my faith are incompatible but I cannot live without my faith so I retain it simply because I must and will."

Such a transition as now is taking place presents two phases: the revision or rejection of the old and the development of new views. The tendency is to remove the sills and timbers of the old structure of ideas before there is anything to put in their places. There are two ways in which men strive to escape from the resulting disturbance or destruction of their own life and that of society. The first way is to strive to perpetuate or reestablish the old. This is the way taken by great numbers of earnest people from Billy Sunday, with his brandished threats of the Devil and Hell and his collarless and colloquial familiarities with the Deity, to Arthur James Balfour with his *Foundation of Belief* in the fact that we need it, William James with his *Will to Believe,* and a goodly company of reverent and intellectual apologists as futile as they are ingenious. The second way is to strive to build the new and to press toward the views of human life that are disclosed by the light of fullest knowledge. This latter course appears to have been relatively little followed by men of the profoundest moral earnestness. It is time to realize that it is not by reluctant and grudging and timorous admissions that we

can best approach the actual truth about life by courageous and zealous search for the truth. The way out is not backward but forward; backward we cannot turn. The way to shorten the period of transition, disorganization, and lack of social agreement upon the fundamentals of life policy is cordially to accept the results and the methods of science and push on toward more adequate comprehension. It is a tragedy if the men of greatest moral earnestness, that is, the men of deepest interest in the human values at stake, are to hold back.

The creed of the incredulous is a working hypothesis to the effect that life is adaptation to objective reality and that for purposes of adaptation it is better to know the objective realities as they are. Such knowledge, according to this hypothesis, is at least in some respects preferable to the most satisfying "conceptions" that the mind can invent in answer to its own longings.

Errors are often elaborate, beautiful, and useful. It is no wonder that men are well suited by ideas which were made by themselves to suit themselves through a long process of invention and improvement; especially when they pertain to subjects about which we can have no knowledge to limit invention. We suffer when our cherished errors are dispelled. The life of the Hopi Indians was shaken to its foundations when they saw white settlers raise crops of maize without the Hopi ceremonies and incantations. There was a sense of loss on the part of physicians and of their trusting patients two generations ago when it was found that most of the current bleeding, blistering, and nostrums were without avail. But the same science which destroyed our comfortable confidence in antiquated practices gave us

chemical physiology, bacteriology, antitoxins and antiseptics; and having destroyed our faith in the virtue of planting at the full of the moon gave us a knowledge of the chemistry of soil fertilization that doubled our harvests.

Science will not replace former ideas about the unknowable with new ideas about the unknowable. The creed or hypothesis of the incredulous is that our faculties are not so inadequate to our necessity that the ideas which we must have in order to live are beyond the compass of our powers. It seeks its guiding and impelling ideas within the sphere accessible to our intelligence. The hypothesis is that man's adaptability is such that he can live a satisfactory conscious life upon what is called knowledge, as contrasted with mere speculation or imagination, provided knowledge is made as adequate as possible.

This is not a creed in the sense of a doctrine to be "believed" or held by "faith" in sharp contrast with what can be "known." It is a rational, working hypothesis to be tested. If it stands the test it will gradually lead to a body of principles based on science and experience, that embody the natural incentives and deterrents contained in the actual values of life and the conditions of their realization. It will be a creed only in function. That is to say, it will serve the purpose once served by creeds.

It may be that knowledge will not function so well, will not make life quite so satisfying and ennobled as did the conceptions that men have gradually formulated in answer to their own sense of need. To claim that knowledge can replace without loss the noblest creeds men have

devised is somewhat like claiming that this is for man the best possible world. Science cannot make that assumption any more than it can deny that possibility. If knowledge about life should permanently lack some of the advantages of conceptual creeds as a source of life's guidance and power, it has on the other hand advantages of its own. If it is truly knowledge, based on adequate verification, its appeal will be more universal, more constant, freer from sectarian divisiveness and will therefore afford the basis for a more solid and general agreement in social coöperation.

The religions of the past have had their roots in curiosity and fear about the unknown. Ethics has always had its roots in actual experience of the known and study of its knowable conditions. All the ethical insight man ever had he derived from contemplation of life's realities. Many religious requirements have been, and some which continue to this day are still, of a merely ritual character; that is to say, they have no inherent ethical importance. Where ethical and religious requirements coincide this agreement may have come about in either of two ways: In the one case an ethical requirement was first perceived and a religious sanction subsequently added. Prophets or moral leaders who had discovered an ethical requirement, since they believed in God, or Gods, believed that the ethical requirement which they had discovered must be the will of God, and that ethical customs of the group must be enforced by tribal deities. In the other case, instead of an ethical requirement coming first and a religious sanction being added, the religious requirement came first and what was at first a merely ritual obligation, or fear taboo, was so modified or reinter-

preted as to give it a practical significance. Sometimes the religious fear, or hope, was thus made to furnish motive for conduct that was not ethical in the sense of serviceable to the general welfare, but serviceable to the welfare of the ruling or priestly class. For example, the food and sex taboos that reserved the choicest indulgences for the use of the elders of the group.

Two rival theories of the origin of sabbath observance illustrate the two methods by which religious and ethical requirements may come into agreement. According to one theory,[3] the practical necessity of a day of rest was discovered as soon as large bodies of men were engaged in regular and strenuous labor. The Chaldeans and Babylonians divided the lunar month of twenty-eight days into four quarters of seven days each and allowed their slaves to rest on the last day of each quarter. From the Babylonians the Hebrews learned this beneficent custom and came in time to treat its observance as a religious obligation. According to the rival theory[4] the sabbath originated in one of those utterly superstitious taboos devoid of ethical value which among many peoples condemn, or bless, certain days on which ordinary occupations are interdicted. Among the Babylonians the seventh days were "evil days" on which the wrath of Gods must be appeased, and among the Hebrews likewise the observance had at first a merely ritual significance. But in later times, and especially in Christian countries, the physiological and psychological necessity of periodic rest has come to be appreciated.

[3] Mentioned by Professor Gustav Schmoller in his lectures on the labor question.

[4] Compare Hutton Webster, *Rest Days*, especially c. vii and viii. New York, 1916.

Whichever of these theories may finally prove to be historically correct the ethical and ritual elements in the requirement are in either case clearly distinct in origin and significance. Any truly ethical duty has its basis, not in a supernatural requirement, but in a practical use. And the disappearance of any religious elements with which it may have been associated does not affect the permanence of the ground for an ethical requirement. No ritual requirement can either add to or subtract from the facts, if they be facts, that physical health and efficiency require periodic interruption of routine, and that recurring periods of time devoted to man's spiritual [5] and intellectual needs are as truly a natural requirement as recurrent periods of physical rest, that regularly recurring days will not be devoted to these physical and psychic needs by the majority of individuals except as the result of a habit, and that such a habit will not prevail among the members of society except as the result of a custom, together with facilities provided by society for the observance of the custom. Sabbath observance, like every other ethical requirement, if it is a duty at all, is a natural duty, that is, a duty by the very nature of things. And conformity to this or any other ethical requirement should be sought in an intelligent society by clearly disclosing the natural basis of the requirement and thus establishing a social agreement as to its importance and social insistence upon conformity to it. Duty of every kind is a natural requirement, a condition of human welfare.

Religious requirements may come or go, ethical

[5] The word "spiritual" means psychic. It refers to the far-reaching effects of states of thought and feeling.

motives remain. The sufferings and the joys of human life are known to man, if anything is, and they are conditioned in accordance with the orderly processes of nature. They are conditioned by the coöperative activity of all men; and this system of coöperative activity by which human joys are realized or prevented, and human sorrows averted or heaped up, places upon each individual participant in the system of human activity obligations, and offers to each opportunities, the summons of which, if clearly apprehended, would evoke both inspiration and devotion. *To open the eyes of men to the facts of their own interdependent existence would reveal a worth and a meaning in life, and supply it with direction and motive adequate to elicit zest and power.*

These facts have already begun to function in the lives of the incredulous in place of creed. These facts are subject to objective test; so also is the effect produced by knowledge of these facts on individual and social life. It may be found that facts are even mightier than creeds as sources of ethical guidance and motive. We may reasonably hope, some day, to have a society in which individuals will measure their success, not by conformity to some current folly, but in terms of the actual values affected, a society in which the distillation and diffusion of sentiments and the adoption of customs and institutions will follow from a far more general perception of the values of human experience and of the mingled consequences of human conduct. Such perceptions once originated by the few can spread abroad. Moreover, such sentiments can be felt, such customs practiced and such institutions enjoyed by multitudes to whom these perceptions never more than dimly penetrate.

CHAPTER II

THE RESIDUUM OF FAITH

The most beautiful and ennobling creed that human speculation has evolved is not lightly cast aside by any man who comprehends the importance of ideas for life. Such a person is likely to feel that no calamities ever inflicted on the world by any war compare, as a catastrophe to mankind, with the loss of the creed of Divine companionship. Only one who has known its full effect in his own life is in position to estimate its value. Can that creed be retained?

It is impossible to prove the truth of that conception of God, and of his relation to the unfolding life of our race, which is the essence of that creed. And it seems amazing that if God is so related to man this truth, so important to our welfare, should be beyond the compass of our rational powers. One may answer, though the answer is not a wholly satisfying or consoling one, that the human brain has been produced by biological evolution and therefore could not develop any powers save those that can be used to contribute to biological survival, and that such powers are necessarily inadequate for the discovery of absolute and ultimate truth.

Some claim that instinct gives us a knowledge of God which reason cannot verify, and which reason may even call in question. But every instinct is as humbly biologi-

cal in origin as reason. The universality, or approximate universality, among savage and barbarous peoples of notions about unseen personal powers seems to be adequately accounted for by students of social evolution without the assumption of such an instinct. The ideas of early peoples about the unseen have not enough consistency nor respectability to be divinely implanted. Scientists do not lack an instinct of this sort that is possessed by savages and barbarians. If any scientist thinks he has instinctive knowledge of God let him ask himself how far he can distinguish religious ideas which he calls instinctive from those which are the result of the social suggestions that surrounded his childhood.

A far more respectable claim is set up by arguing that the existence of a Supreme Power continuously causing all phenomena and possessing not less, but incomparably more, of every attribute of personality than man possesses, is implied in what we know of nature so that it can be legitimately inferred.

Surely it would be an amazing and well-nigh incredible thing if the intelligence made possible by this pulpy mechanism of nerve cells compassed all the truth about the universe, and if these organs of conscious response which have been developed by the process of natural selection so far, and only so far, as is contributory to the survival of our bodily organism enabled us to fathom all knowledge. Such advancement as we have made in knowledge shows us that our ignorance has been great and prompts us to infer that all we now know is still like the tiny circle illuminated by a lantern in a night of darkness. No physicist can tell the whole truth about so simple a thing as my pen or the table on which I write.

According to his hypothesis, when we get a sensation of mottled brown and yellow in looking at the oak table, the external reality corresponding to our sensations is not color but a set of reflected vibrations and the seemingly inert wood is a rhythm and whirl of vibrations and vortices. We have no reason to think that the circle of our knowledge is the boundary of the universe, nor that the orderly causation that reigns within the circle of our knowledge ceases where our knowledge stops. This little realm of phenomena that condition each other, in which we move, we infer to be part of a larger Totality of causally connected reality. Unless the most fundamental of all our inferences is false that Whole contains adequate causal explanations of all its parts. Such is the hypothesis of science. By the constitution of our minds, and by inference from the process of explanation so far as we can carry it, we are compelled to believe in the existence of adequate causation beyond the limits of our power to trace causation.

But concerning the nature of ultimate causation we know nothing. That which science calls causation is merely the conditioning of phenomena by other phenomena no more ultimate than themselves. Shall we lean upon the broken reed of analogy and think to interpret ultimate causation by analogy with this conditioning, by saying that the primal simplicity was already multiple and afforded a "combination of conditions" from which issued the first step in evolution? Shall we add that from this supposed beginning evolution has been a process in which phenomena have persistently risen above their source? Shall we carry this assumption to its conclusion and say that conscious intelligence was absent from the

universe till organized matter attained the degree of differentiated complexity seen in nervous tissue, and that our lantern of knowledge is the supreme light and there is no Sun? Even Schopenhauer, bent above all things upon the avoidance of assumptions, found implicit in the process of evolution the "will-to-be." The conditioning of phenomena by each other throws no light upon the ultimate nature of causation or the origin of phenomena as such. The swinging of planets and stars and the unfolding of buds in spring, every process of nature, the rhythmic surging of the ions in every atom, alike imply the Causation which transcends our search. According to the theories of physicists, all material phenomena are processes of movement, exhibitions of power. Life differs from the inorganic only in being a more intricate and more obvious process. Nature is a system of activities, continuously caused, and kept in being by the unceasing operation of power.

But when we speak thus of power we must remember that "power" and "causation" are synonymous terms; and that each, when used in this sense, is but a name for our ignorance; that by power or causation we mean the inconceivable Beyond, the existence of which our knowledge of the limitation of our powers, and all that we know within the compass of our powers, implies, but of which our knowledge affords no description. We mean the Causation which we cannot discover but which we infer to be adequate to the continuous maintenance of such a universe as this.

If we are practically forced by the constitution of our minds to infer the existence of Causation adequate continuously to maintain such a universe as this, shall we

also infer that there is Intelligence that transcends and includes the intelligence which is conditioned by metabolism in our nervous tissues as the Power that maintains the universe transcends the energy released in our muscular contractions? It appears that many can no more escape the second inference than the first.

Even if the thought of Intelligence adequate to include all the processes of a universe like this be but a doubtful inference, if the existence of such Intelligence be only a possibility that we can neither affirm nor deny, an hypothesis which we can neither prove nor disprove, that is as likely to be false as true, and, for aught we know, as likely to be true as false, still it may have significance for man. If a sound heard from the distance either may or may not be a cry for help by my boy who is swimming, I act precisely as if I knew it to be his cry. I cannot listen and then say: "I am unable to tell whether it is his cry for help or not, and so I will ignore the sound." Passive agnosticism toward such a doubt is unreasonable to the last degree. I must act as if the possible were the actual. And it may be that so long as there is any possibility that there is a God who knows and cares for every man, to act on that possibility is the only rationality. That would be true if it were also true that only by acting on that hypothesis can human life be saved from failure. And there are many who tell us that to act as if the substance of the universe were Intelligence as well as Causation, Intelligence in which all our fragmentary consciousness flows on, that to act as if the power which functions consciously in us were part of the power and consciousness that continuously creates all life and being, that to act as if our thought and our act were

part of the realization in us and in society of a personal ideal and a social coöperation which is the will of God and which struggles toward realization in our endeavor, is the only mode of action by which our individual and social possibilities can be realized.

It may be that the reason why such faith as this is difficult or impossible to many minds, is that it is not such a faith as this that churches, teachers, and all the usual organized functionaries of religion have demanded of us and shed about us by their preaching and their art of ceremonial. They have too often demanded, and are demanding still, other faiths than faith in God, as God can be conceived by one who has outgrown the anthropomorphic belittling of Deity. We cannot conceive of a God whose power is exercised by the contraction of muscular tissue, of a God whose intelligence functions by the metabolism of neuroses. The processes of nature laugh at such a conception of Divinity. We cannot put God in human form. Nor can we implore Him to do his obvious duties, nor conceive of Him as interfering with the orderly processes of nature in response to the contradictory petitions of men. Nor can we find a revelation of God in magic or miracle such as characterize the mythology of a hundred outgrown superstitions. If we pray, it cannot be for gifts of special favoritism elicited by our pleadings, but rather for the sake of high communion, and all our prayers will be elaborations of the one prayer "Hallowed be Thy name, Thy will be done, Thy kingdom of fulfillment come." And to discover what that will is as revealed in the laws of nature which are the method of life, and to make our

actions its fulfillment will be to us the law and the prophets.

Whether such a residuum of faith remains and stirs the mind of a given individual or not the plain course for us is to seek for guidance in the facts of life. If there is either duty or opportunity we must seek and find it in the realities that lie within the circle of our comprehension, this little circle of light in which we walk and see. If there is a God who cares for man we shall truly learn His will only by the appeal to life's realities or by listening to teachers who have made this appeal. If there is a Personal Deity whose consciousness includes all human consciousness and whose will includes all duty and worth and the fulfillment of every good human possibility, then the search for a naturalistic ethics by investigation of social realities is nothing less than search for the laws of God, as revealed in the terms of the problem which He has set us. And any of us who, because of the loss of anthropomorphic conceptions on which they have been accustomed to depend, and because of the incredibility of the forms of religion which have been presented to them and against which they have revolted, or because of the example of those whose influence they chiefly feel, or on account of the vagueness and uncertainty of the residuum of faith, are unable to adjust themselves to noble zeal by the thought of God, they above all other men are bound either to despair of finding in life any high meaning or else to seek such meaning in that observable reality in which alone they confide. To those who feel no kindling of the moral flame at thought of any personality above mankind, nor any consolation drawn from beyond the compass of the life we know, to such

the search for the naturalistic ethics is the quest for the *rationale* of our existence, for the only source of guidance and motive by which our life can escape a *reductio ad absurdum*, for the matter-of-fact method of individual endeavor and social coöperation which alone can disclose whatever meaning and worth our life contains and afford guidance and zest, exaltation and power.

The function of religion is to produce a psychological adjustment, by which the conscious and subconscious sources from which our actions and experience flow will be adjusted to joy and to achievement. The powers of man are latent or half latent till touched by an ennobling and gladdening thought. One cannot summon his best self by a mere act of will. Its coming, like every other phenomenon of nature, is the result of the necessary condition. The necessary condition is the ennobling thought. It must be a thought often renewed. A man can no more be his best without frequent renewal of attention to the ideas which to him are most potent for this adjustment than a watch can run without winding.

Of all the ideas that have adjusted men to satisfying and productive life, the idea of God, as one in whose consciousness every thought or act of man is comprehended and whose will is the sum of all good, has probably been the most potent, or potent for the greatest number of individuals. There is, however, one other thought that has this power of adjustment, of calling forth the serene and balanced and potent man who is the highest of all the multiple possibilities inwrought in the complex structure of the human organism; and this other is the idea of human life as a Social Fact, of individual life as participation in humanity's past, present and

future. By participation in humanity's past we derive all that elevates us distinctly above the naked savage or even the dumb brute. From the fact that we participate in humanity's present and are among the parents of humanity's future we derive the true philosophy of life which affords us motive and adjustment. Human life is social life. The fundamental and interpretative fact for us to recognize is the extent to which as human beings our life is an effect and a cause of the life of our associates. We live a truly human life and find our happiness and worth only when we are guided by the habitual realization that we are participants in a common and coöperative enterprise of creating and maintaining an evolving social situation which affords to all mankind the opportunities and the very content of truly human existence. In our personal contacts of the household and the neighborhood, and in our wider and more impersonal relations of business and politics, in all of our activities, we are essentially participants in this coöperative enterprise.

This, when duly comprehended, is the most inspiring thought that can enter the mind of man. It alone affords a true interpretation of life, reveals life's worth, evokes our full powers, and attunes to normal happiness.

Religion built upon the unknown and the unknowable, great as its services have been and still are, has often obstructed thought and obscured duty. It has occupied men too much with keeping their own souls out of hell and getting them into heaven and too little with the task of transforming the social life of homes and neighborhoods, cities and nations, into a kingdom of heaven. Priests have insisted upon observances while prophets have had to cry out: "I hate, I despise your solemn

assemblies; take away from me the noise of thy songs, for I will not hearken to the melody of thy viols. But let judgment run down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream." The Founder of the Christian religion exhausted the resources of denunciation against those who were punctilious in religious observances but who had no share in His militant righteousness. He made the sole criterion of acceptance: "Ye have done it or ye did it not, to these my brethren," and called upon his followers to "take up the cross," that is to say, to pay their part of the cost of remaking the world. Yet I have heard the pastor of a college church declare that in comparison with failure to accept the mystic theory of Christ's person theft and adultery were trivial matters. Disproportionate emphasis upon the mystical elements in religion has allowed some pious sinners, while diligent in the observances that were expected to save their own souls, to be remiss in their primary human duties. Perhaps it has led but few to put into words the argument that the best solution of the problem of poverty and ignorance is to let unsanitary modes of life, pestilence and war hurry earth's unfortunate millions into heaven after as brief a stay as possible in their sublunary purgatory. But the idea that Lazarus, if he would only accept the gospel, might soon be in Abraham's bosom has lulled men's consciences and is partly responsible for the fact that slums have continued to fester and wars to prevail while churches busied themselves with other-worldliness, half forgetting that it is only in as much as they have done good or taught men to do good unto the least of the brothers of the Son of Man that they have justified their existence. To base our religion, that is to say, our per-

sonal adjustment, too much on ideas about the unseen and the hereafter is to pervert life and to blind us to our actual duties and opportunities. It is difficult to doubt that this cause is in part responsible for the fact that the real task of humanity has been largely shirked; that we have lacked and still lack such a great prophetic propaganda as the case requires, summoning men by the voice of all religious leaders and by the common conscience to meet the clear requirements of that task; that the natural idealism of generous youth is so little enlisted in truly religious devotion to that task; and that the majority of us do not even see that the line between good men and bad men is the line between those whose lives are dominated and those whose lives fail to be dominated by the fact that from dawn to dark life is participation in the Coöperative Enterprise.

Millions of the intelligent, and of the young, have lost, or never had, the religion of the Invisible. Many others cling to it coldly, though it has no power to inspire them. They cling to it because they see no other source of inspiration and its institutionalism keeps it alive for them. We must have religion. That is, we must have a common vitalizing conception. Multitudes can never get the old religion back. It may be far better so. In religion, as in medicine or agriculture, facts afford a better guide and a clearer summons than the speculation that preceded knowledge. We can get our adjustment from the contemplation of observable reality. We can get it by opening our eyes to the social fact, the fact of our membership, our inevitable membership—disregarded and shirked, or loyally accepted—in the Coöperative Enterprise.

Our adjustment will then come from cherishing an idea that is demonstrably true, the significance of which grows with our intelligence. It does not desert the adult mind in a scientific age, but as we advance it grows in power to elicit personal adaptation to life's exigencies. It is a somewhat recondite idea unadapted to the needs of a too juvenile and ignorant humanity. It is an idea the full meaning of which requires to be expounded, an idea not yet formed with any adequacy in the minds of the majority of men. But it is an idea that harmonizes with our social instincts, that is applicable to all the relations of life, that is adequate as the major premise of our philosophy, the fountain of our sentiments and the mainspring of our conduct. And when once developed and popularized, as it some day will be, it will be intelligible to all normal minds.

From the fact of our social nature it results that neither the thought of God nor the thought of participation in the social life inspires us to our best unless that thought is the common property of our group. The weakness of an age of transition is its lack of social agreement. Neither a residuum of faith, purged of anthropomorphism and superstition, nor the contemplation of the social reality can adequately serve the purpose of inspiration and adjustment unless *institutionalized,* that is to say, rationally adopted as a social agreement. It is reasonable to hope, and experience already justifies the hope, that an adequate recognition of the social reality, of all human life as a participation, and of normal human life as a coöperation, if once it becomes institutionalized, so as to be reflected upon us each from the common life,

in literature, in ritual,[1] and by the social atmosphere of suggestion and sympathetic radiation, will serve the essential purposes of religion; that is to say, it will adjust the intricate mechanism of conscious life to attainment of life's highest individual and social fulfillment.

[1] The word "ritual" is used by sociologists to mean something more than religious observance. It is the whole system of customary activity by which the adopted ideas and sentiments of a society are expressed, inculcated, and put into practice.

CHAPTER III

SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS

Sociology sprang from two roots, one in scientific, the other in practical, interest. As a scientific movement, its first great names are those of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. As a practical movement, its origin is represented by such names as those of John Ruskin, Charles Kingsley, Frederick Dennison Maurice, and Arnold Toynbee. Whatever may be thought of the fruits of their labors, the sociological movement has never been without adherents whose personal and intellectual qualities command respect. These two roots out of which sociology has sprung correspond to the two great changes that differentiate the modern mental outlook from that of the past. The first of these is the "scientific spirit," the second is the "social spirit."

The scientific spirit is the tendency and determination, in studying every division of reality, to replace mere speculation guided by prejudice and preference with the patient investigation of facts through the application of the experimental or the comparative method, and with the interpretation of facts in accordance with the hypothesis that among them all there is a universal causal interrelationship.[1]

[1] To common sense the expressions "facts" and "causal interrelationship" are perfectly intelligible, but speculative skepticism,

The second great difference between the present and the past is the social spirit. The social spirit is the sense that the normal goal of endeavor is the realization of life's possibilities of good, not by a few whose welfare rests upon the bent backs of the mass, but by all normal human beings in proportion as they are endowed with the possibilities of good experience.

Given the advent of the scientific spirit and of the social spirit, the coming of sociology was just as inevitable as any other step in evolution when the antecedent conditions were fulfilled. Sociology, in one of its aspects, is an intellectual movement which consists in carrying the scientific attitude into the study of human life. In its other aspect, sociology consists in turning our minds to the great task to which humanity in general has thus far never set itself, the necessarily coöperative task of the comprehensive realization of life's possibilities of good experience.

Obviously these two aspects of sociology, if successfully carried out, would be related to each other as any science is related to its applications. And, as obviously, science must come before the applications of science. The greatest danger of sociology is that eagerness for application will divert men from the strictly scientific pursuit upon which both comprehension and application ultimately depend. Preoccupation with practical aims may even obscure the fact that sociology has a distinctive scientific task. Practical aims cannot be expected to define the field of a science. Such aims are likely to call,

while groping for solutions, has surrounded them with a smother of obscurity. I must use these and similar expressions with the meanings which we are obliged to give to them in everyday practical life and in science. This matter is discussed in Chapter XII.

not for the application, still less for the creation, of a single science, but rather for the application of any number of sciences. Thus scientific agriculture is not itself a science but a combination of applications of zoölogy, botany, chemistry, physics, and even economics. And scientific medicine is the application of numerous sciences, including physiology, bacteriology, chemistry, psychology, and physics (with its trusses, splints, bone-splicing, radium, and Röntgen rays). Likewise, the solution of concrete problems of social welfare may require the application of many sciences. Successful practice requires the combination of knowledge drawn from all the sciences that apply to the purpose in hand; and there is no absurdity when the agriculturist combines knowledge drawn from biology, chemistry, and economics; or when the physician combines knowledge drawn from physiology, bacteriology, chemistry, and physics; or when the social worker, together with the application of his knowledge about customs, organizations, and other social facts, combines application of knowledge about tenement architecture, sanitary engineering, and of any applicable physical science. One may believe that sociology is becoming a "practical science" in the sense in which agriculture and medicine are "practical sciences" and still doubt whether it can ever be a truly fundamental science. I am not employing the name "sociology" to designate merely the effort to concentrate all possible light upon certain pressing practical problems. I assume that to be a perfectly normal exercise of intelligence. But there are distinctly social facts and there should be distinctly social science. The only question is how many social sciences should there be. The word "sociology" at the head of

this chapter does not refer merely, nor mainly, to "social economics" or "social technology," considered as the art of applying all pertinent knowledge to the problems of general welfare, but rather to sociology as a specific fundamental science, that is, as an effort to analyze, evaluate, and account for the content of human life in terms applicable to all its divisions, economic, political, ethical, and whatever else, in so far as the content of human life is made up of ideas, sentiments, and practices that are not peculiar to individuals, but are the common property of groups and that have resulted from a social evolution.

Now ethics also, like sociology, has both a practical and a theoretical side. Ethics in its practical, as distinguished from its scientific, aspect is the sum total of those requirements of wisdom and knowledge which at one juncture or another may become the "duty" of a good man. And ethics of this practical sort, if adequately informed, would be closely related to "practical" sociology, if not identical with it. The distinction between the two would be that hitherto practical ethics has emphasized the individual aspect, and practical sociology the social aspect of life, which is after all one life having both aspects. As a result of this difference of emphasis, sociology has given more attention to detailed information about the opportunities and requirements of coöperative service than has practical ethics. But all would agree that these requirements of coöperative service are properly within the scope of practical ethics. It is equally true that the requirements of private and personal virtue can be formulated only in the light of social knowledge, and that they are formulated in judgments and senti-

ments that have been developed through social evolution and spread by social contacts.

Furthermore, the theoretical or fundamental aspects of ethics and of sociology coincide as truly as do their practical aspects. Ethics, in its more fundamental aspect, is a set of general questions about life with tentative or final answers to these questions. The thesis of this chapter is that sociology as a science, or at least as an attempt to carry on a study of life in a scientific spirit, *cannot escape those very questions which are the problems of ethics,* and furthermore, that *the only intellectually satisfying method of seeking the answers to those questions is to be found, not in* a priori *speculation, which has been the historical method in ethics, but rather in that investigation of the facts of human life which is the work of sociology.*

However, all this is not intended to imply that sociology is ethics and nothing else. Sociology is the attempt to study in a truly scientific spirit and by a broadly comparative method that conscious life of man which is also the life of society and which can evolve as it does only in society and as the life of society. It must seek to give an objectively true description of all the general traits of that life, of the forms of determining relationship between that life and its material environment, and between the various parts included in that life itself. It is a sufficiently huge claim for sociology to say that sociology is ethics. But one cannot look upon the task just stated without seeing that sociology of this fundamental sort, if it is anything valid, must be scientific ethics *and also much more besides.* The descriptive analysis of social life and of the types of interrelationship by which its

content is determined apply to the elucidation, not only of those differences in human experience considered as *an end* which are designated by the terms "good" and "evil," and to the evolution of those judgments and sentiments as to human conduct considered as *a means* which constitute the varying conscience codes of different peoples, determining what they regard as "right" and "wrong," but they apply also to the evolution of languages, religions, governments and laws, economic wants and practices, esthetic arts, and plays and ceremonies.

Thus the Australian's code for dividing a kangaroo with his relatives, American football and baseball, trial by jury, monogamy, baptism by immersion, a vocabulary, or any other social reality, have all had a social evolution *to which the same principles of explanation are applicable.* Geographic conditions mold religion and morality as well as government and household arts.[2] The biological traits of a population have a bearing upon all divisions of their life. The invention of the spinning jenny or the printing press has moral and political, as well as economic, consequences. Imitation is as potent in shaping religious rites as in determining the pronunciation of words. Tastes for art and games radiate just as moral sentiments do. Suggestion, imitation, and sympathetic radiation operate in the political, economic, religious, artistic, linguistic, and ethical realm, and in each depend for growth or decline of their efficiency upon competition between the prestige of the venerable and prestige of the novel, prestige of the mob and prestige of the *élite,* and prestige of half a score of types familiar to the soci-

[2] Compare Chapter III entitled "Geographic Causes and Their Social Effects," in the writer's *Introduction to the Study of Sociology.*

ologist. Social elements of every sort adjust themselves to the preëxisting social order or reconstruct it according to the same recognized methods of assimilation and accommodation, and survive or disappear by virtue of the same selective and eliminating agencies. The stubbornness of unreasoning custom is explicable by the same analysis, whether in religion, popular science, language, morals, politics or economic wants, and arts. And if in one of these fields there is more of custom and in another more of fashion and in another more of rational institution, these differences are problems for explanation which exhibit variations in the application of *constant principles that hold good for all social phenomena.*

If geography develops "social geography" until the conditioning relations of natural physical environment to social life are thoroughly explored; if psychology develops social psychology until it brings within its purview prevalent opinions, social valuations—economic, esthetic, and ethical—and such typical social concretes as fashions, customs, and institutions and analyzes them into their essential and characteristic psychic elements, and traces in detail the types of conditioning relations between the activities of associates; if economics becomes more psychological as well as more historical, and if it extends the study of consumption so far as to observe the social effects of the different forms, amounts, and distribution of wealth; if political science also becomes far more psychological and adequately studies the rise and play of interests which is the soul of political movements and studies the correlation between political opinions, sentiments, and activities and all the *other* elements in social life; if history avails itself of the results achieved by

the completer social psychology and social geography as well as those of physical anthropology, and if each of these social sciences observes how far *the very types of conditioning which operate within its field of inquiry operate in all the others,* then it may be that all the things of which sociologists feel the need will have been done in a fragmentary and scattered way,[3] *except one,* and that there will then remain no task for sociology, except the task of a scientific, as contrasted with a merely speculative, ethics. There will still be as real a need of ethics as of economics or of political science or of history, and by that time all of the enlightened world will realize that *the ethics needed must be a study of objective reality*— of the facts of social life.

By the time that sociology can be ethics and nothing else every social scientist will have become a sociologist; that is to say, he will be on guard against the perversion or inadequacy in his explanations that might result from the narrowing kind of specialization, and above all he will take account of those more fundamental principles of analysis and explanation which apply to all social realities. For the present sociology aims, *first,* to develop and emphasize those essential principles of description and explanation which are common to all the subdivisions of social reality, but which students engrossed with the special aspects of a single subdivision of social reality have largely overlooked, though they are essential to the explanation of every social reality, economic, political, ethical, religious, artistic, or linguistic; and, *second,*

[3] On the disadvantages of separating among diverse sciences the contributions to the one task of explaining social life, see an article by the writer entitled "Sociology, Geography, Psychology" in the *American Journal of Sociology,* xiv. 371.

sociology aims to extend the scientific spirit to that particular division of social reality which is the field of ethics.

Thus, sociology, in its more fundamental or scientific aspect, deals with two classes of problems: one, general, a search for those principles of explanation and evolution which apply to all divisions of social life; the other, specific, and applying only to ethics. Speaking figuratively of these two classes of problems, we may say that the first relates to the *terminus ab quo* and the second to the *terminus ad quem* of the life man lives in society. The first, in other words, asks how are the social realities caused; the second, in what good or evil do they issue. Adequate study of either of these two sets of problems involves the other. Description of human life for purposes of causal explanation would leave out the most distinctive facts if it omitted reference to good and evil, joy and pain, as features in the description; and ethics, the specific study of good and evil, becomes scientific only as a result of knowledge concerning those methods of causation which apply to good and evil as well as to all the other elements of social life.

The first fundamental problem of ethics, What is good? can be answered only by actual human experience. The other fundamental question, What is right? can be answered only by knowledge of the effects of different forms of social conduct on human experience. The supplementary question, What is the nature and origin of the different moral codes? is wholly a problem in social evolution.

The study of ethics here discussed is neither sentiment nor *a priori* speculation. It is a matter-of-fact research.

Nothing here contained is intended to voice the absurd claim that sociologists are more ethical than other men, nor to admit the imputation that sociologists are more sentimental than other scientists. What is meant is this: that sociologists are to study human life in its broadest and most fundamental aspects, and that the facts pertaining to human life contain the only satisfactory answers to the problems of ethics. One by one, the sciences have gone over from the realm of preknowledge, the realm of philosophy and metaphysics in the bad *a priori* sense, to the realm of philosophy in the good sense of ever-widening *interpretative correlation of facts.* Before the beginning of the intellectual movement, which is identified with the names of Comte and Spencer, the study of human life, most of all in its religious and ethical aspects, had been mainly of the bad *a priori* kind. The work of Comte was the great original [4] protest against the assumption that the philosopher had no need of facts beyond those which chanced to come within the compass of his knowledge. The work of Spencer, tentative and partly erroneous as it was, at least set the example of reliance upon an extensive and carefully gathered body of facts about the life of people in every continent and in every stage of progress.

Spencer [5] carefully pointed out that thought about human life does not escape from perverting "biases" without the most determined loyalty to facts. Until men derive their views of life from wide knowledge of facts, as a rule they cannot do otherwise than adopt such

[4] "Original" is a relative term, as "great" is.

[5] *The Study of Sociology,* c. viii-xii; *cf.* also P. G. Hammerton, *The Intellectual Life,* Part II, Letter 3, on "The Supreme Virtue for the Intellectual Life."

notions as are furnished by the groups to which they belong and as suit their own bent and interest. The result of this is the antithesis of scientific.

The bias that has most seriously and most constantly perverted thought about life is not one of those which Spencer specifically enumerates. It is bias in favor of the thinker's adopted life-policy. Life itself is guided by thoughts about life. We depend, not only for guidance, but also for motive and power, upon a few concepts and valuations. These are our most indispensable practical possessions. Moreover, the serious and right-minded person prizes his world-view not alone for the sake of the guidance, motive, and sense of worth which it gives to his own life; he prizes it also as being equally important to society.

A man can more easily see any other ideas called in question than those which compose his world-view or life-policy. As to whether light is a substance or a mode of motion, he has no preference to outweigh his desire to know the truth. He might even bear to find that his political party was in the wrong and its traditional opponent in the right, or that his section or country had been guilty of bigotry and misguided zeal. But he clings to his world-view. It is the foundation upon which his life and being are built. His eyes cannot see nor his mind appraise facts that call it in question, unless indeed he has an honesty and courage that outride any tempest of doubt and despair.

But although all serious-minded men may equally cherish the different opinions that form the foundations of their life-policies, yet not all have been equally right in these opinions. Men can live and even live nobly by

a false theory and may be willing nobly to die for it. A theory that is incongruous with facts is a perilous basis on which to found our valuations and our purposes —a foundation likely at any moment to be destroyed and to leave the believer bereft and engulfed.

To attack either the general causal problems or the specific ethical problems of life in a scientific spirit threatens the world-view of most persons. Especially, to attack the problems of the causation of human life implies that life is part of the realm of cause and effect instead of belonging to a separate realm of "freedom" lying outside the otherwise universal nexus of causation. And the usual conceptions of freedom and responsibility must be called in question and perhaps reformulated or even abandoned, as the results of investigation may determine.

At this point is illustrated the truth that the intellectual movement called sociology may produce significant results, not only in so far as it brings to light new facts or recondite principles, but by merely looking at familiar facts in a scientific spirit, for we have winced from viewing many of the most familiar facts of life in that open-minded way. If the principles of causation or conditioning which apply to individual and social life should prove in their main outline to be rather simple and obvious as soon as we are willing to look for them, yet to learn to look at them as true principles of causation and to adjust our system of thought and action accordingly may be both theoretically and practically one of the most momentous of all results of the scientific spirit and method.

If investigation of sociology's general problem, the

problem of social causation, seems to threaten destruction of the accepted world-view, there already is promise that investigation of the special problems of ethics by the sociological method will prove to be constructive of a modified world-view not less adapted to afford guidance, motive, and worth to life, having the incalculable advantage over the old world-view of being impregnable to any attacks by incongruous facts, and requiring no blinking of the clear eyes of intellectual honesty.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURAL SCIENCE VIEW OF SOCIAL LIFE

The assumption of causation is the major premise of science. To science, nature is an all-inclusive system; that is, whatever we can observe or know is a part of the order of nature, each pebble or blade of grass, each wavelet on lake or sea, the path of every snowflake in January, every act or thought of man is an item, itself more or less simple or complex, in the course of nature. *So far as we can observe* each item in the course of nature appears when, and where, and as it does, because of its relations to the other items in the course of nature. Whatever may be true of ultimate causation, lying behind all phenomena, of it science as such can say nothing. So deep our observation does not penetrate. From such ultimate causation the scientist utterly abstracts. With it, as a scientist, he has nothing to do. To him, as a scientist, the word causation means nothing but the *conditioning* of phenomena by each other.

Men have believed and many still believe that our own acts and thoughts are exceptions to the rule of natural causation, that they issue *de novo* from a creative spring in every human breast, that they are called by the fiat of volition out of nothing, and issue into the world without ancestry, owing their existence to no antecedent facts. According to that view the acts and thoughts of persons

are not a part of the order of nature, as conceived by scientists and above defined, but constitute a separate order of reality; and the world of our observation is therefore divided into two parts, the realm of *natural causation* and the realm of *personal activity.*

Savages assign most events to personal activity, but with the progress of knowledge the realm of recognized causation has constantly expanded. The savages, knowing nothing of gravitation, the movements of the earth, and other essential facts of nature, think that the volition of unseen persons makes the river flow, the wind blow, the sun rise and set, and the changing seasons come and go. If one dies from a club blow on the head, they say he who dealt the blow is the killer. If another dies of unseen and undreamed-of microbes, they say an unseen person is the killer.[1] Only simple and obvious causal sequences are recognized by such savages as natural; all other events the causation of which is inscrutable to crude observation are regarded as "supernatural." If men at this stage of mental advancement have seen one of their number do anything that exceeded the deeds of his companions, they have been wont to say that the man has done it only in part, and has been aided by an unseen helper. The blacksmith who could do with hard iron what other men could not was long supposed to be in league with a spirit. It has seemed to man that he was at every turn in contact with unseen personalities.

As extending knowledge has pushed back the frontier of the unexplained, the area of the supernatural, in that ancient sense, has been diminished until now all material

[1] Even to-day death, except in old age, is very commonly regarded as a Divine taking off.

events are, by most educated people, regarded as "natural," in the sense of being caused by antecedent items in the course of nature. Yet the old dualism between that which is caused and that which is done is so far maintained in thought that the activities of men are still generally regarded as external to the course of nature—to the domain of the mutual causation of phenomena. Thus it is that people commonly restrict the term "natural sciences" to those sciences which deal with material phenomena. But according to the view here proposed, sociology should be a natural science; and man should see himself as standing in the midst of the order of nature, his own life a part of nature's process, caused and causing.

There need no longer be any dualism between things caused and things done; all things observed by man, including his own thoughts and acts, are *caused,* in the sense that they appear to issue out of their interrelationship with the conditioning facts of nature. And it is possible to believe that all things observed by man are also done, in the sense that they all are manifestations of all-pervading power or powers from whose continuous operation all phenomena proceed.

There is no science, in the complete sense of that word, without explanation; and there is no explanation except causal explanation. But causal explanation does not mean ultimate metaphysical explanation, which to man is inaccessible; it means tracing the relation of the phenomena to be explained to the phenomena by which they were conditioned. If sociology is to be, in any complete sense, a science, it must be a "natural" science; that is, it must explain the character and prevalence of social

activities by referring them to their causal conditions.

Wundt expresses the truth thus: "The method of the psychological sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), as well as that of the natural sciences, should of course be empirical in the sense that it sets out to ascertain, in the first place, the facts of experience, and in the second place, their relation with each other, the latter of which should satisfy our need of logical explanation without anything being added to the facts, a proceeding which can find in this need (of logical explanation) no sufficient justification."[2]

And Ratzenhofer says: "Whether sociology can take its place as science depends upon its being brought within the bounds of the Natural Unity, which can be done only in case 'all phenomena are referred to the unchangeable characteristics of a permanent Substance,' and effort is made to end the antithesis between the realm of Nature and the realm of the Soul." [3]

The scientist seeks to know those conditions without the concomitance or preëxistence of which phenomena of the kind he studies do not appear, and by the modification of which phenomena of the kind he studies are correspondingly modified.

The word "sociology" celebrates the thoroughgoing adoption of the scientific method in the study of human life. We cannot wholly explain any given individual life; for to do so would require us to distinguish all the causal conditions affecting it by an analysis not only qualitative but quantitative. But we can recognize

[2] Wilhelm Wundt, *Methodenlehre, Zweite Abtheilung*, 54, Second Edition, Stuttgart, 1895.
[3] *American Journal of Sociology*, xi. 26.

qualitatively many kinds of causes that affect many lives, and can compare the variations of a given cause with the variations of its characteristic effect in many lives so as to arrive at an approximate estimate of its importance to the general weal. Human experience is not an exception to the law of cause and effect, but simply the most intricate exhibition of it.

It is useless and self-contradictory for a theologian to argue that conscious acts and material things cannot cause each other because of being so different in kind. If that were true, how could he hold that the conscious act of a Creator caused the material universe? To deny the mutual causation of conscious acts and material things is to assume an ultimate dualism.

However, we are not concerned with creation or with ultimate causation or metaphysical monism or pluralism but only with the fact that as a matter of observation conscious acts and material things do cause each other in the only sense in which the word cause is used by science; and as to whether they do cause each other, *in this sense,* observation is the sole witness.

The clock strikes the half hour. I am reminded of my next duty, and thereupon suspend my writing and start for my lecture room. The characteristic function, use, and *raison d'être* of consciousness results from these two facts: First, that consciousness *is conditioned* by material antecedents, the striking of clocks, words, signs, houses, trees, and all external things that man must understand and act upon; and second, that consciousness *conditions* results in the material world by which signals are obeyed, trees are chopped down, houses built, associates conciliated, and their actions organized, and all else is done that

man must do to live. Susceptibility to external stimulation (which is to say, susceptibility to external causation) and reaction (which is to say, the causation of effects in the external world) are the functions of the mechanism of consciousness. Indeed all biological functioning is reducible to one formula: Stimulation and response. It appears in the awakening of seeds and buds in spring, in the pulsations of the amœba by which it secures its food and escapes that which would destroy it. With increasing differentiation and complexity nature builds into higher and higher organisms greater numbers of structures each susceptible to its appropriate stimulus and reacting with its appropriate response. Thus, we swallow and wink, and breathe, the heart beats, the glands secrete, the instincts are excited and prompt us to action.

In the brains of the highest animals, including man, minuteness and intricacy go to lengths which it is as hard to believe and understand as it once was for men to believe in the rotation and revolution of the earth and the distances that separate us from the stars. Space, so to speak, extends inward to microscopic minuteness as far as it extends outward to telescopic vastness.[4]

So far as we know, animal life blossoms into individual consciousness only after the development of rather highly organized nervous systems. It is only when consciousness accompanies the issuance of action out of apparently possible alternatives that we call the action "choice." But the same purpose is served and often the same appearance is presented to the observer

[4] Recall not only the functioning of the brain but also the facts of heredity, by which all the organs of the body, bearing the particular traits of ancestors, result from determiners present in two germ cells, that from the male ancestor being microscopic in size.

by the issuance of responses out of alternative stimulations on the part of animals without developed brains or apparent consciousness. Even the decapitated frog, after failing with the first response, will "pause as if for deliberation," and then another ganglion in his spinal cord will function in what appears to be a maturer decision. And the acts of man himself are not always accompanied by consciousness; indeed a great proportion of his habitual conduct is purely automatic, including determination between alternative courses. It seems to be primarily when there is friction or a hitch in the process that the choice between alternatives is accompanied by consciousness. Apparently consciousness helps us over the hitch.

Developed brains retain the tendency to repeat past responses. Such brains have a mass of cells unspecialized until they get special tendencies and connections as results of past functioning. These special tendencies to repeat former responses and to set up former connections are the physical aspect of what we call memory and habit. As a result of these acquired tendencies to the renewal of former activity our actions result not only from existing external stimuli, but also in part from the inwardly revived stimulations of the past. Present incitations and the renewal of past stimulations unite, when congruous, to establish a tension toward the corresponding response. And when contrasting stimulations, awakening opposing tensions, arrive simultaneously, either directly out of the present or indirectly out of the past, then there necessarily results either suspense and inaction or "choice."

There are some who argue that free action differs from caused action in this, that free action reaches toward the future instead of being determined by the past. They say that the act of brushing away a fly from my face is caused by a tickling sensation, and may be as automatic as the act by which the frog with brain severed from the spinal cord brushes away an irritant, but that if I drive away a fly that has not yet alighted on my face it is a free act performed in anticipation of a tickling sensation that has not yet been felt.[5] This is an error. The act is caused by the past in the latter case as truly as in the former. The fly that approaches my face would not be driven off *in order to avoid*[6] a tickling sensation if no such sensation had ever been felt. Past ticklings have left an effect upon my brain. The approaching fly awakens memories of these past ticklings and the mental state thus produced causes the movement by which I drive away the approaching fly. Every psychic state that issues in action is caused by past evolution of our structure and by past or present experiences or more frequently by both past and present experiences. Hopes and fears are caused by the past as truly as memories. Every mental state that issues in action is caused by past and present facts, not by facts that are yet to be. Thoughts of the future exist only in the present, and as results of the past. Consciousness is the burning point where our past becomes our future. No atom of all its light and heat and power is derived from the future.

[5] This figure of the fly is employed by an advocate of the view criticized.

[6] When the act has no conscious purpose but is purely instinctive or reflex it is a result, not merely of the past experience of the individual, but of the past evolution of the species.

All my present fears and purposes would be as they are if by a divine fiat the next moment were to plunge the universe into blank annihilation.

Those who believe that thoughts and actions issue uncaused out of the human will are forced by the obvious facts and practical necessities of life at the same time to act upon the opposite view. The man who hurries to bring important news believes that it will produce an effect upon the thoughts and acts of those who receive it as truly as the man who pours a reagent into a bottle believes that the reagent will produce an effect. The man who places signals along a railroad track believes that they will produce effects in the thoughts and acts of engineers as truly as those who place cogs and cams in a machine believe that they will produce effects in the operation of the mechanism. Those who preach and those who advertise believe that they will produce effects in the thoughts and desires and deeds of other men. All "social control" and all attempts to make "a better world" of human conduct and experience are based upon the fact, and the practical recognition of the fact, that the thoughts and words and acts of men are included in the realm of orderly causation.

We reveal our practical acceptance of the fact of the causation of psychic phenomena in our common speech: We say, "If I had known, if I had seen, if I had heard —I should have done," and what we see and know is caused by that which arrives by eye and ear and other senses. We see and hear only what comes within the range of our vision and our hearing. We are dependent for the character and the fact of our ideas, sentiments

and deeds upon the environment that affects us. Helen Keller, with all her gifts, declared that she "had no soul" till she was seven years old, when external causes began to play an increasing part in her life. The wild barbarians who roamed the forests of northern Europe two thousand years ago could not be Christians, for they had never heard of Christ, they could not live the life led by their cultured descendants to-day although, if anthropologists are right, they were as well endowed by nature as the present generation, for the individual is not free so to outstrip the society into which he is born. To be born and reared in the environment afforded by an inland village in China, remote from all the ideas of the Occident, would necessarily result in a widely different course of life from that which would result from birth and rearing in Paris or London, though all other conditions of individual possibility were the same. Environment and history make one division of the western Slavs Catholic and another Protestant. The child of a Harvard professor and of "Blinky Morgan" in the criminal milieu of the slums, are affected by different, but equally potent, causes. A single word of another "makes one angry." The touch of a single noble life may result in conversion. Manifestation of the fiercest of the passions is subject to variations due to local causes which are as unmistakable as the variation in the wheat crop on different soils. "With quite as much certainty as the Chancellor of the Exchequer calculates the average income of his budget a few months in advance, can the statistician predict the number of illegitimate births which will occur for years to come," and that in one county of

Great Britain and Ireland they will be twice as many as in another, and ten times as many as in another.[7]

But environment is only one factor. Heredity sets the limits within which psychic responses are possible, for activities of consciousness are responses to stimulation by an inherited mechanism. Heredity denies certain careers but leaves others open and accessible. The course of life is affected not only by the inherited character of the brain, but also by the degree of inborn strength and vitality, and by the character of every important organ of the body. To have been born with an inactive thyroid gland would have made Napoleon a loafer.

Moreover, early responses to environment modify the psychic mechanism and add to its strictly inborn possibilities and limitations. Of this fact the fortunately reared take advantage in learning habits and skills, and in all education. To impair or derange the psychophysical mechanism diverts the course of consciousness. A blow on the head, so far as we can observe, interrupts or terminates the conscious processes. A cup of tea or a glass of whisky alters their character. A toxin from disease or a drug causes raving and hallucinations. Health and sickness of the body condition our thoughts and deeds, both obviously and also in subtler and less

[7] To a thousand births the number of illegitimate births in eleven successive years in two English counties was as follows:

Shropshire	76, 80, 82, 79, 74, 85, 91, 82, 81, 80, 82
Surrey	37, 38, 42, 38, 39, 41, 44, 41, 41, 40, 43

During the same eleven years the number of illegitimate births per thousand births in all Ireland varied *between 23 and 29* and in County Mayo averaged *between 5 and 6*. For the purposes of this argument it matters not whether these local variations are due to the heredity of the people or to the influence of the Catholic Church and other environmental causes. The quotation and statistics are from Leffingwell: Illegitimacy, 8, 15, 28.

obvious ways. Pulmonary consumption makes men sweet-tempered and hopeful, diabetes makes them morose. Even the weather affects our thoughts and feelings as truly as drugs or stimulants. There are summer crimes and winter crimes, and even for so intimately personal an act as suicide the statistics of prevalence show a regular seasonal rise and fall.[8]

Sociology, including sociological ethics, if it is to adopt the scientific method, if it is to proceed, not by *a priori* speculation but by the investigation of facts, is forced to be a "natural" science, a science, that is to say, that has for its business the explanation of a special class of facts that constitute its problems, by reference to other facts as their causes or conditions. The dualism between what is caused and what is done has vanished, or is vanishing as fast and as far as knowledge advances. Practical endeavor has always been forced to deny that dualism, and even theory, cannot continue to affirm it without self-contradiction and blindness.

[8] "Nothing apparently is more clearly proved than that the tendency to suicide in every country in Europe regularly increases from the end of winter until July, and then slowly declines. . . . *Without exception*, that period of the year when the suicidal impulse is *least* felt occurs during winter when cold, hunger, and destitution are generally most severely felt." Leffingwell, *The Influence of the Seasons Upon Conduct*, 92, 93.

CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF WILL

Notwithstanding the seasonal fluctuation in statistics of suicide, mentioned at the close of the last chapter, hot weather does not by itself cause suicide in Europe, nor does the coming of the opium crop by itself cause waves of suicide in China, for no one thing alone causes a psychic act, not even disease or inborn genius or the appeal of an evangelist or the cry of fire or the sight of a lion in the path. The causation is always complex and involves various elements included in the inborn and acquired capacity for response and in the past and present environments. It is because no *one* thing is the adequate explanation of a psychic act that it is possible to think that it is uncaused. But a result is no less truly caused because its causation is so complex. Not human conduct alone, but all the phenomena of *life,* even vegetable life, depend upon combinations of conditions that are highly complex, and psychic phenomena are the highest of the phenomena of life and their causation is the most complex and therefore the most obscure of all. One half of that which we call our sense of freedom is our inability to discern the causes out of which our actions issue.

If we confine ourselves to what observation reports, refraining alike from materialism and from idealism and

from every mere metaphysical assumption, then we say that the phenomenon which in daily life we call an idea or a thought is closely related to what the physiologist and psychologist call a neurosis, so that a blow on the head that stops the neural functioning interrupts the thought.[1] Moreover, what we call a voluntary act is always the expression of an intention or idea or thought. Certain psychologists quoted below hold that thoughts go over into action directly, "that consciousness is in its very nature impulsive," [2] that thoughts are a concsious aspect of a motor process. It may be true, on the other hand, that thoughts are afferent rather than efferent, that they are the income that prompts the motor outgo, and that thoughts are motor only by virtue of waking up and calling into play some instinct or habit, some waiting motor apparatus. Important as this distinction is in some connections, it does not lessen the causal efficiency of ideas, but only reveals the complexity of the apparatus of conscious action, and the quotations may be read in the light of this comment. "Volition consists in the self-realization of an idea." [3] "The popular notion that mere consciousness,[4] as such, is not essentially a forerunner of activity, that the latter must result from some superadded will force, is a very natural inference from those special cases in which we think of an act for an indefinite length of time without the action's taking place.

[1] In ordinary life we are unaware of our neuroses and of that which the Freudians call the "unconscious." When we speak of our ideas, our feelings, and our acts, we practice a kind of metonomy, naming a complex total by that element in the total which at the time concerns us, namely, the part of the process which is conscious.

[2] James, *Psychology*, ii. 526.

[3] F. H. Bradley, *Mind*, January, 1902, 2, note.

[4] "Consciousness" simply means ideas and feelings.

These, however, are cases of inhibition by antagonistic thoughts. When the blocking is released we feel as if an inward spring were let loose, and this is the additional impulse or fiat upon which the act effectively succeeds." [5] "It may be remarked in passing that the inhibition of a movement no more involves an express effort or command than its execution does. Just as the bare presence of one idea prompts a movement so the bare presence of another idea will prevent its taking place." [6] An idea of an action that is unimpeded by any contradictory idea is for observation the last step in the causation of that action. Some people do not dare to go on high towers, walls, or precipices, because the very horror of the thought of falling makes that thought so absorb attention as to drive out inhibiting ideas to such an extent that they feel that the dreadful idea is in danger of getting complete possession of their attention, and that, they realize, would cause the act.

Ideas of action that are accompanied by judgments of preference and approval hold our interest and attention more strongly on account of those reënforcing mental states. More often than not the propulsion of ideas thus reënforced triumphs over inhibiting ideas incongruous with our preference and approval. We expect our approved ideas to go over into action unless we are aware of some conflicting idea. We recognize the carrying of approved ideas into execution as the test of our practical efficiency. To admit that an idea of action is definitely preferred and its execution anticipated so that its execution or non-execution will be a test of our prac-

[5] James, *op. cit.*, ii. 526.
[6] *Ibid.*, ii. 527.

tical efficiency is to will the act. The functioning of approved ideas in action in spite of other promptings, which on the whole do not have the sanction of practical judgment, is what we call the exercise of our will. "The difference between a voluntary and involuntary exertion lies in the latter's being conditioned only by the immediate sense impressions, while the former is conditioned by stored sense impressions and the conceptions drawn from them," [7] that is, by judgments of preference and approval resulting from past experience and reflection. "When the exertion is at once determined by the immediate sense impression we do not speak of will, but of reflex action, habit, instinct, etc. Will, when we analyze it, does not appear as the first cause in a routine of perception, but merely as a secondary cause, or intermediate link in the chain. The 'freedom of will' lies in the fact that exertion is conditioned by our own individuality, that the routine of mental processes which intervenes between sense impression and exertion is perceived physically neither by us nor by any one else, and psychically by us alone." [8]

As one part of our "sense of freedom" is our unawareness of the subtle psychophysical causation behind our deeds, so the second part of it is the fact that while we can be simultaneously conscious of opposing ideas, either of which might issue in action, normally those ideas do issue in action which we definitely prefer. Negatively, our sense of freedom is the absence or incompleteness of realization of the causal process that leads to our act; positively, it is consciousness of our own preference and

[7] K. Pearson, *Grammar of Science* (3d ed.), i. 124.
[8] *Ibid.*

practical approval for the chosen act accompanied by the expectation that the approved act will follow. As a matter of fact, our approval and adoption of the anticipated act is itself caused and is one item in the complete causation of the act.

Our sense of "exerting our will" is strongest when motivation by established judgments is opposed to that of ideas which arouse some emotionally urgent habit or instinct. Instinctive impulse excited by a present object affords the more primitive type of motivation, but judgments based on past experience have power to summon other instincts or organic tendencies to compete with the instinct that is excited by the present object.

"The term will is simply a convenient appellation for the whole range of mental life viewed from the standpoint of its activity and control over movement." "There is no specific mental element to be called will, because all states of consciousness are in their entirety the will." [9] What I have spoken of as "the idea that moves us to action" and "that functions in our deed" should be described not merely as one idea, one single element in consciousness, but rather as the net total of consciousness at the time of beginning to act, including the thoughts of the possible actions considered, and all the thoughts, pro and con, about them and their consequences, and also the feelings by which those thoughts are accompanied, and which emphasize in consciousness the presence and the kind of each urgent thought. Moreover, the action that starts is influenced even by some elements that are not in consciousness, for the thoughts

[9] James Rowland Angel, *Psychology*, 437. New York, 1908.

that have recently been in mind leave for a time a set in the organism which gives a bent to action, after the memory of these thoughts has ceased to be acute enough to keep a place in consciousness in competition with the clamorous instigations of the moment.[10] From the point of view of biological function and moral conduct, the whole neural mechanism and also the consciousness issuing from it, in all its phases, exist and were evolved to determine action. This is true equally of the simplest instincts and of those effects of past experiences and reflective states which we call judgments or ideals. What these adopted judgments and preferences or "ideals shall be for any one of us depends in part upon the sort of tendencies we have inherited and in part upon the forces of our social and physical environment." [11]

"When will triumphs over temptation, what checks our impulses is the mere thinking of reasons to the contrary—it is their bare presence to the mind which gives the veto, and makes acts otherwise seductive impossible to perform." [12] "If we could only *forget* our scruples, our doubts, our fears, what exultant energy we should for a while display!" [13] Willing is simply the presence of an idea in the mind in the absence of any countervailing or inhibiting idea. "With the presence once there as a fact, of the motive idea the *psychology* of volition properly stops. The movements which ensue are exclusively physiological phenomena, following according to

[10] May I ask the reader to compare the section on "The Subconscious Set" in my book, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, 298.
[11] Angel, *op. cit.*, 437.
[12] James, *Psychology*, ii. 560.
[13] *Ibid.*

physiological laws upon the neural events to which the idea corresponds." [14]

But it is not always the preferred idea that realizes itself. "To will—that is to approve—is often present with us but how to do we find not." The unthreatened dog marches head up to his meat, but the trained dog skulks as he seizes the joint from the kitchen table, the thought of escaping a dreaded beating half realizes itself in cowering and flight even while he steals. So in man, at times, acquired scruples only half restrain him, while the unapproved thought, in line with habit or inborn tendency, grips his organism and controls his response. The wayward impulse tends to make us "forget our scruples." "Our scruples" are ideas that were not inborn but that have been gained by experience and instruction, and the promptings of these acquired ideas often oppose the instinctive tendencies which are aroused by the immediate occasion.

When engrossing ideas suggested by the occasion, actually make us "forget our scruples," it is an illustration of the principle that thoughts are activities, and like other activities are inhibited by incongruous psychic states or prompted and impelled by congruous ones. Since ideas prompt thinking, as well as other forms of activity, therefore ideas concerning the importance of certain thoughts stimulate the neural tensions and explosions out of which those important thoughts arise into consciousness, and thus ideas that we believe to be important tend to force themselves into attention and wrestle with the promptings of impulse and passion.

[14] *Ibid.*

And even if, at times, the passionate thought partly or wholly inhibits the ideal thought and we "forget ourselves," as soon as the impulse is satisfied and silenced, the important thought begins again to function and plague us with remorse. A good will is the functioning of an organism in which the motivation of judgments and intentions that have grown out of past experience and reflection is powerful enough to regulate impulses instigated by the appeal of present environment.

Some say that there is in our activity both an element of causation and one of freedom. These sometimes specify that we are free within limits set by our environment; we are not free to swim where there is no water, nor to live lives utterly incongruous with our natural or social surroundings. Or they say we are free within limits set by our heredity; we are not all free to write like Shakespeare, nor to compose like Beethoven, nor to live lives for which our capacities and traits have no adaptation. But when we see in one synthetic view all that observation reveals we say: One factor in the causation of our course of action is found in external conditions; another is heredity; and a third proximate cause in habit, judgment, principle—the stored results of our past experience and reflection. The activity of each hour is the resultant that issues from the meeting of these three: hereditary capacity, the effects of past activity and experience, and external occasion. We may believe in another inexplicable uncaused factor that comes down upon the situation and turns the resultant in this direction or in that. But observation cannot discover it, nor the need of it to fill out the explanation. If so, then science has no justification for holding to such a notion.

What then does the word freedom mean to the determinist? It means *power to achieve ends approved by our own intelligence.* "Of course, if we should ask the psychologist whether this unfree and that free action stand in different relations to the psychological and physiological laws, he would answer only with a smile. If the perceptions, associations, feelings, emotions, and disposition are all given, the action must necessarily happen as it does. The effect is absolutely determined by the combination of causes; only the effect is a free one, because those causes lay within us." [15] Human conduct is of two types which by degrees merge into each other. The first may be called fractional response, or peripheral control, and is unfree; the second may be called total response, or central control, and is free.

Fractional response takes place when an idea directly occasioned by the environment is the immediate cause of an action. This was illustrated when the absent-minded bacteriologist drank the glass of water in which he had just washed his grapes to remove the microbes. The idea occasioned by the perception of the water standing there prompted the habitual action and he drank. If he had thought, he would not have drunk; but one fraction of his mental apparatus got away from him and functioned without the awakening of the rest. He acted upon the suggestion as automatically as the jumping jack when the string is pulled. Similarly fractional, though the fraction of personality that dominates the action may be less minute than in the last example, is the action of every impulsive, passionate man who does what he would not

[15] Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*, 8. *Cf.* author's *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, 232 *et seq.*

have done "if he had thought," and who has afterward to say, "What a fool I was," whose intentions slumber while instinctive or habitual actions go into execution at the prompting of external suggestion. It is of such a man that Spinoza wrote, "The passionate man is a passive man." One fragment of his nature functions while the rest of his being is as if it were not. Such a man is subject to external or peripheral control and is unfree.

Total response (to use the terms that symbolize the psychological hypothesis involved) is an action which is the resultant of all the ideas stored in memory centers that are connected by association paths with the idea called up by the external stimulus. The man who, in the presence of the external occasion or interest, prompting to an instinctive or habitual act, does not start off like an automaton straight in the direction of that simple impulse, but calls to mind the upshot of all that he knows about the matter, and about the consequences that have followed from such actions in the past, and the intentions previously formed that may be inconsistent with the present prompting, and who does not move in the direction of the first stimulation unless it has the consent of his nature, enriched by its past experience and reflection, exhibits responses which are not fractional but total. The control under which he acts is not peripheral but central. And such a man is free. Such total response is the expression of his "better self." One's better self is his whole, unmutilated self. Any being is free whose actions are the functioning of his own unobstructed and unmutilated organism. "Freedom of will means to him (the psychologist) absence of an outer force, or of pathological disturbance in the causation of our actions.

We are free, as our actions are not the mere outcome of conditions which lie outside of our organism, but the product of our own motives and their normal connections. All our experiences and thoughts, our hopes and fears, coöperate in our consciousness and in its physiological substratum, our brain, to bring about the action." [16]

According to the natural science view, our freedom, negatively considered, is freedom from external control, not the absence of external factors in the causation of conduct but the preponderance of internal factors, the power to resist those solicitations of the passing occasion which are inconsistent with our own established judgments and sentiments. Positively considered, it is the power to execute a definite policy and purpose. Freedom is not liberty to act uncaused, not freedom from oneself, but it is the power of a developed individuality to express itself in action that is not the result of any temporary external condition, but is the result of his own whole past evolution.

Any high degree and quality of freedom has to be developed or acquired. Men differ in the degree of freedom which they have attained. One grows more and more free only in proportion as he accumulates a store of central judgments and approved sentiments and establishes their habitual domination over the promptings of transitory and accidental stimuli. Man is free, in the high and human meaning of that term, only in proportion as his acts are the expression of the rational judgments and appreciative valuations that are stored in his own mind. Freedom, or the power to pursue the ends

[16] Münsterberg, *op. cit.*, 7.

approved by one's own intelligence, exists when one's own approvals issue by natural causation in corresponding conduct.

The individual characterized by partial response and peripheral control is free, if free at all, only in a poor and fractional sense, for he cannot carry out his own good intentions. Each adult has built up a central store of ideas and judgments which are his own, and of which, if he is well organized, his acts are the fitting expression. A well organized *mind* is one in which the items of knowledge do not remain in scattered fragments or unsorted heaps but are analyzed and then connected according to relations that are congruous with the laws of nature as reflected in the laws of thought, and that have meaning for his interests, in the light of general concepts. A well organized *will* is the overt expression of ideas that are not fragmentary and detached, but correlated into general principles of conduct.

As men are born with differing degrees of muscular strength and mental correlation, so also are they born with differing degrees of power and consistency of will. There are geniuses of will as well as geniuses of intellect and of sensibility. Some, therefore, have more freedom than others ever can acquire. Yet all of us, save a very small per cent who are mentally defective or diseased, can be so educated as to fit into some normal place in civilized society and can develop a sufficient degree of the freedom of rational conduct so as to live "steady" lives. Those who cannot require guardianship till death.

Freedom, as above defined, is a perfectly clear concept. It is definable and does not, like causeless freedom,

become indefensible when once defined.[17] On the contrary, it thoroughly corresponds to the facts of human experience. It is the real freedom and no illusion. This definition of freedom, which is clear and unescapable from the scientific point of view, claims for man all that the staunchest defender of causeless freedom is able to formulate in positive terms. The positive definition of freedom (as distinguished from the merely negative statement that human behavior is uncaused) is identical whether given by the determinist or by the voluntarist. Thus Bergson says: "In short, we are free when our acts spring from our whole personality when they express it, when they have that indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds between the artist and his work." [20] And is freedom when seen as the causal resultant of the whole past evolution of a rational being less worthy and dignified and valuable than freedom would be if it existed according to that old illusive notion of freedom which has been clung to in spite of all evidence and at the cost of discrediting the human mind and of denying that for us the words truth and reality have any meaning?

That ancient illusion was that the free act issues *ex nihilo* by a creative fiat of the individual mind and by a different fiat its opposite might have issued just as well.

[17] "Any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism." H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, 220. Translation of T. L. Pogson, London, 1910. "Every attempt to define freedom will open the way to determinism." *Ibid.*, 230.

[18] *Ibid.*, 172. In spite of his admission that no conception of freedom, that includes the idea of causelessness, can be defended, Bergson is at present the most prominent champion of causeless freedom, as will appear in later references to that writer.

According to the natural science view the free act, instead of issuing out of nothing, is the culmination of the whole process of evolution. Up from the ooze the process of biological evolution has mounted through geologic ages until there was achieved the immeasurably intricate organism of man. And social evolution, likewise, from paleolithic time has been compounding out of human experience the moral sentiments, the counsels of prudence, the arts of life, the languages and creeds, that issue in the words and deeds of men. And the life of the individual by a series of subtle reactions between the products of these two evolutions develops preferences, policies, ideals, and habits which in the well-born and well-reared constitute a regulated system of potentiality. Thus, each free act is the culmination of biological and social and individual evolution. It does not issue out of nothing and it could not have been its own opposite. Just as we have abandoned the crude notion that God made man by fashioning him of earth like a child at play and then breathing on him to give him life, and have adopted a far diviner idea of creation, so we may now adopt a less inadequate notion of the free act, the act that carries into execution the approvals of intelligence, the self-conscious birth of man's future out of his own past and the past of the universe.

The principle was noted above that practical judgments prompt not only muscular activity but also, and primarily, neural activity, including the neural activity which underlies thought. Consequently, when we judge that a given course of thought leads toward a painful conclusion, that course of thought is inhibited just as the muscular act of putting the hand into the fire or of

jumping in ice cold water would be. And when we judge that a given course of thought leads toward a pleasurable conclusion, that is, one that is either pleasurable in itself or that is a step toward other pleasurable experience, then that course of thought is prompted as truly as the taking of pleasant food. Our only salvation from a fool's paradise lies, first, in objective facts that are what they are, in spite of all our preferences and dreams, and second, in that the whole mechanism of consciousness, from sensation to reason, functions under the stimulation of facts. Fortunately we have by instinct and predisposition a veritable hunger for facts. But desires for courses of action or states of mind incongruous with the facts often prompt us to shun them, shut our eyes to them, select these for attention and those for neglect.[19] And when we begin to speculate on subjects concerning which objective facts knowable by man are few, then we build up systems of thought that suit us, and to which we therefore cling tenaciously, but to which we are entitled by no sound claim.

Reasonable opinions are as truly caused as unreasonable ones; reasonable opinions are the product of hereditary capacity, together with the facts which are furnished by present occasion and by memory or by adequate testimony. But since we have often strong desires besides the desire for facts and truth, the opinions of men are frequently unreasonable. Even in the presence of new and convincing knowledge they prefer cherished error, they fear to change it, and so it lives on. It is possible that the reader has decided that he will not

[19] As an extreme exhibition of our power to believe what we will in spite of facts witness Christian Science.

believe in a natural science view of social life and individual volition—has decided in the only sense in which man ever decides that he will or will not do anything—except that the reader may not admit that his action is to be caused by his preference.

Because interest is operative in determining the direction of activity in the association paths of the brain, as well as in the innervation of the muscles, therefore it is not enough to say that systems of thought *can* be built up according to the interest of the thinker. It would be nearer the truth to say that it is inevitable that a man's thinking be governed by his interests, that is to say, by his fears or his hopes, except as it is turned this way or that by the facts of observation, interpreted by those laws of thought which themselves are products of the facts to which throughout the race-life man has been compelled to adjust his notions or die.

Because of the effectiveness of judgments of preference felt as interest, desire, or aversion in directing the course of movements within the brain, in all the vicissitudes of historic situation systems of thought and belief have seldom been wanting to sanction the actions approved by the leaders of society. The aptness with which supernatural, metaphysical, political, and economic beliefs have corresponded with the motives evoked by varying situations is matter of observation to the student of comparative sociology. This commonly implies no insincerity even on the part of the leaders of thought who manipulate opinions to their own advantage. It is not that men pretend to believe, but that they actually do believe, that which accords with their preferences and interests. Since the neighbor's thought of his neighbor,

the judge's thought of his case, the voter's thought of his party, the business man's thought of capital and labor, the tempted man's thought of his conduct and his future and his duty, and every man's thought of that for which he really cares is subtly and powerfully drawn toward the conclusions favored by his preferences, therefore it is of the highest importance that the truth-seeking interest should itself be reënforced by a judgment of preference, in order that it may function undeterred by other motives. This is the hard demand of intellectual honesty, and the justification of Hammerton when he wrote that "disinterestedness is the supreme virtue for the intellectual life."

If interest has shown such power to control political and economic beliefs, how can we expect to escape from baseless illusions if we enter upon realms of thought where man is guided, not by observation, but only by tenuous inferences? We live "on a little island of sense and fact in the midst of an ocean of the unknown." While we cannot chart that ocean nor descry its distant islands we are tempted to stand gazing out to sea. To assert that beyond the observation of our finite faculties evolved to fit our conduct to the facts that affect our little lives, there is no reality, would be a colossal assumption of dogmatism. It is just, moreover, to confess that the mind in which the intellectual interest is strong is not free from the urgency of preference. This preference often takes the form of an impatience with vague uncertainties and an impulse to deny the existence of any reality beyond the limits of observation. The mind guided by the prompting of intellectual interest would round off its knowledge with a neat boundary of utter

ignorance rather than see it fade away into a vague horizon of undemonstrable inferences.

The only defense for belief in causeless freedom is the argument that if we only knew more of that which lies beyond our horizon it would reverse the conclusion that is based on all we see, and that since belief in causeless freedom is essential to the worth of life, that fact is a reason strong enough to make us set aside all other reasoning upon the theme. As to this argument three remarks require attention.

First: Whatever is true of faith or philosophy, science cannot be influenced by such an argument. It is the mission of science to carry as far as possible our knowledge of the interrelationships of observable phenomena. The particular business of sociology, as science, is to carry as far as observation and reason warrant the explanation of *prevalent social activities* in terms of causally conditioning phenomena. And sociology may carry this explanation so far as to yield the conclusion that, for science at least, human action, instead of being an exception to the law of causation, and independent of conditions, is in fact of all classes of phenomena the one most intricately inwoven with conditions, the consummate exemplification of the law of causation. It is only by the speculations which overleap the limitations of science that we can take any other view of man's activities.

Second: What is true of science in this respect is true also of the practical conduct of life. Whatever our philosophic creed, we must act as citizens of a realm of cause and effect. By our faculties, developed for practical exercise, and by the necessities of our existence, we are

compelled to act as if human conduct were caused. And if experiment is a test of truth, then this belief concerning our actions and those of our fellow men, if it be not the whole truth, is yet true. Within the limits of observation set by our finite faculties this system of causal relationships regularly and consistently presents itself.

Third: We may therefore inquire, Can it be that in order to make life worth living we must reverse the conclusions of observation and experience and infer that what our faculties disclose to us of life is erroneous and false? Are we justified in inferring such a fundamental and thoroughgoing self-contradiction between observable nature and ultimate reality? *Do we in fact need* the belief in uncaused freedom in order to save the worth of life? Sociology, as science, could leave this question unanswered and rest its case upon the first remark just made but for the fact that sociology, as science, cannot escape the problems of ethics, and must inquire what are the answers to the questions of ethics which reason and observation furnish to the sociologist as he takes a natural science view of life. Sociology, by its investigation, makes the causation of human activity more obvious than ever. It may even render the old doctrine of moral philosophy quite untenable for instructed minds. If so, will this prove their ruin? Would greater ignorance be better for us? Or does the same investigation which renders the assumption of causeless freedom so difficult and so utterly opposed to the scientific interpretation of life, at the same time reveal a sounder basis for ethical value and obligation, and is the ancient assumption of causeless freedom only one more instance in the long list of

cherished dogmas defended at great pains, found at last to have been a needless incubus upon the mind?

The sole argument in favor of the uncaused freedom of man is the argument that no other view will work, that here we must forsake observation for speculation dictated by practical preference or else adopt an unlivable world view. On this ground we may choose to say with Professor James that we simply will not believe so ill of the universe as this.[20]

Says Mr. Balfour: "If naturalism be true, or, rather, if it be the whole truth, then is morality but a bare catalogue of utilitarian precepts; beauty but the chance occasion of a passing pleasure; reason but the dim passage from one set of unthinking habits to another. All that gives dignity to life, all that gives value to effort, shrinks and fades under the pitiless glare of a creed like this." [21] And Eucken adds: "What is it after all which in spite of an accumulation of apparently unanswerable arguments in its favor, again and again causes man to strive beyond determinism? It is the fact that the logical consequence of determinism can be nothing less than the destruction of everything which is characteristic of the spiritual and intellectual life of man." [22]

As a way of escape from the apparent logical necessity of belief in determinism, the world once welcomed the teaching of Kant, who said that, although in the world, as we observe it, all is causal sequence, this must be a mere appearance and all our observation and inference illusion, and that beneath this false appearance there must

[20] James, *Principles of Psychology*, 2.
[21] Arthur James Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*, 77. New York and London, 1895.
[22] Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, 436.

be a world of reality where freedom reigns, that in fact we live in a world of freedom though to all appearance we live in a world in which all our actions issue as the culmination of a causal sequence.[23]

In our own day Bergson comes to the rescue of belief in uncaused freedom stating much the same argument as that of Kant but casting it in the phraseology of modern science. The substance of the teaching on this subject, both of Kant and of Bergson, is contained in two propositions: (1) Says Kant: It is a world of mere illusory appearance and not the world of reality that is presented by sense-perception, and understanding. Therefore we are emancipated from all conclusions that would follow from the exercise of these faculties. Says Bergson: The intellect is evolved in order to enable us to adapt our overt actions to our material environment, but life in its essence is not material, therefore the intellect is not adapted to know life in its essence and the conclusions of reason are not applicable to life itself.[24] (2) But we have an inner light to guide us. This is "practical reason," says Kant; while "perception and understanding" leave us in a world of causation, "practical reason" utters an inner voice in man which still assures him that he is free. It is "instinct" developing into "intuition," says Bergson.[25] Intellect is only a specialization of life adapted to know material things and to develop ideas that accord with the laws which govern material things; but instinct

[23] Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft,* Preface xvi, xxviii, xxx, 7; *Transcendental Dialektik,* 566 *et seq.; Metaphysik der Sitten,* 46 *et seq.,* 93 *et seq.,* 301 *et seq.*

[24] Bergson, *Creative Evolution,* 21, par. 1; 153, 154, 169, *et passim.* This argument is more fully developed in Bergson's *Time and Free Will,* 78, 80, 82, 90, 99, 112, 137, 160, 167, 170 *et seq.*

[25] *Ibid.,* 135-185, especially 143, 151, 165, 168, 176, 177.

is life itself. According to both Kant and Bergson, the belief that perception is illusion and that understanding is blind to the inner meanings of life, does not leave us agnostic concerning that which lies beyond the realm of sense perception; on the contrary, emancipated from the conclusions of understanding and the so-called facts of perception, we are free to adopt a philosophy that arises out of our own inner consciousness. Bergson's emphasis upon "instinct" as a reliable source of assurance for the belief in freedom is slight compared with Kant's emphasis upon intuition, or "practical reason." Bergson's main emphasis is upon the negative argument that we need not believe anything that observation and reason assert concerning our own activity.

Thus Kant and Bergson agree in proposing a device for ridding the mind of the conclusions of observation and understanding in order that it may be free to accept a conclusion that better suits our preferences, and that is supposed to issue from deeper recesses of our consciousness. But they adopt slightly different methods to serve this same end.

According to Kant, time, space, and cause are merely forms of thought which our minds impose upon the world. As seen by us in time and space, phenomena are arranged in causal interrelationship. But he asserts that there is no guaranty that phenomena really exist in time or in space or in causal relationships. These, he says, are merely our modes of thought. Bergson admits that *material* phenomena are actually arranged causally and in space, but asserts that life and action, which are not material, do not exist in space but in time, and that in time there is no causal sequence.

According to Bergson, it is only because we live in a world of material objects arranged in relations of space and causation, and survive by manipulating such objects, that the faculty of reason has evolved as an instrument exclusively adapted to the contemplation of phenomena so arranged, which therefore insists upon regarding our own acts as included in such an arrangement, although in truth they are not so arranged. Hence, says Bergson, reason and science apply only to the material world and not to the facts of life itself. Therefore, he tells us, "we must break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But that is just the function of philosophy." [26]

The defenders of uncaused human freedom agree that reason based on observation leads certainly to belief in determinism, and therefore they undertake to discredit reason and understanding. Both Kant and Bergson tell us we must cease to trust the powers of observation and reasoning in order that we may listen to the voice of "practical reason," "intuition," or "instinct." But are we sure that this does not merely mean we must cease to think reasonably in order that the process of thought may follow the guidance of preference? It may be true that if one can suspend the process of intelligence and listen to the last vague whisper of consciousness he will hear the reassertion of the doctrine of uncaused freedom. But is he sure that what he hears is anything more than the echo of his previous belief, the belief which he had held from earliest childhood, and which has been kept alive by preferences but which the voice of his instructed reason

[26] Bergson, *op cit.*, 30.

contradicts? Will the children of a future generation, adjusted to the world view of the instructed, continue to have "intuitions" and "instincts" of uncaused freedom?

To Kant's doctrine of practical reason which contradicts perception and understanding, and to Bergson's doctrine of instinct and intuition, Eucken adds the doctrine that by actively living upon them we discover the truth or falsity of our ideas. This would prove every vagary by which men have ever continued to comfort or pervert their lives. It is no proof of a "transcendental spiritual" conception if one who powerfully desires to believe it, by drowning critical thought in action and habitually living with his creed is able to "become inwardly superior" to doubt. It is true, however, that the test of action reveals the truth or falsity of ideas that can collide with objective facts. And therefore no rational being can *act* as if the doctrine of unconditioned freedom were true.

If it be true that belief in determinism brings all life's values down in ruin, then let us believe in uncaused freedom, provided we honestly can, on the ground that, our faculties being limited as they are, it is more probable that they mislead us when they teach us to regard our own conduct as part and parcel of the causal consistency of nature, than it is that in a world containing so much of order and reason, so good a thing as man's possibilities of character and experience should only come in sight and never be realized. But we cannot be justified in resorting to so desperate a shift as the repudiation of our own faculties, without first making sure that the conclusion of reason and observation is so mischievous as is alleged, and that the belief adopted in its stead is in fact better

adapted to the needs of life. The vehemence with which the ruinous consequences of unbelief in causeless freedom are set forth reminds one of the zeal with which preachers have insisted upon the perdition that would follow unbelief in the most untenable points of a vanished orthodoxy. And as the church now finds that it can do much better without those impossible doctrines than with them, so it is conceivable that the liberation of thought may go a step further and that we may discover that we can get on better without the doctrine of causeless freedom than with it.

The mind of man has "shied like a frightened horse," from belief in determinism, but when boldly gazed upon and then adopted and put to the test of practice, it may prove better for the purposes of life than the belief in causeless freedom—this is the theorem which we are now ready to examine. Since the only argument for belief that the activities of man are an exception to the apparently universal consistency of nature lies in the supposition that abandonment of that belief will involve us in moral ruin, let us squarely face the question: What would be the ethical consequences of belief in determinism?

CHAPTER VI

THE ETHICAL ADVANTAGES OF A NATURAL SCIENCE VIEW OF LIFE

Belief in the doctrine stigmatized as "determinism" [1] would not change the facts concerning the nature of man. It would not remove from our vocabulary the words "freedom" and "responsibility"; it would only give them an altered meaning. It would give them a definable and intelligible meaning in place of the meaning which, as Bergson expressly admits, cannot be defended after once it has been defined.

As between the working hypothesis of causeless freedom and that of a freedom which is caused, we have in favor of one, all observation and all reason based on observation, in favor of the other nothing but an inveterate preference. The problem of freedom has commonly been regarded as insoluble only because we have preferred not to accept the only rational solution possible.

The question now before us is whether there is reasonable ground for this preference for belief in causeless freedom; whether those practical ethical advantages

[1] This is a dangerous word. Let me beg the reader not to think that I undertake to defend all the connotations that have been given to it or to any other word that has become involved in philosophical controversy, but to hold me responsible for only the ideas which I expressly state or which are inevitably implied in my statements. By determinism I mean simply the doctrine that every phenomenon is conditioned, and that to this our own acts are no exception.

which have been supposed to depend on this belief do in reality depend upon it; whether indeed a preponderance of practical advantage may not follow its abandonment; whether faith in causeless freedom is not one—perhaps the last and highest—of those beliefs which in every field of thought men have formulated in order to serve for practical guidance till knowledge came, but which knowledge replaces with ideas that serve practical needs far better. Thus, faith in incantations to bring rain in deserts preceded irrigation. Thus, the belief that the day could be lengthened to fit the journey by putting a trig in the crotch of a tree to stop the sun preceded clocks and automobiles. Thus, belief in the witch doctor and later in bleeding, blisters, and nostrums was held before the arrival of the bacteriologist and antiseptic surgery. In the material realm we have long ago replaced such creeds with science, for in the material realm creeds, formed to fit subjective wants give way to science formed to fit objective facts far earlier than this exchange is made in the social and ethical realm. In the latter realm men desiring to enlist hopes and fears as motives to goodness long continued to teach with Job's comforters that the righteous always prosper in basket and store while only the wicked suffer boils and losses. Thus, men living in a chaos of disorder under warring chieftains believed in the divine rights of a central monarch, and later, men suffering from the tyrannies of central monarchy believed in the social contract as the historic origin of justified authority. And thus, men knowing little or nothing of the intricate causation of human action and therefore unable to work out any far-sighted program of social control have clung to the doctrine of causeless freedom which

turns some of the elements of psychic causation into the right direction though it forfeits the effectiveness of control that comes only with more adequate comprehension.

A favorite method of preserving faith in any doctrine not easy to defend has been to assure us that without that doctrine we cannot live. Without faith in transubstantiation there is no absolution but only endless torment. Without belief in baptism by immersion there is no washing away of sins. Without faith in the infallibility of the pope, or in the verbal inerrancy of Scripture, there is no assurance of any religious teaching, no guaranty of any plan of salvation. Without belief in causeless freedom there is no motive, no responsibility, no moral worth. But does this method prove anything? People —that is to say, many people—can be induced to believe anything if the *motive* is strong enough though the proof is nil. The part played by this principle in the invention of magic, and other elements of creed, is an essential factor in the explanation of social evolution. Tell sick men that a given faith is their only hope or cure and no absurdity is too monstrous to command belief.

And thus we have been urged to keep our faith in causeless freedom because on it all ethical values and motives depend, and to eschew a natural science view of life because morality, beauty, and even reason itself (*sic!*) lose their characteristic value "under the pitiless glare of a creed like this." Hence, even though this "glare" be the shining of the light of truth we must not look.

We are told that there is no beauty in the rainbow if we cease to believe that "it is painted on the cloud by the hand of God," and think instead that the external realities

are damp cloud and reflected vibration. It is true that to strip away familiar mental associations changes experience. But what if our experience when we look at the rainbow had never been invested with these associations? Do such associations explain the delight of the child in the rainbow? Or does the scientist accustomed to a natural science view of the rainbow and of the clouds and the moon cease to feel the beauty of nature? A thousand times no. When once accustomed to the loss of traditional associations he finds that the beauty of nature is conditioned only by nature and human nature. Likewise, we are told that if moral worth is not the product of causeless freedom the characteristic value of morality is gone, and the difference between a good man and a bad man becomes like the difference between a good lawn mower and a bad lawn mower. Very well, and what is the difference between a good lawn mower and a bad one? One is good and the other is bad *for its purpose.* And what is the purpose of a man? To function well with reference to all those "social values" to be enumerated in our next chapter, which are the elements, and in their union constitute the totality, of human happiness. The difference between functioning well and functioning badly with reference to these values of human life is as great a difference as any moralist can conceive, and so long as human nature endures this difference will evoke our enthusiasms and detestations.

The practical motive for clinging to belief in causeless freedom, the motive for the sake of which we are willing to stultify our own reason, nay, eager to do so, and ready to expend the subtlest ingenuity in devising pretexts for setting aside its conclusions is twofold: First, the fear

that a natural science view of life would destroy *moral values*, that if our acts are caused they have no moral quality, and character no moral worth, that there is then no merit and no sin, no place for praise or blame, reward or punishment; second, the fear that the natural science view would paralyze *motive*, that if our acts are caused there is no incentive to endeavor, that the earnest must sit down in despair saying: "That which is to be will be and we cannot make it otherwise"; and the light-minded will abandon themselves to impulse, saying: "Whatever our negligence or excesses, they are only the inevitable." I propose to consider this twofold objection to the practical effects of a natural science view of life and to show:

1. As to moral values,
   a. That after accepting the natural science view the sense of moral values, of right and wrong in conduct, and good and evil in character would continue;
   b. That reward and punishment would not cease, but would be even more clearly justified and more effectively applied.
2. As to motives to endeavor, that they would be intensified rather than diminished.

1. *a.* The Effect of a Natural Science View of Life on Moral Values

The sense of right and wrong is a feeling reaction. It is the functioning of an inborn predisposition to experience certain feelings of disgust and abhorrence or of admiration and enthusiasm for types of conduct. Our predisposition to moral discrimination and our predis-

position to esthetic discrimination are similar, or, rather, they are fundamentally the same. We have similar reactions toward the morally sordid, corrupt, and mean as toward the physically hideous, and similar reactions toward the morally pure and heroic as toward the physically beautiful and sublime. We express our feelings toward moral and material beauty by many of the same adjectives, and the poet and the preacher evoke and express our moral approvals and repugnances by images of material hideousness and beauty. Beauty and ugliness in the realm of human action differ from beauty and ugliness in the realm of visible objects no more radically than the latter differ from beauty and ugliness in the realm of sound. The identity of nature between the predisposition to esthetic discrimination and the predisposition to moral discrimination further appears in that both are manifestations of a natural adaptation or inborn adjustment to survival and successful life. Sensitiveness to physical beauty and ugliness is one form of adaptation to life in the world of things [2]; sensitiveness to moral beauty and ugliness is the same form of adaptation to life in the world of men. This similarity, or identity, again appears in that while we have a strong inborn tendency to both esthetic and moral preferences and repugnances, just

[2] "Elevation and serenity of mood have a biological value, and it would be dreadful if the aspects of nature were to us harsh and disquieting. We have become at home in our terrestrial habitation. The principle of familiarity is at work to make us at home in any surroundings to which we are long exposed; in a strange environment we miss the result of its gentle ministry and grow homesick, and are deeply moved by one familiar sight. The principle of familiarity is perhaps the most fundamental element in beauty aside from conventionality to which it is not unrelated. But there is also a principle of novelty which helps to make objects beautiful." From the author's *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, 504. In the same passage various other principles of beauty are discussed.

what we shall find preferable and what repugnant, either esthetically or morally, is largely influenced by experience and education. We may prefer the negro or the Mongolian or the Caucasian type of beauty, the array of the Zulu warrior or the current Parisian styles. And similarly, we may approve the moral code of the Thug, patriarchal polygamy, or the "divine institution of slavery." There are certain principles that help to determine what we shall regard as beautiful, for example, harmony, symmetry, and supposed appropriateness to human uses. And there is a principle of moral beauty, namely, that conduct which regards all and disregards none of the values *recognized* as pertaining to our own group or to any member of it, whether our group be a primitive horde or the brotherhood of humanity, seems to us morally good, while an act performed *with knowledge* that it tends to destroy some recognized value pertaining to our group or to a member of it seems to us morally bad and ugly. In either esthetic or moral repugnance and appreciation *the ground of the reaction* in the harmony or disharmony, symmetry or asymmetry, of the object or in the harmfulness or beneficence of the act may be less vivid in consciousness than the feeling reaction. A conventionalized moral sentiment may be vivid in the case of a child or adult who has never thought clearly about the practical judgment underlying that sentiment.

Moral responsibility conceived as blameworthiness or praiseworthiness is liability to favorable or unfavorable emotional reaction; our own emotional reaction, the emotional reaction of our neighbors, and the supposed emotional reaction of God. Now instinctive and conventional emotional reaction and its expression in various

forms of instinctive and conventional punishment and reward serve a valuable purpose in primitive society; and these instinctive and conventional emotional reactions towards human character and conduct would be modified by the adoption of a natural science view of life. But while all esthetic response is modified by education it is not thereby obliterated, instead it is likely to be intensified at many points. Instinctive esthetic feelings toward good and evil conduct, though they would be modified by education, would no more be eradicated by recognizing the fact that good and evil conduct are natural—that is, caused—phenomena than esthetic feelings toward flowers and sunsets are eradicated by our knowledge that flowers and sunsets are natural phenomena.

The emotional reaction which we feel toward character and conduct is not simple but complex. It includes, on the one hand, instinctive disgust and anger and hate and, on the other, instinctive admiration, emulation, tenderness and loyalty. *Just because these emotions are instinctive they are not to be eradicated by any change in theory.* Changes in our ideas never eradicate a human instinct or predisposition, but only cause changes in the objects by which an instinct is aroused and in the responses by which the instinct is manifested. If any of these emotions were likely to be partially inhibited by a natural science view it would be anger-hate. And we can very well afford some diminution in the cruder manifestations of anger and hate. The very strength of instinctive anger and hate makes us resist a theory that tends to check us from giving free rein to the blind exhibition of that emotion. Yet, even this emotion will not become obsolete however widely the natural science view

of life may be adopted. An instinct cannot thus be obliterated. It will only be made more rational in the direction it takes, and the manifestations it prompts. Anger is the emotion that accompanies resistance to that which opposes our will, whether we irrationally kick the chair that stands in our way or reasonably push benevolent plans despite selfish opposition. The Freudians affirm that sex impulse, unrecognized as such, transfuses all forms of endeavor with tenderness and zeal. There is at least equal evidence that sublimated anger remains an element in nearly all strenuous effort.

We feel hatred and anger toward the rattlesnake or the tiger that we see killing a child, notwithstanding we are all determinists in our views concerning rattlesnakes and tigers. But the determinist's revulsion toward the evil deed of a man will be something more and other than his rage at the rattlesnake or the tiger. All tigers and rattlesnakes kill, but not all men kill or are cruel or deceitful to their group-mates, and we have an inborn emotional discrimination between men who do and men who do not commit such acts, and between those acts which destroy and those which promote the interest of our group and of its members.

Furthermore, the instinctive emotions that we feel toward our own conduct when we have "a sense of moral desert" or toward the conduct of others when we praise or blame, are tremendously heightened by the sentiments which society about us has taught us to entertain toward the different forms of conduct. The power of society over the sentiments of its members is shown by the fact that these sentiments vary as they do from age to age and from place to place. This astonishing variability as

to the forms of conduct which are praised or blamed is one of the most impressive lessons of comparative sociology. These variations in sentiment rest upon variations in the estimates that have been placed by social leaders upon the harmfulness or beneficence of different acts. In so far as the individual's emotional discrimination toward his own conduct and that of others is not purely instinctive, but is due to social incitement of the instinctive tendency, it will not be destroyed in the individual by any change in theory unless that change in theory prevents the development and inculcation of moral sentiments by the social leaders and by the folk sense. And since social incitement of moral sentiment is based on the judgments of social leaders and folk-experience as to the good and bad effects of conduct it follows that whatever clarifies the perception of causal relations between conduct and its consequences rectifies the moral sentiments of society both as to the conduct to be approved or disapproved and as to the strength of these sentiments. Adoption of the natural science view of life tends powerfully to increase the clearness with which consequences are traced to conduct and with which moral normality and abnormality are defined, and consequently to heighten the insistence and the wisdom with which society inculcates the beauty of the one and its fitness to be emulated, and the hideousness of the other as a trait of a rational being able to foresee the consequences of his deeds. So long as we retain our social nature we shall continue to catch the sentiments of society toward evil forms of conduct and shrink from those types of conduct which are condemned by the social sentiments in which we share. In fact the old-fashioned view allows us to

regard our baser acts as failures to express our true selves, to regard them as evils which we might have chosen to reject. But natural science compels us to regard them as inevitable self-revelation, and this makes the *anticipation* of such acts all the more revolting; and acts which are sufficiently revolting in anticipation are not inevitable, they are prevented.

And what of the worth and beauty of virtue? Would virtue be less precious if recognized as a natural product? Not one whit, but only less pharisaical. We have seen that repugnance and disgust and admiration, tenderness, emulation, and loyalty toward human character are instinctive in the same sense as other esthetic discrimination, and at the same time are reënforced by social education in the same sense as other esthetic discrimination. No change in the theory we are discussing can extinguish them so long as we retain our instinctive tendencies to feel repugnance and appreciation and to catch socially radiated sentiments. We can no more cease to regard virtue as beautiful than we can cease to regard the sunset as beautiful. It is true that emotion is heightened by familiar associations, and in the generation that makes the change any considerable departure from familiar opinions may disturb conventional sentiments. But in the long run, the natural science view of life cannot eradicate our instinctive tendency to discriminate between the beautiful and the hideous in human conduct. On the contrary it strengthens the social development of sentiments of moral discrimination, for their social development depends upon rational perception of the good and evil consequences of conduct, and that rational percep-

tion is distinctly clarified by the natural science view of human life.

"But," says the objector, "do you mean to claim that we shall love and admire goodness as much and attach to it as great worth if we believe that it is the inevitable product of heredity and environment and not the immediate creation of the will of the good man?" I answer, Why not? Do we love and value the beauty of a woman less because it is the product of nature and not of her own endeavor? Would she be gratified if assured that we regarded her beauty as a product of her efforts to beautify herself and not natural to her? Do we admire and value the intellect of a man less because intellect is an unmistakable natural endowment, and does any man attach less value to his powers because they are native, and not acquired by an effort of the will? Moral excellence is not different in this respect. A good will is not a separate and peculiar faculty. It is the whole of a man; it is the net result of his personality. To be one who functions normally, consistently, and beneficently under the causal prompting of his own mental states is the highest merit that man has ever claimed, and that is no whit abated by a natural science view of life.

1. *b.* The Effect of a Natural Science Point of View on Rewards and Punishments

Now for the second proposition under the first head, namely, that under a natural science view of life good and evil conduct will still be rewarded and punished. Society will no more have lost its right and disposition to punish bad men because they and their acts will be regarded as

natural phenomena than it has lost its right and disposition to wage war against tigers, rattlesnakes or the boll weevil. And as the foregoing argument shows, and as the experience of determinists illustrates, our sentiments toward bad men would continue to be all that we feel toward the tiger or the boll weevil, and more because of the hideous abnormality of such conduct in man. The arm of the law has grown unsteady and weak. Nothing can give it back its power but frank adoption of a natural science view of the rational basis for severity, which is social protection through deterrence, restraint, and reformation.

"Retributive justice" has meant simply the degree of severity that coincided with the emotions of those who inflicted it, or of the group who sanctioned it. "Justice" at one time and place requires the penalty of death for an act which elsewhere "deserves" little or no punishment. Justice cannot be successfully administered in an advanced society on the level of unrationalized instinct. Instinct prompts both a severity that is capricious and ill-directed and a sentimentality that is irrational. A natural science view of crime would give to the arm of law much-needed reënforcement and guidance. It would prevent us from setting at liberty the degenerate or the victim of abnormal rearing, saying as our excuse, "He cannot be blamed and ought not to be punished," and it would prevent us from tolerating the immaculate and elegant gentleman whose wholesale sinning murders hundreds and robs men of millions but whose personal attractions allow him to escape crude instinctive disapproval. It would prompt a perfectly rational exercise of severity in the spirit of social surgery, the severity being propor-

tioned not to the crudely instinctive repugnance and anger aroused by the criminal and his acts but to the harmfulness of his deeds to society and to the strength of the temptation from which men must be deterred. It would spare no form of crime, but would be hardest on the most gilded and the most destructive forms of crime.

We have now seen that the natural science view of life has no power to annul the instinctive feelings of revulsion and admiration with which we contemplate the good or evil deeds of men nor the sentiments of approval and of disapproval, enthusiasm and detestation which have been socially acquired. Instead it clarifies the ethical judgments which underlie these feelings, and also guides and reënforces the arm of the law. So much, then, for the notion that under a natural science view of life we should lose our sense of moral values and our right to reward or punish. We are now ready to consider the second aspect of the fear which deters the mind from accepting the only possible solution of the so-called insoluble problem of freedom, namely, the fear that its solution would destroy the motives to endeavor.

2. The Effect of the Natural Science Point of View on the Motives to Endeavor

The view of life which we are discussing contains two propositions: First, our acts are caused; second, our acts are causes. The fear that this view would diminish our sense of the importance of our own activities and lessen our disposition to carry them on with energy is due mainly to the fact that our startled attention has been so fixed by the first of these two propositions as to cause us

almost, or quite, to overlook the second. If our zest in action seems to be destroyed by the fact that our acts are caused, it is not merely restored but intensified by contemplation of our acts as causes.

"Voluntary" conduct is that which we approve and to which we lend ourselves with full consent because of *the results* toward which it tends or because of the *satisfaction* which we find in its continuance. There is nothing in the natural science view to diminish our satisfaction in activity, and nothing to diminish but everything to increase the vividness with which we foresee results. There are two conditions of zestful activity or "endeavor": First, human nature, the instinctive tendencies or predispositions, which cannot be affected in any way by theories about freedom or determinism; second, ideas —ideas about *the present objective conditions* which constitute the occasion for action and about the *consequences of conduct*—which incite the instinctive tendencies. So long as ideas about present occasion and anticipated result are sufficiently clear the action follows with undiminished zest whatever notions men may have about freedom and determinism. A hungry man with money in his pocket will not stand motionless before the door of a restaurant and starve because he is a determinist. Let a determinist know that there is deadly poison in the draft he is about to drink and his hand already raised is stayed. Let him know that he has already taken deadly poison and the draft is the antidote and the antidote is taken with alacrity. The determinist does not lack motive. Ideas are causes. This is not contradiction or diminution of motive but states what is the very nature of motive, and has been so during all the years when men have be-

lieved in causeless freedom, and during the other years before they began to puzzle their brains about the theory of conduct. Ideas are causes of acts and acts are causes of consequences: this is the very formula of motive and of responsibility.

The natural science view of life is not that the hungry man may be satisfied whether he eats or not, and that the poisoned man will be saved from suffering and death whether he takes the antidote or not, but that a normal man will eat and will take the antidote, and that if he does not eat or take the antidote he will inevitably suffer the consequences. The natural science view of life consists in a clear and emphatic realization of the causal nexus, of the absolute dependence of our future and the future of others on our present functioning. It does not teach merely that the future depends on the past but that the future depends on the *present,* the present of our conscious activity. And if the past has been one of normal evolution that has left us neither crippled nor idiotic, then the past has equipped us with forward-tending propulsions and powers, and we shall rejoice in their exercise, and this exercise of our powers will be all the more zestful and eager if the past has equipped us also with an adequate realization of the direct and inevitable dependence of the future on our present activity.

Once realize that our acts and our ideas are causes, that from them inevitably flow consequences good or evil, and every normal human being is impelled toward seeking true ideas and performing the actions that will condition the results to be desired. The thought of the inevitable, natural, causal connection between our thoughts and deeds and their consequences, instead of destroying motive, is

the most urgent form which the motives to thought and conduct can take. The man who takes a natural science view of life knows that he must do or die, and cause the death of others, and having that knowledge he, above all men, does do and live and bring life to others.

It is a pure misconception to confuse scientific determinism with the creed of fatalism, like that held by some of the Greeks, by the Mohammedans, and by many of us. As a matter of fact, scientific determinism is the opposite of such popular fatalism. Fatalism teaches that something comes down upon the situation and shapes it in spite of the causes working in it. It says, "Do not shrink from going to battle and facing a discharge of rifles. You will not be shot unless you are fated to be shot today." Determinism says, "If you stand up before the aim of a rifle when it is discharged, you surely will be hit; nothing can prevent the conditions from leading to their consequences, and the only way to control consequences is to shape conditions."

Fatalism is such a violation of common sense, science, and human nature that there never was such a thing as a consistent fatalist. No one but a suicide or a crazy person would act upon the creed of fatalism if he knew that he had swallowed a deadly poison and had the adequate antidote presented. A consistent fatalist under such circumstances ought to say, "There is no occasion to take the antidote. If I am fated to live, I shall live, and if I am fated to die, I shall die, with or without either poison or antidote." No consistent fatalist ought ever to work. He ought merely to say, "These acres will bear me their harvest and I shall be fed and sustained if it is so to be."

Fatalism is a faith that men adopt in the presence of

results the causation of which is obscure, and in regard to which they wish to escape the responsibility that determinism forces upon them. It is a comforting doctrine for one who must face bullets. "Fatalism" and "special providence" are the metaphysical and theological phases of the same thing. Each is a faith adopted as a comfort in those cases in which the conditioning of consequences is not obvious and responsibility is not willingly accepted, the sense of living under inscrutable protection from the consequences of conduct being desired. The determinist, on the other hand, knows that conduct will lead inevitably to its consequences.

That knowledge is responsibility. The moral effect of determinism is not only to reënforce motive but to intensify the sense of responsibility, that is, the sense of being a link in the causal chain, and of functioning beneficially or destructively.

To see my thoughts as causes of acts and my acts as causes of good or evil consequences, adds propulsion to both thought and deed. Instead of reducing me to effortless despair or recklessness, *it adds to the motive power with which my life proceeds.* Consistent and intelligent belief in causation increases, instead of diminishing, both the sense of responsibility (in the rational sense of that word) and also the power of all rational motives.

For consciousness I am my activities. I am aware of the part I play in the causal process. I, as I act, am a link in the causal nexus that sees, though dimly and imperfectly, other links on which my act depends and the consequences that depend upon it.

It is the fact that ideas are causes that makes it worth while to give warning to the man about to drink the

poison, and that prompts all instruction. It is the realization of this fact that makes us seek for knowledge as the seed of all good conduct, that makes the hungry man inquire the way to a restaurant, that makes the poisoned man seek to know what is the antidote, that furnishes the *practical* motive to research and reflection.

This view of life keeps me pursuing thoughts, and translating thoughts into deeds. I cannot stop so long as I hold this creed. I cannot let stand untasted the antidote for the poison I have drunk; I cannot let my field go unplowed; I cannot cease from endeavor. Nor can I cease from the pursuit of ideas that are the seed of all good conduct and experience or from seeking the helpful environment that echoes with true and wise ideas, spoken and embodied, which make their appeal to my propensities. Only death or the loss of reason can reduce me to the unreasonable state of inactivity. Only sleep, exhaustion, or the uncertainty of contradictory psychic states can temporarily interrupt the issuance of the psychic process, which I am, in deeds. And the more vivid my creed of causation the more powerful the propulsion. I do not think myself a god, creating my acts out of nothing, nor a spangled fairy with a wand, but I think myself a representative of that species which holds in trust the accumulated heritage of evolution, aware that in my functioning I supply the causal link required to bring to fulfillment the possibilities of good which I, with my kind, realize in consciousness. Perhaps I ought to lose the sense of the zest and worth of life because I have lost the theory which has long been orthodox with moral philosophy, but that sense of zest and worth will not leave me. Is it inconsistent for one who does not regard him-

self as the creator of his acts, but rather as a conscious link in the causal process by which psychic states arise within him and issue in deeds corresponding to the foreknowledge included in those psychic states, who feels the knowledge that wisdom is guidance urging forward the search for wisdom, and the knowledge that good can be had and done issuing in strenuous exertion, is it inconsistent for such a man to find zest in hope, activity, and achievement? If so, it is inconsistent with an outgrown theory and not with the facts of life.

To superficial thought it has appeared that the belief that my act is caused will stop my act, relax my striving. But, as a matter of fact, it does not have that effect. To know that the act by which I take the antidote for the poison I had drunk is caused by the nature of my muscular and nervous structure and by the warning and directions which I have received does not prevent my taking the antidote, and does not prevent me from struggling for it if necessary. All fear that this belief will relax human striving is based on the merest illusion, with no foundation in fact. Belief in fate, belief that consequences will come independent of my act might relax my effort; but we have seen that belief in fate is the opposite of determinism. Determinism teaches that consequences are made inevitable by my act as truly as my act is made inevitable by the past. The illusion that a natural science view of life will nullify endeavor is based upon the absurdity of omitting the *present* from the concatenation of time. That illusion results from saying the future depends upon the past instead of saying the present depends on the past *and the future depends on the present*. The latter is the natural science view of life

and it impels us to act in the living present so that it may be the point of explosion in which the past culminates into the future. As the burning point travels along a fuse, so the present travels along the course of time. In it alone life comes to consciousness. And it is a point of vivid activity all the more, and vastly more, because we know that it not only is the culmination of the past but also the determinant of the future.

The natural science view of life alone gives us a comprehensible view of the method of human salvation. It is asked, Can one repent who believes that all his past acts were caused? He can. The old notion that good and evil, right and wrong, depend on a creative fiat of volition has been the greatest preventive of obedience to that maxim of wisdom and virtue: "know thyself." Because one has not deliberately preferred and approved evil, but has slid into evil by instinct, or laziness, or habit, he thinks himself good. This is the very leaven of pharisaism. Many a pious sinner interested in the salvation of "the world" does not save his own home, never discovers his own besetting sin nor his own urgent duty. Many a complacent person is a burden, a life-embittering irritant, a blight who might be healing and light and achieve both heroism and joy. Even the titanic malefactor in business and politics is generally self-excused.

The disbeliever in causeless freedom can repent but his repentance will not be cast in the old phrases. The traditional formula of repentance is: "I could have done better and next time I will." The deterministic formula of repentance is: "That revealed me. I could do no better than that." It is as if a man discovered himself to be deformed or weak of muscle. He does not say, "Next

time I will do better," but, "Next time I shall do no better under equally trying conditions *unless in the meantime* I have become something other than I then was. There are two things that can change a man for the better. Both of these I must seek. The first is within myself; it is attention or adjustment. This revulsion within me when I think of my wrong action and its probable consequences, and the setting of my tendencies when I contemplate the better way make me for the moment a different man, and if I often enough repeat my attention to my ideal, I shall thereby be periodically fortified and besides there will result some lasting tendency of readjustment. Since ideas are causes, this knowledge will cause me to direct my attention thus; it will make me feed upon the saving ideal as a hungry man takes food or a poisoned man the antidote. And attention thus directed to the approved ideal is an agency of salvation. The second condition of reconstruction is outside me; in some environments my evil propensity becomes clamorous, in other environments it slinks away and my better nature arises and assumes control. This knowledge prompts me to seek the favoring environment, scenes, books, persons, as I would seek food and shun poison."

Too much good resolution dies before January is out because we have been taught to rely upon the fiat of our own will. Vain reliance! To-day's resolution is only one causal fact; it must be renewed by habitual attention to the chosen good, and fostered by the auspicious environment. To expect changes in personal conduct and character from a single good resolve, is like expecting a harvest to grow in response to the fiat of the will without plowing or planting.

Precisely this is the principle of causation upon which the achievements of religion in reality have depended. When the sinner is told that "the unaided human will" cannot transform him, that daily he must pray and read the Bible and come often and regularly to the mission chapel, it means that attention to the chosen good must be frequently renewed and that the favoring environment must be sought. Thus he enlists the causal agencies within and about him.

Determinism rids the mind of the illusion that salvation can be secured by a single experience of conversion. However momentous and however precious, conversion can be only the beginning of a course of life that must continue in the same direction, if life's full fruition is to be attained. Likewise, determinism disposes of the notion that one may as well sow wild oats for a time in anticipation of a late amendment of one's way that will set everything right. Every day has its irreversible effects which may in part be offset, but which can never be annihilated. Life is a unity of causal sequence. One can no more delay for a day to move on the path of progress and achievement than a racer can stop in his course, for if he does, that day's opportunity will pass him never to be overtaken.

Such knowledge as this, says the determinist, will be the direct cause of constancy and fidelity, of daily renewal of attention to those objects of contemplation that prove their power to raise life to its highest levels, and of association with the environments that assist achievement.

But the objector responds: "If thoughts are causes, why do not men always do as well as they know?" The determinist replies: "Because thoughts are not the only

causes; there are also habit and instinct." The conclusions of reason only elicit and guide inborn or acquired dispositions to action. The ideas, whether they are presented by deliberate reason, focusing upon the matter in hand all the data of past and present experience and reflection, or whether they are presented by momentary sense perception, switch the current of energy into this or that mechanism of action. In some directions the wires have never been connected, the mechanism is out of gear and the wheels rusted on their axles; in other directions the mechanism is well oiled and smooth, ready to move at a touch. This is the method of habitual conduct. Every human being has a set of ideas that he lives by, and other ideas that are laid away on the high shelves of memory; and certain avenues of speech and thought whose mechanism he keeps always in use and others that are seldom or never called into play. It is conversion when he awakens some of these little heeded thoughts that had been like mummies on the shelves of a catacomb and gives them a place at the fireside of his mind's warm interest and at the table of his daily contemplation, and they, having their due places and residence in his attention, open the long-closed avenues of potential conduct. Conversion is the readjustment of interest and attention that brings into causal functioning new ideas or ideas that have been neglected, and in some degree crowds out those that have occupied the mind; and since thoughts are causes, there follows a corresponding readjustment of conduct; old mechanisms of habit are disused and other avenues of conduct open with greater and greater readiness and ease.

Such a readjustment of interest and attention cannot

come about without a cause. It may be that by the gradual accumulation of experiences, of joys and disappointments, of perceptions and reflections, a certain point of saturation is reached and a new reagent is precipitated in the subtle chemistry of consciousness; or to change the figure, some reservoir of thought and feeling is gradually filled by the accumulating experiences of life till at last it overflows the dam that shut it in and turns loose new power. This gradual accumulation of the effects of experience until they cause a shifting of emphasis in habitual attention may be assisted by the changes in organic tendency that come with years. But though conversion may conceivably be occasioned by this gradual accumulation of mental responses to familiar stimulations, it usually requires also as a condition some particular outward stimulation, either in the appeal of a person or persons who emphasize new or neglected ideas and who radiate appreciation for those ideas, or in some new experience that forces the attention into a new adjustment.

We all are frequently undergoing conversions, that is, alterations in the contents of the mind, resulting in corresponding alterations in conduct. It is such a conversion when we learn from a sign or a passer-by that we are not on the right street to find the house we seek and turn about, or when we receive directions for a task and set out to discharge it, or when we are appointed to a new field of labor. But it is a terrible waste of life's possibilities if we ever need conversion, in the sense in which it used to be thought necessary to salvation; that is, if we live to maturity upon our instinctive level of activity,

supplemented by habits of thought[3] and interest, of speech and conduct that must be unlearned if we are to be fit for the level of advancement to which human society has attained. To avoid this tragic waste is the business and meaning of adolescence and education.

Conclusion

The traditional fear of a natural science view of life and the vehement warnings against it arise from two illusions: First, the illusion that such a view will obliterate moral values and destroy the basis for reward and punishment; second, the illusion that it will relax the sense of individual responsibility and unnerve endeavor.

These illusions should be dispelled. This fear should be allayed. If we will but look with open, honest and unfrightened eyes upon the only possible solution of the problem of human freedom we shall perceive that the practical advantages do not lie with the traditional conception to which men cling with so precarious a hold, but that the facts of life as they exist in nature are better friends to man—who is himself a part of nature—than are his own fond speculations.

At the close of the preceding chapter we saw that the doctrine of causeless freedom requires the mind to commit a kind of suicide, and exercise its utmost ingenuity to discredit the conclusions of observation and reason. The doctrine of determinism, on the other hand, gives us the strongest if not the only guaranty of the trustworthiness of our faculties. The doctrine of cause-

[3] To speak of "habits of thought" is, of course, an extension of the word habit, beyond the overt responses to which that word is usually applied.

less freedom takes man out of the chain of causation which is nature and thereby deprives him of all certain knowledge of nature. The view of science leaves the conscious activities of men in the unbroken nexus of nature, caused and causing, and thereby assures us of a certain correspondence between our conscious states and the objective world. In its efforts to defend the doctrine of causeless freedom the traditional philosophy has sacrificed all claim to the validity of our knowledge of the external world, in the sense of correspondence between our ideas and the external facts which our ideas pretend to report,[4] and has done so because of a vain and baseless fear. But for this fear few philosophers would have held the problem of freedom to be insoluble or have asserted that the reports of our intelligence are an illusion from which we must escape.

We have seen that in spite of our philosophy, in order to produce practical results in the social world, the world of human life, we are obliged to act as if our thoughts and deeds and those of our associates were caused. Whatever our metaphysics, it still remains true that to observation our acts appear to be conditioned by other phenomena, such as our weariness or freshness, our glands and our nerves, our food and our drinks, our travel and our money, our books and our associations, our opportunities and our stimuli. For observation and for practice no phenomena are more variable, in response to variations in conditions, than the thoughts, tastes, interests, ambitions, and practices of men. The difference

[4] That the nature of this correspondence (which is discussed in Chapter XII) is very different from what ignorance has imagined in no way lessens its importance.

between the savage ancestors of the English-speaking race and their descendants of to-day is not the product of an incalculable agency, whose effects have no intelligible relation to conditions. Causal connection (in the *naïve* scientific sense) alone gives intelligibility to a succession of events, or renders them amenable to rational control. Without the connections of antecedents and consequences, all human activity would appear as an inextricable confusion and hurly-burly, an unmanageable and unimaginable mix-up and madhouse. But, on the other hand, the frank acceptance of the view that human activity and experience are caused, not only *opens to scientific investigation and interpretation the whole range of social life,* but also *justifies us in regarding it as the supreme field for practical endeavor.*

Finally, in opposition to the natural science view of life there remains only the fostered fear which arises from that twofold illusion which this chapter has discussed. As to the first aspect of that illusion, namely, that the conclusion reached by observation and reason, common sense and science obliterates the distinction between good and evil conduct and destroys the worth of goodness and the punishableness of badness, we have seen that sense of moral worth and blame is composed of two elements. The first is instinctive and therefore inherent and ineradicable by any change of theory. The second element in sense of moral worth and blame is social sentiment directing instincts of approval and disapproval toward conduct which, judged by its consequences, is beneficial or harmful. And we have seen that the natural science view of life clarifies and strengthens the judgments which evoke instinctive approval and enthusiasm or disapproval

and detestation. We have seen that to be free is not to be freed from oneself to act irrespective of one's nature or one's past, but it is to be such a self as possesses the developed power to function regularly in conduct which expresses one's own deliberately approved aims. The actions of such a self do not lose their value by being regarded as the culmination of evolution instead of issuing magically out of a momentary fiat. We have seen, moreover, that this view does not abolish social surgery but gives to the arm of law much-needed guidance and force. The second aspect of the illusion that has frightened us into timid faith in an "undefinable" freedom, which is an "insoluble problem" and involves the painstaking stultification of our minds, is that the natural science view of life will relax responsibility and unnerve endeavor. We have seen that as a matter of fact and of experience it does not have that result. Habitually to regard our conduct as the inevitable resultant of our character and environment as well as the cause of inevitable consequences to ourselves and others, instead of relaxing the sense of responsibility, intensifies it, and transforms repentance from an experience largely misguided and often futile into intelligent cultivation of better possibilities; and instead of unnerving endeavor it clarifies our motives and impels us to intenser, more constant and more rational exertion of our powers.

This is the conclusion of a natural science view of the world with reference to freedom and responsibility: If freedom means that the acts of man may issue undetermined by the functioning of his cerebroneural mechanism, by the peculiarities of his inborn nature, or by any-

thing in his education or past experience or present surroundings, then no man was ever free. But if freedom means so to function as to attain results chosen by our own reason, then men can be free, and a natural science view of life helps them to achieve freedom. By nature, education and resulting endeavor one may become capable of central control so that his acts are the expression not merely of sense perception appealing to instinct and predisposition, but also of the wisdom stored by the experience and reflection of the individual and of the race. Then, knowing which path leads to evil, he will avoid it, and knowing which leads to good, he will follow it, not driven about by vagrant thoughts and accidental percepts, but by his organized intelligence functioning as the cause of his overt deeds. Such a man in his rounded selfhood is the cause of his conduct—caused but a cause—the highest expression of causal correlation. He is the cause of consequences approved by his own intelligence and, in that sense, free. And if moral responsibility means that some have the right to look upon others with supercilious contempt instead of pity, and to punish others in the spirit of unmitigated anger and unchastened instinctive vengeance, or "retribution," instead of in the spirit of corrective surgery or defense, then Christ and the determinist do not believe in moral responsibility. But if moral responsibility means first, that conduct reveals what the man is; and second, that conduct leads to its own appropriate consequences; that he who finds himself other than he would be may know of a course of action that would make him better than he is, and that, having such knowledge, if he be a normally developed

man, he will follow it as he would take food and shun poison; if it means that the present is the causal culmination out of which the future springs, and that our thoughts and deeds are the seeds of inevitable life and death; then the natural science view of life is not only true and reasonable but adapted far better than the common view to heighten the sense of responsibility and to evoke constancy and energy in well guided endeavor.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOCIAL VALUES

Interests or desires are spoken of by many sociologists as "the social forces" and the "causes" of human action. But feeling cannot be the cause of human action, for it is an element in human action. To call feeling the cause of human action is like calling the beating of the heart the cause of human life. The beating of the heart and the respiration of the lungs are essential parts of man's physical life, as thought and feeling are parts of his conscious life. It has been and still is the fashion to say that social realities are explained when they are referred to motives. But socially developed wants are quite as characteristic and essential parts of the social reality to be explained as overt practices. If by motive is meant a specific desire or other sentiment felt by one group of men and not by mankind universally, then it is part and parcel of the social activity to be explained.

And if by motive is meant a biological capacity for feeling common to all mankind, such as the emotional side of an instinct or predisposition, like fear or hunger, that is indeed a part of the explanation of human conduct, but such a biological or psychophysical tendency or capacity is never the whole or adequate explanation of any social fact. There must always be a stimulus to call the capacity into exercise; each social fact is conditioned by a

social environment and a social past and also by a material environment, which may be both artificial and geographic. It is an amazing thing that sociologists will in one paragraph emphasize the claim that the instincts and predispositions of men are *the same* in China and in America, in the Stone Age and in the present, and in the next paragraph defend the view that these inborn traits are the explanation of social activities that differ so widely as do those of China and America, or of the Stone Age and the twentieth century.[1]

The word "feeling" will be used in this chapter to mean not the causes of experience but qualities in experience, and feelings will be spoken of not as the means of explaining social activities, but as the means of evaluating them.

But are not these value elements in human experience the most intimately individual of all realities, and if so, by what justification do we speak of them as "social" values? They are indeed in the core of individual life and experience, but individual and social life and experience are only different aspects of one and the same reality. Religious experience, scientific activity, the work of a carpenter or of a banker, the reading of books, the enjoyment of art, the wearing of clothes, and the eating of soup, roasts and ices with silver and china at table, and all activities in which we find value, except socially unmodified biological functions, are social activities, that

[1] An article entitled "The Social Forces Error," published in the *American Journal of Sociology*, xvi. 613 and 642, combats this error and sets forth what the writer conceives to be the scientific conception of sociological explanation. Also published with discussion in the *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, v. 77.

is to say, products of social evolution, elements in the process of social life; and the values contained in such activities are the social values. There are no ultimate social values except those which are realized in the experience of the individuals who compose society, and whose socially evolved activities in their totality and interrelation constitute the life of society. It is by their effect upon values which are realized in individual lives, massed into the life of society, that all social organization, all progress, and all projects must be judged.

A recent brilliant monograph has proposed a "transition to an objective standard of social control," to be applied in measuring the success of our efforts to promote social progress and welfare and in determining the direction in which pressures should be applied. The objective standard proposed is the social order itself; that is, efforts at social control are to be regarded as successful in proportion as they tend to maintain or improve the social order. With reference to this proposal two remarks may be made:

First: The social order itself is not objective but subjective, if by subjective is meant psychic. Professor Cooley is justified in choosing as the subtitle of his book, *Social Organization,* the phrase, "A Study of the Larger Mind." Disapproval of private vengeance, insistence upon monogamous marriage, belief in future rewards and punishments, regard for the authority of specialists, the sentiment of patriotism,—these and other psychic realities are the stuff of which the social order is composed. The institution of trial by jury is not an oak or mahogany or parchment bench, bar, and panel, but a set

of ideas and approvals, formed in the public mind, which would speedily replace the material apparatus, if that apparatus should be destroyed by fire. The Christian church, as a factor in the social order, is not the meeting house, but a body of beliefs, sentiments, and practices which unite the people among whom they prevail. It is not strictly accurate to say that the Christian church is even the body of people so united. These people are much more than their church: they are the bearers of trades and callings, domestic and political activities, and much besides, as well as of the life of their church, though perhaps in nothing else united. If they should lose their faith, and their religious activity should cease, their church would be destroyed, though the people still lived in other activities. The Christian church may be introduced among a population where it had not existed, simply by introducing into the lives of those people the necessary psychic elements, that is, the faiths and practices of the Christian church. The social order, fundamentally considered, is a system of psychic activities.

Second: If the social order is to be the standard of social control, then *what* social order, the existing one? In that case no prophets should invite stones nor Christ dare the cross. But if not the present one, shall it be the one advocated by the socialists, or the one advocated by the Mormons, or some other? Clearly no social order can be regarded as the standard, since every social order must itself be measured. What then is the standard by which to determine what social order should be striven for? By what can we measure a social order save by its

effects upon the values which are to be realized in human experience.[2]

All Value is in Activity

Our actions are like a shield, one side of which is exposed to the world, the other pressed against the heart. The inner side of activity is emotion, satisfaction, desire, and pain. Even the thought of an action is itself an activity with its lining of desire and satisfaction. When circumstances hinder our actions, still the inner activity may continue like the straining of a man in chains, and though it cannot show its outer side in overt deeds, yet its inner side may be hot and vivid or cold and heavy to our own passionate or dogged consciousness. This mere thought of action is itself an activity, a functioning, which is not wholly robbed of satisfaction so long as it is a thought of completer action that the future may allow; but when it is the thought of completer action that can never be, then, deserted by satisfaction, desire alone becomes despair. But our normal activity rushes on, at the same time tingling both with desire and with satisfaction. Without activity there is neither desire nor satisfaction, but only stagnation, stupor, death.

Desire and satisfaction both are phases of the inner essence of our activity. They are one as water and steam are one, for the inner essence of our activity may be frozen to icy despair, or ebullient in satisfaction, or dissipated in satiety. Therefore we may be glad that we are capable of many kinds of activity, and that while some

[2] Compare review by present writer in *American Journal of Sociology*, xvii. 852, of Bernard's *The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control.*

are volatile others simmer steadily. The steady pleasures are commonly and normally mingled with desire. The immediate gratification of every wish is far from being the way to greatest satisfaction.

Satisfaction as here used does not mean satiety, it does not mean absence of desire and striving. An equation is "satisfied" by the values that fit it; a capacity is satisfied by the successful activity for which it is adapted, for our capacities are capacities for action. To grant at once every desire is to inhibit action and in effect resembles murder. A man in whom a dormant capacity is wholly unawakened has no desire corresponding to that capacity, but neither has he any satisfaction corresponding to it, but only a blank. Fortunately our desires are not easily quenched in satiety. New desires can be awakened, and beyond desires for our own happiness desires for the happiness of all mankind invite our zestful continuance in the exercise of our powers. Lessing preferred the search for truth to truth itself, if he must choose between the two, because the search was the satisfaction of his intellectual powers. That is their appropriate functioning. The object attained by successful functioning, whatever that object may be, has worth only if that object itself be an activity or a means to be used by further activity. There is no such thing as passive experience; all experience is found in an active response to stimulation. And satisfying activity may be full of desire.

If satisfaction is not the same as absence of desire, neither is it the same as pleasure. A person with many unawakened capacities may have pleasures as the birds do, or as the Eskimo stuffing himself with blubber, but

such a person in a deep, true sense is unsatisfied, even if unconscious of the lack. The capacities which are to be satisfied are still slumbering. The partial satisfaction he already enjoys may be easy and the fuller satisfaction difficult, and the awakening of additional capacities be followed by the pain of unsuccessful striving. Even this pain is better than the former pleasure because it is nearer to a fuller satisfaction, and also because striving itself contains a satisfaction. It is life and joy. Activities gain in value by their alternation and harmony. So that the measure and standard of our aims and of our rational endeavors is no single pleasure, nor even a few fragments of life, but the totality of all the values which we are capable of experiencing, each in its due proportion and in subordination to the harmony of the whole.

It is essential to observe that the word "activity" as here employed does not refer alone, nor even primarily, to the actions of the hands or of any muscles, but to the functioning of the psychophysical organism *as it exists for the consciousness of the actor.* The student in his chair or the poet dreaming beneath the linden tree may be far more active than the shoveler in the ditch, to say nothing of the squirrel in the tree. And in the long run, the fuller, more varied, more purposeful, and better proportioned the activity the completer the satisfaction. Some necessary activity is painful. Painful activity may be necessary to the maintenance of life itself. But if all activity were painful life would not be worth maintaining. Life is worth maintaining only because normal functioning on the whole is satisfying.

The common notion of a temporal sequence: first desire, second action prompted by desire, third resulting sat-

isfaction, is true only of action regarded as a means to an end, and is false as a conception of the ultimate relation between desire, activity and satisfaction. Activity as a means finds its reward in some further activity (experience). And the activity which is an end in itself, because it contains satisfaction, contains also desire. A man eating has both desire and satisfaction. Moreover, when desire is greatest satisfaction is greatest.

Instead of regarding desire and satisfaction as concomitants and correlates men have regarded them as contradictories. It has even been taught (and the sociologist Lester F. Ward is one of the baldest offenders)[3] that desire is a form of pain which diminishes as satisfaction increases, and that satisfaction is the gradual cessation of desire. On the contrary, desire and satisfaction generally increase together up to a certain point, then diminish or cease together as the activity is finished or weariness and desire for change set in. Satisfaction is the accompaniment of desire and is measured by desire. Desire can indeed exist without satisfaction, because the activity may be inhibited. It is then that desire becomes painful. But satisfaction cannot exist without desire, nor without continuation of activity. Instead of saying with Ward, "All desire is unsatisfied desire. A satisfied desire would no longer be desire at all,"[4] we should say: Without desire there is no satisfaction. Natural desire is appetite. When "desire shall fail" man may as well "go to his long home." As strands of scarlet and gold woven into a cord are part of the cord, so desire and satisfaction are elements in human activity as it exists for consciousness.

[3] Cf. *Pure Sociology*, 103 *et seq.* New York, 1903.
[4] *Ibid.*, 104.

Normal, uninhibited, and unforced activity as a whole, and satisfaction and desire in particular, increase or diminish together. This is not only true without qualification of all ultimate satisfaction, that is of human experience regarded as being, or containing, an end in itself. It is even true of much of that activity which is primarily a means to some future activity. For this mediating activity as such often contains satisfaction, which like other satisfaction, is in proportion to desire; such desire being not for the continuance of the mediating activity, but for progress toward the ultimate activity.

The so-called paradox of hedonism is that progress increases wants as fast as it increases satisfactions and so adds nothing to happiness, indeed that progress may increase wants faster than satisfactions and therefore even diminish happiness. This famous paradox grows out of the error of regarding desires and satisfactions as contradictories instead of correlates, supplemented by confusion of desires for experience or activity with want of material things. Progress cannot produce a new *kind* of desire, for the appetites are all determined by nature and all are awakened in the life of savages. Progress can do two things: It can invent new forms of activity in which a given appetite can find satisfaction, and it can invent new material conveniences for activity. Progress in science, art, literature, play, customs, and numerous kinds of interesting work vastly multiplies the forms of desirable activity, and this is pure gain except in so far as it depends on the use of material conveniences. To diversify the activities of life and multiply the wants for this diversified activity is to enrich life and to increase its satisfactions. To produce new conveniences for old and

new activities is further to enrich the life of those who possess them but *relatively* to impoverish those who cannot get them. To increase the dependence of life upon inaccessible material things is an evil. Yet to refuse the material conveniences afforded by progress would be folly. Diversification of desirable activity is an unmixed blessing. Material progress is a mixed blessing so long as the quantity of goods produced is too limited and the distribution of them too unequal.

Commodities Have No Independent Value

All ultimate value is in experience and all experience is found in activity, that is in life. Life itself alone is inherently good. What do we live for? "For money," men answer. But this is false; no rational being ever lived for money. Money has no value in itself. All ultimate value is in activity, in experience, in life. Money has only *utility* and value *in exchange*. Utility is the quality of a *means* by which good experience can be obtained. The *end* is always that ultimate value which inheres in good experience alone. The end lends value to the means. The end alone has value in itself.

Robinson Crusoe carried away the bits of old iron, ropes, and pieces of sails from the wrecked ship that served him so well, but hesitated to take the Spanish gold. With iron he could smite, and hew and toil with zest, and, having toiled, could eat and live to toil again, but gold is of no value unless it can yield experience. What would be the value to its possessor of a million dollars in gold if he were compelled to keep it? It would shine, and give him some experience of beauty,

and that is good. If he could show it, it might give him a silly pride and pleasure in the envy of others, which would be an experience. Or even if he could not show it, if he had earned and saved it that achievement might make him proud, it might fulfill his ideal, though a paltry and pitiful ideal, and then his pride would be an experience and as such would have its value. But gold, even a million pounds of it, if it is not the means of an experience, has no value. Gold, *as money*, has value only because one can get rid of it for something that one really wants.

And any *thing* for which one can exchange it has no more value *in itself* than the gold had. Suppose one exchange a dollar of his gold for good beef and potatoes. Even these are not good in themselves, and if he has no digestion or appetite, if he is seasick or has just dined, they may even be a cause of vexation and disgust. It is the conscious satisfaction that one gets in eating with appetite, and the other experiences possible to one who is sustained by food that have value. For value can exist only in consciousness. It can never be seen, or weighed, and it can be measured only by comparison with some other satisfaction as imponderable as itself.

No material thing is good in itself, or good in any ultimate sense; it is only good *for* something, and that something for which it is good is always a conscious experience. Conscious experience alone is good in itself.

This is not saying that what is only good *for* something is of trifling account. On the contrary, since experience is itself so good, is indeed the whole and only good of which we have any knowledge, therefore things, just in proportion as they are means of securing good expe-

rience, are valuable and important. But their value or importance is wholly secondary and derivative; it depends on the fact that they are good *for* experience; they have no value in and of themselves. Therefore things can never be the ultimate end of rational endeavor, but only a means to an end.

We have fallen into grave error in discussing "the economic motive." There is no specific desire that should be so named. Motives of every kind impel men to economic industry. It is one form of this error to speak as if the desire for material things, like food, clothing, and shelter, were the economic motive. Does the millionaire return daily to his office in spite of his physician's warning, until at length nervous prostration stops him, because driven by the need of food and shelter? The interest on the bonds in his safety deposit box, if he stopped business at once, would feed, clothe, and house a retinue. No, he goes to his office because he has schemes on foot upon the accomplishment of which his heart is set, he is in the midst of activities that he cannot bear to suspend, his sense of power and achievement in these activities intoxicates him, his determination is set upon them, and it is like suicide to unclamp it, and he commits suicide in obedience to it. He goes back to his office as the football player with a broken rib takes his place in the line. One thinks as little of his food and clothing as the other. American men make money as American boys play marbles in spring, baseball in summer, and football in autumn. The rich man toiling for more often is simply trying to run up a high score at the national game.

The motives to economic work are as various as the

desires of man and as manifold as man's capacities for desirable experience. A man may engage in economic work for the admiration of the spectators, his fellow townsmen, or for the sense of power, the pleasure of "workmanship," for the mere sense of possession, or in order that he may pay for food to fill his stomach, for books to feed his mind, for music to solace his soul, for the support of religion which affords him experiences now and hoped for experiences in eternity. There is no human experience in the promotion of which material things can be used as a means that does not afford a motive for economic work. There is no specific economic motive since wealth is in no sense an end in itself; but every human desire is an economic motive in so far as its fulfillment calls for the use of material things as means. It is true man seems to have an instinct for hoarding, like the squirrel or the jay, but that falls immeasurably short of affording the propulsion to economic life.

The motive that impels men to work is often a kind of purée of all desires, a generalized notion that desirable experiences are possible to the man who has money. The kind of desirable experience which stands out oftenest in his imagination as obtainable by the expenditure of what he earns depends on whether he is a gourmand, a libertine, a sport, a lover aspiring to marriage and a home, an amateur of art, of music, or of books, a social climber, a political aspirant, a religious zealot, or what not!

Every man engaged in economic work, in so far as he is impelled by any rational desire, is impelled by desire for some imponderable psychic thing, that is, for some experience which is to be realized by himself or by others.

But not all human action is impelled by any rational motive. It may be impelled merely by one or other of the instinctive propulsions, somewhat directed by social suggestions. It may be chiefly a matter of irrational imitation of the conventional mode of life.

Thus, the man who makes business his career may or may not be guided by a rational aim. He may be so poorly educated, even in spite of diploma and degree, that he has very imperfectly discovered the real goods of life, is not familiarized with, or adjusted to, life's desirable experiences, does not recognize and appreciate in their due proportion the values that are attainable. A man who has engaged in business imitatively, because in his home and among his acquaintances there prevailed a judgment, by which talk and practice were guided, to the effect that business was the natural occupation and goal of mankind, may be without any rational aim in life. A whole society, engrossed in business, may be without any adequate and balanced appreciation of life's aims, of the real values of life which are to be attained or lost, and its members may rush on in the imitative pursuit of "goods" which are in fact good only as means to ends which they have never properly estimated or understood.

The statement that a society may lack any rational judgment of life's aims should have been more strongly put: probably there never was a society in which the popular group judgments, that each individual inhaled with his breath, embodied a rational conception of the aims of life. Moreover, we are all imitative, and only occasionally anything else. Our independence consists mainly in clinging to one set of suggested ideas and

sentiments in face of those suggested by another source. Only now and then do we make for ourselves estimates of the unseen realities of experience. Therefore, in a society whose members in general judge each other and themselves by the number of marbles in their pouches, or the number of scalps at their belts, or the number of skulls over their doors, or the number of dollars in their bank accounts, even one who does not play that particular game may find it hard not to estimate his own success by the same standard, and impossible to prevent his neighbors from applying that standard to him and his work, and more or less difficult to convince them that he is at heart pursuing any higher aim.

Business as a Life Work

It is not impossible to play the game of business without allowing it to supplant worthier purposes and occupations, and our work may have play interest as activity and competition while at the same time having a further aim. Business should be not merely what war once was, the game in which strong men wreak themselves and compete for glory, but also an intelligent means to all good ends and a method of social service, entirely worthy of the exercise of great powers.

But this requires that success in business be measured by *production* as well as by *acquisition.* Why does a man run a shoe factory? To make money. But does it occur to him that he runs it to make shoes, that to make shoes is an indispensable public service without which misery, disease, deaths, and the impeding of our whole civilized life would ensue, and that after forty

years of making excellent shoes, though no money had been accumulated, he would have achieved a success? Every wage-earner may share in this motive and this satisfaction. That manufacturer may well have had it who, when a visitor remarked: "After twenty years' experience you ought to be able to make a pretty good hammer," replied: "No, we never make a pretty good hammer, we make the best hammers in the world." The work is greater than the pay.

The "captain of industry" performs a service, not only in the output which he places on the market, but also in that he organizes the lives of his fellow workers. It may or it may not be that he is abler or better than all of those working under him, still it is essential that some one occupy the directive position, and by no means all can do so with success. He who can and does performs a great service to all the rest. He ought to rejoice in this also, and make the excellent performance of this service a chief part of his conscious aim. Here, as among warriors, *noblesse oblige*, power is opportunity and responsibility. An employer has no more right to consider only his own profit in the business in which others also spend their days, than a military commander has to consider only his own glory in warfare in which others risk their lives. Laborers and employers are necessary to each other; all industry, on the side of production, as distinguished from acquisition, is coöperative in fact, even if it is not coöperatively managed. The fact that production has called for unified management does not nullify the rights of labor, nor make the rights of management equal to the might which centralization of management confers. The necessities of

organization confer upon the managers of industry a power which does not inhere in them as individuals, and which they have no right to exercise in their own exclusive interest.

With these things in mind the business man will realize that he may attain a high success though he accumulate no more money than the teacher or the scientist. In these callings, and in others that might be named, there are men who regard the money that they earn as a by-product of their work and not its main purpose, a necessary by-product without which the work could not continue, nor their own proper satisfactions be secured, but still not the main product of the work. These men would not leave their task though assured of double the financial returns in an occupation that had no aim but money. The business man, whose sole and ultimate purpose is to get from the public and from his laborers the biggest profits, exhibits disregard of the true aims of business, namely, the uses to which his profits or earnings can be put, the serviceableness of his product to the consumers, and the usefulness of his leadership in the organization of industry. And, further, a business which yields profits without furnishing to the public any utility is related to proper business as piracy is related to the merchant marine. The vikings gloried in their piracy and sang of their heroes as "seawolves." That social standard has changed. Ours will change. It is a foolish conventionality that allows a man's success to be measured by income alone, and his business to be treated as if it were a useless game with no purpose but the score or even as if its only aim were his own satisfaction, with no regard for his place in the social teamwork.

Business is a far worthier thing than that. Its aim should be the production of utilities not less than acquisition. The amount and character of the product, the level of wages paid, and the profits must all be regarded, in order to have a just or truthful measure of business success, and mere profits, when excessive, may even be an evidence of failure.

The Means to Life

There are two kinds of means which may be employed in promoting the objects of human desire, namely, work and wealth (together with free goods), or things and men. Of material commodities as means we have already spoken. The other and more fundamental means to human satisfactions is work, or more broadly, *conduct,* that is, activity put forth, not merely for the satisfaction which the activity itself contains as an experience, but also in part or wholly as a means or condition of some further experience.

Concerning work as it exists for the worker, or conduct, it is to be noted that it differs from material goods in this, that while material things are means only and never ends, or as phrased above are only good *for* something and never good in and of themselves, on the other hand, work, or conduct, is itself a human experience and therefore may be good in itself as well as good for something. However, the words good or bad as applied to work, or conduct, as such, just as when applied to any other means, have not the same signification as when applied to experience regarded as an end in itself. Good conduct, *as such,* is only relatively good, that is, good as

a means to some ulterior experience, and it may at the same time be either good and desirable or hard and bad in itself. Good conduct is that which, even if hard and bad in itself, yet on the whole and in the long run, serves to increase the net sum of good experience. Colloquially "good conduct" is that which conforms to prevalent sentiment.

All estimation of human values, for the purposes of ethics, or education, or any practical endeavor remains more or less misguided unless it distinguishes clearly between these two aspects of human activity, namely, its aspect *as experience*, which is good or bad in itself, and its aspect *as conduct* which is a means to further experience either good or bad. Activity which is judged good as conduct may be bad as experience, and activity which is good as experience may be bad as conduct. Experience, not conduct, is the only ultimate good. The net total and quality of experience *contained in* and *produced by* conduct is the standard by which to judge whether the conduct is good or bad. Scientific ethics must arrive at two types of judgments: First, judgments of value; second, and dependent on the former, judgments of conduct. The former recognizes *the good*, the latter recognizes *the right*. Rightness is the secondary and derivative form of goodness.

Man, in all his work has, or is, experience. To enslave or exploit man is to treat him as if he were capable only of work or conduct and not of experience. Herein lies the necessity of Kant's principle of ethics that "man is never to be treated as if he were a means only, but always as being an end in himself." The distinction between land and capital is, for our purpose, relatively unimpor-

tant, but the division between work and things is fundamental. Work is never a mere commodity, it is an experience. It is always a part of life, which is to be regarded as an end in itself. All others means are things.

As things may be used to produce things, so work may be applied to eliciting and adapting the work of others. Work of that sort is organizing work, method in such work is the art of organization, and capacity for such work is organizing or administrative ability. Organization on the greatest scale is politics or government.

Each kind of means may be used in securing the other, that is, work in securing commodities or commodities in securing work. Commodities so used are commonly called "wages" or salaries. Wages include two elements which it is highly important to distinguish: necessary, or compulsory, or what at times deserve to be called exploitive wages without the payment of which the coöperation of the laborers could not be secured; and differential wages, that is, a return over and above necessary wages yet paid out of the product of the labor of the wage-earners. There is no economic law to compel the payment of differential wages. It depends upon the voluntary action of the manager, in his capacity as the agent of secondary distribution, that is, distribution of the proceeds resulting from the sale of output among the participants in the production of output, or upon bargaining power obtained by the laborers through organization, or upon some form of external compulsion exercised upon the employer as agent of secondary distribution. There is no ethical claim to property which is clearer than the claim of the laborer to differential wages, when the productivity of industry is such as to yield more

than the necessary wages, interest, rent, wages of superintendence and replacement of capital, the amounts of all five of which are approximately determined by economic laws. The manager is as justly entitled to a share in differential wages as any laborer. The salaries of hired managers often include a large differential above their necessary wages. Favoritism to a hired manager which gives him differential wages while denying them to other laborers is unjust. Not every industry is productive enough to yield any differential wages. If distribution were just, the interest of the laborer in the efficiency of management and in the productivity of all the labor employed would be as great proportionally as the interest of the manager himself.[5]

The Five Ultimate Values

We have defined right conduct as that which increases the net sum of good human experience. But while we can define the goodness, or more precisely the rightness, of conduct by reference to its results, we cannot define that result by reference to anything beyond itself. The goodness of experience is the final good, and being ultimate can no more be defined than red or the sound of a cornet can be defined. It needs no definition, for, like those sensations, it is vividly known by direct experience without the aid of description. Each of us has had enough experience that for consciousness was good and enough that for consciousness was bad to know what

[5] Compare the statement of the organic theory of distribution set forth in a paper by the present writer, entitled "The Social Control of the Acquisition of Wealth," and published in *The American Economic Review Supplement*, viii, no. 1, 194, and in *The Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, xii., 111.

good and bad are, and to find inducement or deterrence in the words of others who tell us of experiences which they have found good or bad. Activities, that is, experiences, which for consciousness are good constitute the only conceivable ultimate good.

As there are two great means of human satisfaction, labor and material goods, so also there are five kinds of desire and satisfaction to which those means can minister, that can be realized in human experience, and that in their proper union and harmony constitute the only ultimate good of life.

The first class of good human experiences is physical and is represented by the comfort of warmth and ease, the exhilaration of muscular movement, and the gratification of bodily appetites.

All our experience has a physical basis, but in experience of this first kind a material excitant is usually obvious and the physiological character of the experience is also obvious, instead of being concealed in the minute and hidden functionings of the brain and nerves and interior organs. Here, as well as anywhere, that which we pronounce good is an experience existing in consciousness, a psychic activity, of which the physical is only a means or condition.[6] But it is bound up with sensation, that is, psychic activity of the least evolved and differentiated sort, and may contain little or even none at all of the more evolved psychic elements which are found in other good experiences; it does not necessarily rise above mere sensation even so far as to reach perception.

[6] Unless we regard the physical and the psychic as aspects of the same functioning. Compare pages 317 and 334.

It is customary to cry down these physical pleasures and to call them low and coarse. This is in part because they do engage those powers of man which are less evolved, and are shared by lower orders of animals. The sensuous pleasures are, however, a real good by no means to be despised, and they are ennobled in man when with the sensuous experiences there is mingled the exercise of man's other and higher powers, and when there is allowed nothing in the former which violates the latter or prevents the realization of the whole sphere of good human possibilities.

A second reason for the general practice of decrying the physical pleasures, a practice much declined since the days of our too austere forefathers, is the fact that the human individual is far more certain to be a craving animal than to be an aspiring soul.[7] The powers later evolved often compete precariously for their due place in his attention with the basal beast in him, and need to have on their side all the reënforcement of social suggestion, lest they be crowded out and overwhelmed and man remain a beast. And civilized man cannot be a good beast, he must either be far more and better than a mere beast or else fail miserably.

Some say that a third reason for decrying physical pleasures is that the desire for them gives brutal intensity to economic competition. But physical gratifications are not extremely expensive until they become esthetic. And it is a false standard of social and personal success far more than desire for physical gratification that overstimulates the pursuit of wealth.

[7] The meaning attached to this word is a human individual considered with respect to all his possibilities of consciousness.

Physical pleasures are by no means to be omitted from an enumeration of the classes into which the real goods of human experience are divided, but they are coupled with an awful capacity for physical pain.

Even the higher animals below man show abundant evidence of enjoying other satisfactions than those which have just been defined as "physical." And man is utterly unfitted to live in a "pleasure economy" that takes into consideration only gratifications of this class. Under a "pain economy" where his activities are mostly directed against discomfort, and hunger, and bodily peril, man may do fairly well with such heed to higher interests as instinct prompts. He may secure the coarse and powerful physical gratifications at their strongest, and in war against want and pain may feel the zest of bodily and mental activity. He will taste other pleasures also, he may exult in personal prowess and the admiration of his fellows, practice by force of physical necessity and social pressure the simpler virtues, and feel an untaught gladness in the beauty of field and sky. But let him once triumph over nature, let him become rich and let the attainment of physical pleasure become easy, and its pursuit yields him neither zest in action nor pride and honor in achievement, and even physical pleasure, in spite of luxury and artful stimulation, weakens and palls, and his body itself, or that of his offspring, if he have any, sinks in decay. Man, when once he becomes well-to-do, must care for other than bodily satisfactions. When the attainment of satisfaction, not the avoidance of pain, becomes his predominating motive, he must have discovered other satisfactions than those of ease and appetite, and always he must have a goal that evokes his powers, for life is

action, and there is no passivity for man but death, and though the death may be slow, it is pain.

Second may be named the esthetic pleasures. The experience of beauty has an immense range of variety. At one time its chief character is tenderness, at another it is exaltation, yet it is one distinct class of experiences which we know in our own consciousness, and the presence of which we evince to others, and which we with conscious purpose evoke in others.

Sensuous beauty, the pleasure in color, line, and sound for their own sake, are as dependent upon material excitants, and nearly, if not quite, as divorced from developed intellectual elements playing an essential part in the same experience, as are the "physical" gratifications. They are physiological responses as truly as the pleasure in food. How far we share them with the animals it is not our present province to discuss, but they are the possession of untaught men, though in varying degrees and subject to increase by the communication of esthetic judgments, and by the sympathetic radiation of esthetic feeling.

The beauty of nature affords perhaps the most universal of esthetic experiences, both because the beauty of nature is everywhere, at least in the sky, and because some responsiveness to nature's beauty is common to practically all men. Not all can feel the beauty of a symphony or a sonnet, but few, if any, among normal human beings, are insensible to the beauty of dawn and sunset and the stars. Of this the folklore of savages does not lack evidence. Wordsworth did not "reveal" the beauty of flowers. Little children of the city slums

feel it as well as he, though they cannot express it in verse, and South Sea savages twine flowers in their hair. At the same time no student of comparative sociology can overlook the power of social radiation to heighten esthetic experiences even in the appreciation of nature, and to create artificial and fantastic tastes, through the prestige of the esthetic mentor and the influence of the mass of society over the likes and dislikes of its individual members.

In civilized society, except among the wretched class, the beauty of the home stands next to the beauty of nature. It is largely due to a sweet familiarity, the positive, of which homesickness is the negative, the same principle which enhances the beauty of a familiar quotation or favorite song. Visible adaptation to cherished human uses is one principle of beauty, and it is heightened by evidences of actual use. The unceasing labor that preserves the cleanliness and order of the home is essentially a work of art, done for beauty's sake as truly as the practice of any other art, and in the aggregate contributing to the enjoyment of beauty at least as much as any other art. At the same time every other art combines with it to enhance the beauty of the home, as all arts combine with religion to reënforce its power.

The designer of artistic manufactured goods renders an inestimable social service. Perhaps the arts that have at present in America the greatest opportunity for social service are those of the architect, town-planner, and landscape designer. Hamlets and villages will not always remain hideous but will become picturesque and beautiful. Here is a field for enthusiasm and devotion to one's country "equal to that which would be aroused by a great

war." And those who lead the American people to a due sense of their opportunity in this direction, and to efficient coöperation in meeting it will exercise a noble generalship.

The beauty or lack of beauty of the human person and personality are inextricably mingled, now reënforcing, now counteracting each other, and beauty of the one sort triumphing over ugliness of the other. Beauty of personality, or moral beauty, is everywhere to be seen, even though never perfect—the beauty of an unspoiled child, of a man as sturdy in character and intelligence as in body, of a woman worthy of that name, or of serene, magnanimous, and dignified old age.

It is likely to be the case that we justly appraise only our brief or unusual pleasures, which give us a shock of contrast, and fail to appreciate or even to name those which give light and warmth and color to the successive hours of our common days, until they are cut off and we find how cold and dark it would be without them. If it were always day we should have the cheer of the light, but should take it for granted, and our experience would scarcely inform us that it is the light that gives us this cheer. And likewise, beauty in nature, in our homes, in people, and wherever we find it renders a subtle ministration seldom duly valued.

Of the esthetic experiences which are ministered to by the arts usually called fine, one may remark with satisfaction that the American people have begun to admit that the promotion of these values is work worthy of real men having the manliest gifts; though it is still to be feared that a Michelangelo, or Leonardo, or Beethoven

born among us would be in danger of going into business.

The third great class of values which life contains is made up of satisfactions that accompany the active exercise of the intellectual powers, the satisfaction of interest, the joy of comprehension, the zest of mental application rewarded by perceptions and insights. This is the distinctive delight of the reader, though in his case it is complicated with nearly every other kind of pleasure, as he imagines scenes and experiences portrayed and enters into comradeship with the author and his characters. The traveler also is lured on by the pleasures of curiosity. The amateur scientist partakes of intellectual pleasure, he reads nature's own book, and looks upon all living things, material events, and even the dead but storied rocks, with eyes that have been touched and opened. And the professional scientist is in the truest sense no less an amateur. The mind is only a little less hungry than the stomach and its gratification is a pleasure, often keener than that derived from food, and capable of being indefinitely more prolonged. Even those of us who are somewhat dull and ignorant, find wherever we go, something about which to question and speculate and wonder, and feed our hungry wits; it may be the interpretation of our neighbors' movements, the study of a stranger's physiognomy and dress, judging the contents of a package by the evidence afforded by its outward appearance, or solving the puzzles in the weekly paper. The pathos of ignorance is that the ravenous mind feeds upon husks instead of bread. Education makes life a feast. In our day some look upon education merely or chiefly as a

means of making money—a means to a means. It is that, but far more it is an introduction to life's values, which without it would be largely missed, not intellectual values only but all those that escape the mere animal man. It is entering upon our heritage as sons of man and heirs of the ages.

Fourth among life's values are the social experiences, experiences of a peculiar character and flavor, which are conditioned by our thoughts of our associates. To be wholly satisfying our thoughts of our associates must include thoughts of their thoughts or feelings about us. Imagine, if one can, a human being never noticed by any other human being, never receiving an answering smile, or greeting word or gesture, to show that his presence was observed, who, though alone or in the crowd, was equally nonexistent for his kind, as if forever wearing the garment of invisibility. Absolute isolation, if prolonged, causes hunger for this natural satisfaction which may become unbearable and induce insanity. Yet even in isolation we may have some social pleasures, for we are not wholly deprived of thoughts about associates, but only of the new and vivid ones which their presence would occasion. To pass from a community where one has been surrounded by friends and the marks of respect and esteem, to dwell in the midst of strangers, is like falling from a sunny shore into the North Atlantic. And what shall be said of one who suddenly finds the cordiality of friends diminished, silence, averted looks, suspicion, contempt? We expand under the favor of our associates like flowers in the sun; joy blooms and all our powers bear fruit;

but their indifference blights and withers us like a frost.

What is so precious as the friendship of one comrade whom we like, whose judgment we trust, who knows us thoroughly and likes, approves, and trusts us, what else is the occasion of so deep a comfort and joy, and what advantage is there in exchange for which we could afford to lose the trust of such a friend! Fame is the acquaintance, or esteem, or friendship, of a great number. As cold esteem it may be of the highest; as friendship it is likely to be thinly diluted.

Our personality is largely the fruit of social contacts. Conscious life is adjustment to a psychic milieu furnished by our kind, as animal life is adjustment to a physical environment which meets its needs; and it is scarcely too much to say that our higher and more constant satisfaction depends upon social relations as completely as animal pleasure depends upon material conditions. It is not impossible that the desire to love and to be loved, to esteem and to be esteemed, to be thought successful and admirable, and the corresponding satisfactions, are the heartfelt side of more human striving and realization than desires for physical or intellectual or esthetic pleasures, perhaps more than all these combined. Even the outcast criminal boasts to his pals of his success in crime, and the tramp prizes his reputation among tramps as a successful beggar. Physical desires are universal and urgent, but they are soon satisfied and even satiated, but not so the appetite for social satisfaction. Whatever achievement friends and associates reward with approval and honor men will strive for. By its approvals society can turn its members to follow with eager feet any path it may select, and for this

reward it may have any service up to the very limit of human possibility. That is a wise society in which the mass knows what to frown upon and what to honor—none yet has been so wise as that.

The fifth form of value realized in experience is that which accompanies one's thought of himself. This we may call the personal satisfaction, for it is the sense of one's own personality. It has its roots in social experience. We who pass judgments upon our associates are compelled by the logical consistency of the human mind more or less to judge ourselves by similar standards. Having called another a villain for a certain act, straightway to view the same act in oneself is likely to produce a twinge, and having called another glorious for a certain act, one aspires to like action and commends himself if he perform it. We all are born into a society in which social interaction has equipped each adult with developed standards, both intellectual and emotional, which judge us and teach us to judge ourselves and others.

We find it hard or impossible to think well of ourselves when all others think ill of us. But we live in many groups, the home, the school, the shop, the newspaper world; each has its standards. The vicious gang, the boarding-house company, a single powerful personality representative of another circle than any in which we usually move, the characters in a storybook—we are impressed by the standards and sentiments of each. And concerning each we often ask half-consciously: What would these think of me? What would my sweetheart think? What would my boy think if he should see that in his father? What would my dead mother think,

whose standards differed from those of my present associates? What would God think? And since the social contacts from which we derive our standards of self-judgment are so numerous and so diverse as to impose on us opposite requirements, we cannot be simultaneously governed by them all, but are compelled at any given moment to select some one course of conduct, making it *our* way, and its standard of judgment our standard of self-judgment.

The personal ideal may be shifting and vague at points, wanting in standards applicable to some situations, and in part irrational and absurd; but in no individual who is the product of any normal social life, however primitive, is it absent, nor are its promptings at all points lacking in definiteness and urgency. I do not mean that every human individual, even in the most advanced society, has consciously formed and chosen a personal ideal. One's standard of self-judgment may be a mere natural product, the result of reaction between inborn tendencies and external suggestions. But if the environment has been fortunate and the education wisely conducted, the personal ideal represents a working adjustment between the various interests of the individual and the claims of society upon him, as they are understood by the group that has chiefly influenced him, perhaps somewhat modified by his own reactions.

What I am calling the personal ideal includes not only moral requirements but also ambitions and all standards of personal success and worth. It is the concrete concept of a satisfactory self. It is satisfied whenever the individual does what he meant to do or is what he fully meant to be. The individual measures himself by it

when he dresses and looks in the mirror, when he has the feel of himself in company, when he plays a game at which he has some pretensions to skill, when he reviews a speech that he has made or a bargain that he has driven. His self-thought, if tolerably definite and stable, is the most central and determining thing in his character. It dominates his deliberate choices, and even in the busy hours when absorption in objective aims drives it below the threshold of consciousness, if he lives an organized life, it still is determining the direction and force of his activity.

We differ greatly as to the honesty with which we select our self-thought on its merits, and the deliberation and constancy with which we cherish any chosen standard. This honesty and constancy, or the lack of them, mark the path of our ascent or our descent.

We tend to cherish a self-thought that does not make us too uncomfortable by its exactions. Many experiment with ideals that prove too high for comfort. When their personal reaction upon some situation disagrees with their ideal, they say to themselves that under the peculiar circumstances under which they acted the ideal was not binding, or else that the ideal was impracticable anyway for real life as conditions now are, and comfort themselves with the opinion that most persons would have done no better than they. Thus, they try, with greater or less success, to make themselves comfortable with the selves they are, instead of holding their attention on the better selves they ought to be. Others are too honest for this, and here is the supreme test of honesty. They admit the real character of their own act, make no apology for it and still cling to their ideal. This honest

and valiant clinging to an ideal too high for easy attainment is the virtue of humility. Humility is not cringing. Only a soul of the toughest fiber can keep his humility in this true sense. The pain he suffers at the discovery of his own inadequacy, the revulsion against the hated act, and the desperate clutching of the standard of his resolve, are repentance, which alone enables such a soul to forgive himself. And such repentance resets his organic being with new tensions, so that in spite of the power of habit, strengthened by the last repetition, the natural consequence may be that he is less likely than before his fall to repeat the act repented of, and though habit and hereditary tendency combine against him he may at length conquer, and fulfill his ideal. For the key to the nature of man's psychophysical organism is its adaptation to function under the stimulation of ideas. To have his idea of the self which his whole nature, when freed from clamorous solicitations of circumstance, approves, clearly enough and often enough before his mind so that it gives the set to his habitual conscious, and even subconscious, tensions, is to approach that ideal as nearly as his nature allows. And the extent to which man can respond to an idea, and be transformed into its fulfillment, is the supreme miracle of nature.

But this implies the deliberate constancy as well as the honesty, which are the central soundness of personality.

Constancy is wholly a matter of attention. The dishonest mind winces from the facts, its attention fades away from unwelcome realities. All life is determined by attention; and the strong man who knows that this is so will see to it that the inspiring summoning thoughts

are daily brought before the mind. The man who does not pause in the morning of every day, or at other stated times, to call to mind his chosen thoughts and aims, and who does not seek the environment that presents them to consciousness, but lets his attention be filled with whatever chance suggests—the morning paper, the chat at the club, the sights of the street, the routine of business, is like a farmer who lets his field be windsown, instead of selecting the seed; his ground will be covered with growths and will bear some flowers and a little fruit, but mainly weeds unless the winds blow to him over the well-tilled fields of neighbors. Such people may seem as respectable or as despicable as their surroundings, but are in either case equally devoid of self-determined personality. In one environment they might be toughs or sneak thieves, slatterns or prostitutes, while in another they speak proper English, wear clean linen, and practice conventional morality. They are drifting derelicts, rotten hulks if environment so shape them, or with fresh paint and glittering brass by better fortune, but in either case without engine or steering gear, floating forever aimlessly or entering some harbor or crushed upon the rocks, as tide and wind determine. There are others whose nature reacts strongly to certain standards and stimulations, and holds to the course thus defined in spite of counter allurements. Their conduct is not determined from moment to moment by present opportunities and influences, nor even by old habits, but by an inner set of the organism, established and maintained by attention to an idea and purpose that is cherished and remembered notwithstanding the changes of circumstances, or with the aid of circumstances of their own choosing.

The only unpardonable sin is failure to have and keep before the mind an honest ideal. An honest ideal is one that its possessor adopts and holds with his eyes open, open to all that he can see of life's present and future meaning to himself and to all who are to be affected by his life. Such honesty and constancy require the courage and strength not to flinch from looking at the most exacting truths as well as at the most consoling ones, and not to let the ideal fade away into the background of consciousness; they imply the humility that admits the evilness of one's own evil, and the goodness of the good unattained, and makes each error the occasion of fresh resolve. The man of integrity is true to his ideal, that is, to his deliberate and honest view of what his life should be, just as the needle is true to the pole, which may oscillate indeed, but turns continually toward its star.

A schedule of life's pains and satisfactions would by no means be complete without including reference to the peculiar experience which is felt in the pain of self-mutilation and the peace of personal consistency. There is satisfaction and there are pleasures. Satisfaction is the deep strong current of life, pleasures are its ripples. One may have pleasures and never know satisfaction, but have instead only the termination of pleasure in satiety, and the unrest of those who have never discovered life's deeper, fuller values. Satisfaction is for all who can frame and pursue intentions to which their whole nature consents as good enough to be the measure of their life, and *the pursuit* of which is in itself a well-spring of satisfaction, and waters into bloom and fruit all other joys, in their due place and measure. When the realization forces itself upon the mind that one's action

does not correspond to the approved self-thought; when some errant impulse has defied the cherished judgment centrally enthroned, and forced the admission: "I am not that which I thought I was and meant to be, but something other, which I disapprove"; when there is a breach between one's judgment and one's conduct, a hiatus in one's personality; then there is wretchedness: but conformity and unity between conduct and the thought of life, the thought that is reaffirmed and approved whenever the whole nature asserts itself, and acts are viewed in their entirety—not when one clamorous impulse drowns all the rest and one single fragment of man's nature leads him captive and he is dazed by the present importunity of external occasion and reason utters faint protests from the farther rim of consciousness, but conformity and unity between conduct and the thought of life that stands forth when no external occasion clamors and the untroubled judgment holds in balanced regard all the interests of life, the concept of one's own life which each calls his better self, the experience of this conformity has a value that cannot be omitted from the inventory of the good of life—it is peace, it is moral health; without it one may have pleasures, as one sick or maimed may enjoy dainties brought to his bedside, but not the zest of sound life. This is that good of which the Stoics taught that it so outweighs all others that no blow of fortune or act of man is to be regarded as calamity so long as this inward treasure is inviolate. "No one can harm you," said the Stoics, "but yourself, your own act alone can mutilate your personality."

Here is a kind of satisfaction wholly different from our enjoyment of eating or any physical pleasure, or our

delight in intellectual interest and comprehension, or our appreciation of the beautiful, or our gladness in loving another or in being loved, respected, admired, or applauded. The applause and approval of others may be turned to bitterness by the absence of this other satisfaction of self-approval, and great as our pleasure in applause is wont to be, we value it lightly, if at all, when we are applauded for that which we do not value in ourselves. I have pointed out the intimate relationship between the personal satisfaction and social approval, and we should not forget how largely our standards of self-judgment grow out of the approvals and disapprovals that have been expressed by those who influence us, and how largely our self-approval is strengthened or weakened by the judgment that others pass upon us. Yet our standards of self-judgment, however derived, are our own after we have formed them, and the experience of self-approval is so distinct from the experience of social approval that it may incite one to stand *contra mundum*, rather than violate his own soul. It does incite every righteous man to stand against world, flesh, and devil. It is so distinct from pleasure in social approval that, perverted in the stubborn or erratic man, it leads him to defy the judgment of others for the sheer pleasure of getting a pungent self-sense. It sustains the thinker, at times the most solitary of men, in an honesty that may compel him to sacrifice agreement with his associates and the consolation of approval and companionship of both the God of his fathers and of men, so that some, facing that hateful loneliness, have walked out into it and dwelt there, for a time at least, in the belief that reason required it, and that to cling to the cherished belief would be the

dishonesty of willful self-deception, and to flinch from carrying to their logical conclusion the processes of thought would be the abandonment of their own integrity.

It may be that not many in a thousand would be prompted by this motive to stand against the world, but it is not true that the presence of this motive, in some degree, is rare. On the contrary it is universal. It is what Sumner and others call the "social force of vanity." That cynical appellation calls attention to the trivial or contemptible exhibitions of this phase of life. It has other exhibitions that do not fall short of sublimity. To select the word "vanity" as the designation for this phase of human life is to prefer the meaner fraction to the whole of the truth. Pride is sometimes base and sometimes noble. At its best it is the sense of the worth of personality on the part of the one who is responsible for that worth. Every street boy who says to himself, "I wouldn't be so mean," has it. And though we cozen ourselves into the acceptance of easy standards, the mordant regret will now and then be felt, as we catch glimpses of the self we "might have been." Indeed our self-deception consists largely in retaining only those parts of the ideal that we find it easy to obey while denying the validity of hard requirements; thus we are seldom left—even the worst of us—without some remnants of righteousness, and, far from being totally depraved, the demand for goodness competes with the other urgencies of our nature.

Moreover, it would be absurd to imagine that the gratified self-sense comes only in connection with the rare heroic experiences of life. It comes with conscious

sincerity and right intention in the commonest day.

Still further, as already pointed out, it is not the peculiar accompaniment of moral excellence alone. It is the sense of power, for which all that is strong in us hungers. Like every other craving of our natures, when indulged in disregard of other values realizable by ourselves or others, it becomes dangerous, in proportion to its strength as a motive. It gives power to every ambition, whether base or noble. As desire for wealth may prompt to theft instead of thrift, so this may prompt to mere self-aggrandizement in disregard of social values. It is the sense of every power and every excellence to which we aspire. Of all satisfactions it is the most constant and reliable, and the least subject to the tyranny of circumstances. In it the strong nature of the Stoic takes refuge against all vicissitudes. One lives always with the self that one sincerely and consistently chooses. In small and great activities the self-sense gives color to an experience. The player winning his game, or stiffly holding against a superior antagonist, the tidy housewife, the carpenter surveying the perfect joint which he has made, as well as the legislator who has refused a bribe, have the satisfaction of an acceptable self. The ditcher may have a thought of himself as a ditcher which puts into his toil a glow of idealistic satisfaction as real as that felt by the artist. It is present in every sort of worthy life work, and in a degree, in every activity of man, not of work only but also of play, which he approves as a part of that concatenated system of activities which he recognizes as his living self.

The folly of vanity consists not in appreciating one's own more trivial excellences, but in appreciating them

disproportionately. Vanity is the lightness which is too much uplifted by slight matters and too indifferent to weighty ones. And vanity is commonly associated with petty injustice in the preference of that which is one's own and the disparagement of that which is another's. The disparagement of another's excellence is one of two poles of meanness, of which the other is the hypocritical humility which pretends indifference to one's own excellence. It is absurd to ask men to value excellence everywhere except in themselves. Virtue is always proud and will not stoop. But it is always humble in the sense above defined; it sees the ideal shining ahead and counts itself not to have attained. It compares itself with the ideal, the good that should be striven for, and not with other men.

The fact that an exhilarating self-sense may be had in common work—by the ditcher and the carpenter—is emphasized by one of the most helpful discussions in this field,[8] which goes so far as to say that the economic interest, or wealth experience, is the joy of the workman who shapes material things to human uses. If the view expressed in earlier paragraphs is correct, there is not a single economic motive; but every human desire, the satisfaction of which requires the employment of material means fashioned by labor is an economic motive, and such motives are reënforced by appetite for the social applause that follows business success and for the self-respect that comes of capable work. But according to Professor Small, the joy of productive labor upon material things is the wealth interest. In that view the wealth experience is not to be had by the possession of

[8] Small, *General Sociology*, 459 *et seq.*

goods that derive commercial value from natural scarcity, but only those that derive it from the labor required for their production, nor is the wealth experience to be had by the *possession* of any goods, but only by the *production* of goods. And it is only the worker in material goods that has the wealth experience and not the man who appropriates those goods by trade, or earns them as the reward of his song or his wisdom. The good human experience which this teacher extols with impressive eloquence is a reality, but is it the economic interest? And is it the exclusive possession of the producer of material goods; or shall we say that man discovers himself only in action, not in sleep or any negative state; that he realizes himself only in the fulfillment of his intention by his deed; and that whatever the nature of the deed he has the same essential satisfaction? Is not this self-sense of a functioning personality in its most essential quality the same kind of experience in the case of a carpenter helping to build a house, a scholar helping to build a science, or a statesman helping to build a constitution? If so, it is far from being the peculiar joy and dignity of those who are occupied in shaping material things for human uses; it is rather the common joy of *those who work*, and behold in the fruits of their labor the fulfillment of their intention.

Instinct and Satisfaction

The position of Professor Small which was just noted has resulted from connecting economic satisfaction with the supposed "instinct of workmanship" which has been

given so much prominence in recent discussion,[9] instead of connecting it with a more general predisposition, the existence of which is free from all doubt, namely, the predisposition to enlarge our own rôle and to take satisfaction in the expression of our own will.

The activity and satisfaction attributed to an instinct of workmanship are explicable without the assumption of any such instinct. Man has no need of an instinct of workmanship in order to secure all the results which such a special instinct is supposed to account for. Man has a powerful urgency toward self-expression and self-enlargement; the gratification is felt as the experience of power or self-realization which we have been discussing. In itself this is no more an instinct of construction than of destruction. This tendency functions in the successful safe-cracker and in every Napoleon pushing forward schemes of destructive ambition. The child smearing the tablecloth with ink has glee in seeing its own activity objectifying itself in results. The self-expression of a child is likely to be mischief because he is only a child. The self-expression in which a man finds satisfaction is likely to be materially or socially constructive because he is a man; that is, because he is a more or less rational being and a product of social rearing, who approves in himself that which society has taught him to approve and which his own reason plans. Thus we behave as if we had an instinctive bent to do constructive or useful things largely, if not wholly, because we are alive and want to function, our powers demand exercise, we find delight in self-expression, in

[9] Compare Thornstein Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship.* Macmillan, 1914.

seeing our own activity objectify itself in results, and since we are somewhat reasonable and very much molded by social judgments, normally reared adults commonly adopt as their mode of self-expression activities which meet with rational and social approval.

This discussion leads us to the general question of the relation between instincts and satisfactions. Instinctive action regularly includes an emotional phase. Thus the instinct of flight includes the emotion of fear, and the instinct of self-display includes the emotion of elation. A given variety of instinctive emotion may be painful if obstructed or pleasurable if the instinctive activity goes triumphantly to its object. And some varieties of instinctive emotion are predominantly painful, as fear and disgust.[10] Since the same instinctive emotion may be either painful or pleasurable, and some instinctive reactions are characteristically painful, it is clear that the instinctive emotions, as such, do not exactly coincide with the satisfactions. It is the purpose of the instincts to secure survival, not joy. And the instinctive actions which are felt as fear, disgust, and anger are as truly necessary to survival on the instinctive level as pleasure and pleasurable activity.

Besides the instincts we have special nerve endings to detect painful contacts and certain vaguely pleasurable sensations that guide reflex action which does not rise to the level of instinct, but which must be included in our idea of inborn propensity. All of our activities above the rudimentary physiological functions that we share with lower animals, all of that socially evolved activity that differentiates man from the dumb brutes, is

[10] Compare McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 48. Luce & Co.

at bottom the functioning of some well developed instinct or propensity. And all of our satisfactions of whatever grade are dependent upon inborn capacities for activities that contain an element of satisfaction. However much inborn tendency may be disguised by education and habit, however greatly *acquired* tastes and sentiments may differ from primitive emotions, we have no satisfaction that does not depend upon the functioning of an instinct or predisposition that is common to all normal human beings.

Since instinctive actions contain our satisfaction it is worth our while to note the kind of pleasure likely to be found in the functioning of a given instinct. Thus, the functioning of the food and sex instincts carry *physical* pleasures. Activities of the gregarious, parental, and loyalty instincts carry *social* pleasures. The *personal* satisfactions may be had in any course of action that the individual adopts so that it becomes a mode of conscious self-expression. They are strong in connection with all actions that objectify the fulfillment of one's intention in visible results, either in material things fashioned to the will of the actor or in the changed activities of other men. The personal satisfaction in controlling the activities of other men is strongly felt in connection with the emotion of elation included in the instinct of dominance and in that "self-mastery" which is subjugation of fragmentary impulses in complete self-expression. Psychologists have familiarized us with the fact that the self-thought includes whatever we include in our habitual description of self, and we have observed that self-satisfaction may rest on base as well as on noble grounds. The miser's self-satisfaction rests upon the

thought of himself as rich. If he were impoverished his sense of identity would dwindle, and he might even go crazy, like Silas Marner when he lost his hoard. Intellectual pleasure is found in the satisfaction of curiosity, and in what we call "interest," which pertains to activity of the cognative powers. The esthetic pleasures accompany functioning of a universal human instinct or propensity which in its negative aspect is repulsion and disgust, in its positive aspect is attraction and appreciation. While "desire" and "satisfaction" are not merely other names for instinctive emotion, they are nevertheless elements, correlative with each other, and contained in those activities for which we are prepared by native predispositions.

Work and Play

Earlier in this chapter it was said that human activity may be looked at either as *experience* which is an *end* in itself, or as *conduct* which is a *means* to future experiences. That is much like saying that an activity may be regarded either as play or as work.

The contrast between work and play does not lie in the objective character of the activity but in its value to the actor. Almost any overt activity may be either work or play. Hunting and fishing which are work indeed for hunters and fishermen are the very type of play. Gardening which bears the primal curse of toil is a form of play to thousands. Driving fine horses is work to the coachman and jockey but play to their owner. Even professional baseball becomes work. There is hardly a form of labor which is not imitated by children as play.

We have been taught that play is the expression of a

special play instinct. That is an error. Play is many times more instinctive than that. It is the expression of every instinct in the functioning of which we find pleasure. Play is any activity in which we find a satisfaction that is sufficient to be a motive for the continuance of the activity. It is not a matter of hands and heels alone, but may be the exercise of the loftiest gifts of intelligence and sensibility. Art is play. Research may be play as truly as hide-and-seek. All satisfaction is in the functioning of some power of mind or body. It is in the play of our powers that we find all conscious life and all ultimate values. Activity becomes work when the motive of the activity is found, not in the satisfaction which the activity contains but in some ulterior aim, some external sanction, some proffered reward or threatened penalty.

Work may be as zestful a functioning of our powers as any mere play. It is possible to distinguish between mere play or activity which has all its motive and value in itself; work that is play, that is, activity which has a double value, both satisfaction in itself and an ulterior aim; and mere work, which as activity is joyless or even painful but is induced by motives external to itself.

The reasons why we think of play as more joyous than work are mainly two: First, work is often done from necessity, and some necessary work is painful, while play is the free part of life which we choose according to our inclination; consequently in play we do what is congenial to us. But what we choose as play another may do as work, and what we do as work another may engage in as play. Second, we all get enough of our daily occupation and want change. Activity is subjected to a law of

diminishing returns; an activity of which we have but little is more valuable to us than addition to an activity of which we already have enough. The activities in which we engage as diversion from our main occupation are delightful as diversions. But most of them would become intolerably irksome if pursued eight hours a day six days a week for a working lifetime.

All the values of life may be realized in work, or rather values of every kind. Work includes the zestful exercise of our powers, physical or intellectual, it very commonly includes an esthetic element, it is a means of communication and coöperation with our kind and wins their recognition and esteem, and in work we see our own worth, power, and mastery proved and objectified before our minds. Moreover, work is purposeful, and contains not merely present realization of every kind but also hope and anticipation, not only joy in the working but also joy in the remoter end to which the labor is the means. And finally work is commonly of use to others and so secures the altruistic reduplication of satisfaction.

In the classic impersonation of humanity's quest for satisfaction Faust tastes first the intellectual pleasures and they leave him in a mood for suicide; thereafter he tries license, wealth, power, glory, beauty, and mastery over nature, but finds no hour in which to cry: "Tarry for thou art fair," no hour of satisfaction, until at last he discovers life in useful work.

Only action is life, only purposeful action is life in full tide, only a purpose that is of use, that is real, that is worthy of our powers, that disregards no values it affects, that weaves into the web of human realization,

of which our own experience is a conscious part, ever truly and fully satisfies a rational, social being. Such action is work, and such work is play, not "child's play," but the free harmonious play of all the resources of our being.

Work, home, friends, health, play,—these are among the symbols of life abundant with its fivefold satisfactions: physical, esthetic, intellectual, social, and personal. To be interested is to be alive, not to be interested is, to a conscious being, death or stupor. To have an aim worthy of one's possibilities, a sincerity at peace with one's own reason, a loyalty to that social whole which is immeasurably greater than any single self and membership in which conditions the worth of every individual life—these are essentials of a complete human existence, the experience of a true son of man, joint heir in man's rich inheritance and a participant with all true men and with nature in the work of social creation.

The Good a Social Concept

The ancient Sophist said the good is the good-in-consciousness, but he lacked the social point of view. He drew a tiny circle around himself within which the good was supposed to be. He had not the notion of good as a process of fulfillment to be realized in the cumulative experience of mankind. Nor did he see the consequences of conduct, by which it must be judged, running out into the wide spheres of social causation which modern enlightenment is exploring. We now begin to perceive that the good to be striven for is not *my* good but *the* good, and *the* good is the good of the whole society of which I am a functioning part.

The hedonist ultimately discovers that the pursuit of his own happiness does not lead to happiness. John Stuart Mill, one of the soundest of men, in mind and heart, after long experience in practicing the utilitarian philosophy, wrote in his autobiography: "Those only are happy who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness. . . . Aiming thus at something else they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken *en passant,* without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination." [11]

What is that other aim which one may reasonably pursue and in pursuit of which his own happiness is achieved? It is fulfillment of the possibilities of good experience that are latent or but partially fulfilled in *the society* of which he is a member and with which he is in effective communication, be that society great in numbers or small. This is an aim in the pursuit of which life is found to be not merely "a pleasant thing" but a zestful thing, nobly evoking all man's powers and often arousing him to a glorious enthusiasm. John Stuart Mill, Josiah Royce, in his *Philosophy of Loyalty,* and others from ancient to modern times, from Christ to Goethe, are right in declaring that "he who seeketh his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall find it." No man is wholly and humanly happy without an aim that is greater than his own good. And what aim is there that is greater than the happiness of *a man?* The happiness of *men.*

[11] John Stuart Mill, *Autobiography,* c. v. 142. New York, Henry Holt.

The only greater aim which he can promote is the social good. Man becomes fully man only by the realization of membership in some society great or small. The harmonious fulfillment of that system of good experience-activity which constitutes *life,* must be a coöperative social achievement in which each depends upon all.

This is not the doctrine that a life of social service, being the only road to the fullness of life, exacts no sacrifice. Only in a completely normal society will the way of transgressors be made as hard and that of the righteous as shining as it should. Moreover, it is not to beasts but only to persons of normal social development that the law of normal life applies. A villain in a villainous world may be happier acting as a villain than in attempting the rôle of an angel, but not so happy as a righteous man in a good world. The devil gets some compensations out of his deviltry and we need not grudge them to him. The righteous man is devoted and will suffer, if need be, in a bad world to pay part of the cost of making it better.

At the same time no man is fully satisfied until he partakes in the social devotion. Young millionaires who left their life of dainty self-indulgence for the Great War and peeled potatoes in the cantonments and were cased in the mud of the trenches testify that it was the happiest time of their lives, because they were for the first time included in a great social coöperation with adequate motives and were possessed by the social devotion. The need and opportunity for such devotion are never absent. We are social beings, and though we may shrink from it as the child bather from the first plunge, social devotion is our element. Without it we never fully get

the social satisfactions, and without them life is abortive. Neither do we get the personal satisfactions so long as we stultify our reason and balk our social instincts by acting with sole regard for that fraction of the interests we affect which can be realized in our own experience. We feel ourselves men, and living, when we accept our human citizenship and live by purposes that are bigger than our own ego. Sometime, when society at large—and not alone the seers like Christ or Mill or Royce or Goethe, realizes this truth—social suggestion will cease to mislead us into pettiness and instead will incite us to individual realization through participation in social teamwork.

To the doubt whether life itself may profitably be subjected to scientific analysis, whether we are wise to dissect our own emotions, ideals, and beliefs, we have answered that the insatiable intellect, hungering for comprehension, cannot be stopped by such scruples from this prying investigation, that such knowledge and insight as is possible to us is unescapable and must be faced, and that the implications of our knowledge cannot be glossed over. Therefore, with determination not to flinch from pursuit of the utmost truth within our powers, we have set out to meet it, welcoming it and reconstructing our ideals and beliefs accordingly and accepting such emotions as may come to us. If this course create for our mental life a new environment by dispelling and replacing cherished illusions about the unknowable, then let us begin a new process of adaptation to our environment, for there is fresh power of adaptation so long as there is store of courage. What seems ruin may prove to be the necessary clearing of the

ground to build higher than before. Transition is costly, like the introduction of labor-saving machines that render old skill profitless but prepare the way for general comfort and plenty, impossible before. And a clear perception, or as clear a perception as we can attain, of the good of life and the method of its realization may afford better guidance and as powerful an incentive as any of the illusions that fall away.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL VALUES AS OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE, OR THE PROBLEM OF THE GOOD

Only those phenomena can be treated adequately by the methods of science which can be observed and described, so that with reference to their qualities a "consensus of the competent" may be established. We are assured by certain writers that the most essential qualities of social activities, namely, their value as good or bad human experiences, being subjective, are known only to the actors, perceived by no one, and therefore incapable of observation or description. Wherefore they must be approached by the more direct metaphysical method of "appreciation." [1]

The word "appreciation," introduced into technical philosophical terminology by Professor Royce, and by different writers somewhat vaguely and variously used, appears to mean, not merely sympathy in the ordinary sense, but a direct knowledge of the content of consciousness of our associates, based, according to some, upon the metaphysical doctrine of the unity of all souls as parts of one "world process." It does not appear to me at all necessary, for the purposes of sociology, or for any other purpose, to imagine any mystical communion of all

[1] This view is expounded in *The American Journal of Sociology*, x. 354, also 501, and xii. 822, and commented upon by the present writer in the same journal, xi. 623, and xii. 831.

souls, nor to adopt any "other and more direct mode of approach" to social phenomena than the familiar methods of science and common sense,[2] namely, experience, observation, and inference.

The fact that the experiences of others cannot be perceived and described precisely as flowers and butterflies are perceived and described of course is very far from being proof that they can be known by any metaphysical method of appreciation. We certainly feel that we know something about the experiences of our associates. And there is no occasion to think that this sense of knowledge is derived by a process radically different from that by which other knowledge comes. If there are some limitations on our knowledge of the experiences of our associates, through observation and inference, those limitations by no means wholly exclude such knowledge. And many of us would say that if there is no science of values it is because the values of life are so accessible to ordinary experience, observation, and inference, and knowledge of them is so current in human intercourse, that it requires no science, no elaborate and recondite research, to give us that knowledge. A reflective person may add, however, that our knowledge of life's values is often incomplete and fragmentary, and may gradually be extended by much the same logical method as that by which scientific exploration and description extend our knowledge of the resources of a continent. Such a person might further add that when we pass from the discovery of values, or the question of the good, to the discovery of the methods of conduct by which these values are attained

[2] The meaning with which I employ the dangerous term "common sense" will be explained in the last chapter.

and by which their attainment is prevented, or the question of right and wrong, then we must not only approach the problem in the spirit and by the method of science but our investigations must be extensive and recondite. After all, the chief difference between ethics and other sciences is the greater degree to which in this field every intelligent human being is an investigator.

If the method of appreciation gave us direct knowledge of the values realized in the conscious states of our associates, that would be an acceptable aid to sociology and would make it more scientific, and not less so. But if we had such direct knowledge of the conscious states of associates it would seem that we ought not to be so often cheated and deceived by the lies and pretenses of others.

While the feelings of our associates cannot be directly perceived, yet their manifestations are perceived, and the feelings are inferred. Like electricity and many chemical and vital processes, which cannot be directly observed, they are known by their immediate consequences or expressions, which are open to perception. It is true that one who witnessed the manifestations of fear, anger, joy, or sorrow, if he had never experienced those states of feeling, could only *name* them without knowing their inner essence. Supposing him to have the idea that there were states of consciousness corresponding to man's overt conduct, he could only think of fear or joy as that state of consciousness which manifests itself in certain peculiar ways and which often arises under certain conditions, and he would miss entirely any knowledge of the feeling as feeling. But if he has had those feelings, then when he recognizes their presence by the presence of their manifestations and their occasions he knows their

quality as feelings. It is true that our knowledge of the feeling value of the activities and experiences of others is based upon the belief that their feelings are similar to those which we ourselves experience when we are under similar conditions and exhibit similar manifestations. If the belief in this similarity is well-founded and affords a valid basis for inference then we know something about the feelings of a man whose hand is in the flames and whose face is distorted with agony.

And this belief in the similarity of human feelings is well-founded. We and our associates are members of one species, products of a common evolution. From this we infer, with reason, that we inherit capacities for the same types of subjective experience. And we corroborate the truth of this inference with adequate experimental tests. We continually put the accuracy with which we have apprehended the feelings of others to practical proof. We speak and act upon the supposition that we correctly understand the signs that our associates have made and they usually accept our interpretations as correct, and are quite capable of making us vividly aware of it if at any time we are wrong. Furthermore, we reveal our own feelings by manifestations similar to those which we observe in others, and are continual witnesses of the degree of success with which our associates interpret those signs so as to become aware of the feelings which we manifest to them.

A minor corroboration of the truthfulness with which we are able to interpret the signs of feeling which others evince, and even to anticipate the qualities of feeling which they will experience under given conditions is in the fact that with respect to some feelings a vivid

imagination of the conditions that evoke feelings in others even evokes in us a degree of the same feeling.

Neither sympathy nor the trustworthy and continually tested conviction of the similarity of human feelings is dependent upon utilizing any metaphysical method or theory. From the point of view of science it is as futile to engage in scholastic speculation as to whether we can know each other's subjective states as it is to engage in similar speculation as to whether we can know the external material world.[3] It may be true that the consciousness of each individual is a share in the "organic unity of the one self," but it is not necessary to prove that doctrine in order that the smile of my friend may be more to me than the mere wrinkling of his skin and his tears something more than so much water. The very existence of society, as we know it, is evidence of the correctness of the *naïve* observations and inferences of normal men, "the consent of the competent," concerning the feelings of their fellows.

Though our observations and inferences concerning the feelings of our fellows are in the main correct, yet they are not infallible, as they ought to be if they were direct "appreciations" due to the unity of all consciousness. We are representatives of one species and the offspring of a common physical evolution, yet we differ somewhat in temperament and disposition, for there is organic variation in all the higher species; and as products of social evolution we differ yet more. There is a universal sign language of feeling, common even to those of alien tongues, yet members of the same house-

[3] The question as to our knowledge of external material realities is discussed in the last chapter of this essay.

hold may be too unlike wholly to understand each other. The most prized experiences of some may be in part unintelligable to certain others, and that which we most hate we may never wholly comprehend, unless we hate it, having disapproved it as present or possible in ourselves.

But in spite of our idiosyncrasies, by the process of association we have developed to a wonderful degree the art of communication, so as to express our thoughts and feelings, and to interpret the experiences of others in terms of our own. Man has an insatiable interest in the psychic activities of his associates, both for the satisfaction he takes in contemplating, analyzing, criticizing, and appreciating them, and also for the practical necessity of understanding this most active, helpful or harmful, portion of his environment. Where interest is strong, there intellectual power and skill develop; and the skill of men in understanding each other is perhaps the highest everyday manifestation of intelligence. Doubtless it is not only an individual skill, but also a biological adaptation developed by the social necessities of the race. Desires and purposes are not only divined from the subtlest signs, but also foretold before they are formed. And even when men deliberately lie and pretend, employing generally understood symbols in order to deceive, their fellow men are skilled to discover not only the meaning which the deceiver intends to convey, but also the presence of deception and the motives of the fraud. It is true this skill in reading one another breeds corresponding skill in dissimulation, but both forms of skill are tributes to the subtlety with which we understand each other, and interpret not merely words and other con-

ventional symbols, and deeds that are intentionally overt, but also subtle revealers of emotions, moods, and traits which their owners never meant to reveal, but endeavored to conceal.

Many of the signals from the inner life which we learn so accurately to read are far too subtle to be conventionalized. Smiles, frowns, tones, and changes of the facial muscles, too minute to be described, are promptly interpreted. One reads a passage full of subtle suggestion, and by his reading proves that he has felt the suggestion, and looking up he sees in the face of his listening friend that the friend has felt it too. This is communion of spirits—author, reader, and friend. Expressions of voice, countenance, and bearing, numberless and fleeting, are included in the seemingly inexhaustible signal code that reveals the rich variety of human feeling. They are mediums for the admonishing or cheering influence of the parent, friend, and lover, and instruments of power in the man of prestige, the orator, and the commander. Not tears and sighs alone, but the slight movement of the eyelid and the almost insensible tension of the person thrill the heart of the observer, and awaken trust or suspicion, love or hate, fascination or contempt, as they signal the presence of affective experiences which the observer is prompt to recognize and estimate in terms of his own subjectivity.

The metaphysicians referred to object that social phenomena are not only too imperfectly accessible to observation and inference, but also too incapable of description, to be successfully treated by the methods of science. Yet a great portion of the world's literature exhibits the success with which the emotional phase of human experi-

ence can be described. The activities, including even the feelings of associates, appear in time, show recognizable resemblances and differences of manifestation, and appear under characteristic conditions. That is to say, they appear in categories of description. All this is specifically denied by those who declare that social phenomena are incapable of scientific description. Nevertheless, in the *naïve* view of science and common sense that is all true. If in some subtler sense it is not true, if, for instance, voluntary acts are, in some metaphysical sense not caused and not in time, then it is not in that metaphysical sense that sociology or any science, uses the words cause and time. For human observation and practice our acts and experiences are as truly in those categories as any phenomena.

All description is based upon the inferred similarity of human experience. It is true that the possibility of describing the emotional states of associates, so that what is subjective to one becomes in a sense objective to others, is dependent on the inferred similarity of the experience of different individuals. *But it is no more dependent upon it than all "description."* "Red" is the name of a subjective experience (referred to an objective cause). Descriptive words like "long" and "heavy" are as really names of subjective experience as words like "angry" and "afraid." Concepts and propositions exist only in consciousness, and *all description, indeed all language,* is based upon the supposed similarity of human experience—similarity of perception and conception in case of material phenomena, similarity of affective states in case of the values. If it is still objected that the attempt to communicate knowledge of values is more

liable to misunderstanding than other description, because we differ in our feelings more than in our cognitive processes, we could afford to admit, if necessary, that there is a difference of *degree;* but any difference on this account would be only in degree, and may not be even that. Color blindness that invalidates the universality and publicity of sense-perception may be quite as common as any equally wide departure from the normal in the great common human feelings. To assume uniformity of conception with reference to the supposedly public, scientific, and purely cognitive, even among experts in description and argument, may occasion serious misunderstanding as often as it does to attribute to men emotional [4] similarity. Indeed, when men are looked at in broad classes in a way to suit the purposes of sociology, individual emotional idiosyncrasies become negligible.

We have just pointed out that all description, indeed all conversation, is dependent on the inferred and proved similarity between the conscious states of associates, the description of value-experiences no more so than the description of rocks and trees, butterflies, and flowers. Now we are to add that the knowledge and description of our own past or future value-experiences is of practically the same kind as our knowledge of the experiences of others. We know our own remembered or anticipated joys and sorrows descriptively, not directly nor by metaphysical appreciation. We can recall and state the fact that under certain remembered conditions we had a good

[4] Using the word "emotional" in the broad sense to include not only the feeling side of instinct but also pleasure-pain and the appreciation of values.

experience whose value is of a well-known kind. But in so doing we do not have that experience, we only describe it. We can plan in anticipation of good experience—of well-known kinds that are yet to be. We can recognize what has caused or destroyed our happiness in the past and arrange the causes of future satisfactions. But when we recall the fact of past happiness we do not have the past happiness. Instead, its recollection may give us present pain if its cause is lost and the departed wealth or companionship contrasts with present poverty or loneliness. Or, if we remember the fact of past poverty and loneliness we cannot bring back the past suffering, and to recall it may give a present satisfaction, for we do not recreate the pain of poverty and loneliness when we remember and describe the past reality. But neither do we recreate a tree that stands no more, when we describe the tree. And "in a practical way we have a memory of affective experiences as genuinely as we have in case of ideas. We can tell what affective tones belong to vivid experiences. But our ability to *reinstate* the original affective tone with the cognitive memory of the event is extremely defective." [5]

To summarize, we have developed a subtle and effective technique for communicating to each other a knowledge of our feelings. The description of feelings is dependent on the well proved similarity of human experience but so also is all description, indeed all communication whatsoever. Feeling, or value, is always an element in an experience, all of which except the feeling element every one recognizes as describable. This by itself suf-

[5] James R. Angell, *Psychology*, 312. Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1908.

fices to make the feeling itself describable in the sense in which electricity is describable. It makes it possible to name the values, to tell the conditions under which they are experienced and the manifestations by which they are accompanied. If we have any knowledge of the world in which we live we must proceed as if appearance in some way corresponded with reality, and so saying, we say that some things make men sad and others make them joyous, and that anger, terror, joy and sadness make men behave in vividly contrasting ways. If this were all, we could name our neighbors' feeling, affirm its presence, tell its time, its place, its occasion and its consequences. But this is not all; we are not confined to such knowledge about the feelings of others as we have about electricity. By virtue of our own similar experiences we know their inner tang, in the same way that we know our own past joys and sorrows. And if we know all this concerning the feelings of our associates, then they are sufficiently open to observation and description.

All great and difficult problems have, in their turn, been treated by the method of metaphysical speculation, until one by one many of them have proved accessible to the methods of science. Sociology is the attempt to reach by the methods of science one more class of problems, namely, those pertaining to the life lived by man in society—where alone the life of man becomes more than bestial—the values which that life contains, and the method of their attainment.

We are often told that what *is* is matter for science, but what ought to be is matter for philosophy. Upon this point the position here offered for consideration is

as follows: The good and evil realized in human experience are a part of what is; and the causation by which these values are attained and increased, or forfeited and lost, is as truly a matter for natural science as the conditions under which crops may be raised or insects exterminated.

Our views of the "meanings" and "values" of things are not to be deduced from any metaphysical theory concerning "the final goal" of the universe "reduced to unity." On the contrary, our knowledge of good and evil is actually derived from experience and observation. If any one were able by some other process than observation and comparison of phenomena, that is, by other than scientific method to arrive at a verifiable view of the final goal of creation from which to deduce teachings concerning the values involved in human life, then we should be glad to have him do so. But efforts of that kind have led to dispute, uncertainty, error, and illusion. So long as the method of observation is open to us we propose not to depend on deductions from merely speculative views as to the goal of being. We admit that our results will apply only within the sphere of human observation. But as human beings, not to say as sociologists, we are content to understand the worth and meaning of Life to human beings, and within the realm of human observation and experience, and not to stretch out after the meanings involved in a "total unity of creation" which is an assumption the very conception of which, to say nothing of its proof, is beyond the power of the intelligence that has evolved upon this planet.

The values that are disclosed to human comprehension exist in human experience and, by the method above de-

scribed, the experience of each can be more or less perfectly known by his associates. These values are phenomena of consciousness, *true phenomena,* and so really matter for science. As we saw in the foregoing chapter, material things have value only in a secondary and derivative sense, in proportion as they are means of promoting valuable experience, which alone has value for its own sake. Value is a phase or element or quality in every state of consciousness which men can pronounce good in itself. Accordingly, the question, "What is of worth?" is equivalent to the question, "What values do men discover in actual experience?" The answer to this question can be reached only empirically and is determined by the concurrent testimony of the competent.

It is true that the only competent witnesses concerning the value of a given kind of experience are those who have had such experience, but it is equally true that the only competent witnesses concerning a kind of external phenomena are those who have observed it. No individual is a competent witness concerning external phenomena that he has not observed, any more than concerning values that he has not experienced. Man is the measure of all things—that is, of all experience—only when he has had all kinds of experience. But each can observe his own good and evil experiences and, in the sense explained above, he can describe them. Some kinds of values are so universal that practically all men are competent to testify concerning them. Other kinds of value are less nearly universal, yet those who have experienced them can sufficiently describe them so that others, who have never had the like, can desire them and be taught to seek them. Those are the most com-

petent witnesses concerning human values whose experience has been richest, especially in those types of worth-experience which are higher than others by common consent of those who have had these particular types of experience together with the widest range of other worth-experiences with which to compare them.

What in human experience is of worth is a question of fact. As the foregoing chapter pointed out at length there are numerous kinds of worth, and an adequate conception of them involves the concept of a proportioned harmony of these elements into a whole thought of the worth of life. To arrive at such a thought of life is an intellectual achievement. The method of this achievement is not deduction from a concept of the "final goal of creation reduced to an absolute unity," but is induction from knowledge of human experience, whether it be the unconscious induction from a narrow range of experience, which may be only prejudice, however high-sounding the phrases in which it is arrayed, or whether it be a conscious induction from a wide range of human experience, which is as much as to say, a fruit of scientific method.

It may be questioned whether in this day of applied sciences any science confines itself to the question, What is? and ignores the question, What ought to be? But even if every other science be confined to the questions, what is and how comes it to be, still there is a special reason why sociology, as science, cannot be so confined and must proceed to ask what is good, and how does the good come to be? And this reason is that the good and the bad are essential elements in the objective realities studied by sociology, and by no antecedent science.

Therefore, it seems to me that those sociologists [6] are quite wrong who admit that it is true for sociology, as for other sciences, that pure science, since it has to do only with what is, therefore has nothing to do with what ought to be, and nothing to do with differences between better and worse. Good and bad are essential elements in the description of what is. The good and the bad nowhere exist as abstractions, but always as elements in or phases of concrete experience-activities which, in so far as they are more than biological, or purely instinctive, are social products. The social activities cannot be truthfully, that is, scientifically, described without including reference to the value elements which they contain.

The tattooing and tom-toms of the Polynesian, and the grand opera and millinery of the Parisian, as material phenomena, are social realities only in the most superficial sense. The essential social realities are the activities and experiences which are manifested in these material products. The social activities revealed in tattooing and tom-toms, grand opera and millinery cannot be adequately described without reference to the esthetic values which they contain, and to the social values which they contain as display activities. The value element in the consolations, as well as in the terrors of religions, both savage and civilized, is an essential part of the description of religions. Slavery cannot be truly and adequately described by one who ignores the suffering which it has contained. The penologist deals with negative values inflicted by crime and suffered as deterrent penalty. The reformer and educator have it for their business to promote positive values. These are illustra-

[6] Ward, *Pure Sociology*, 4, 5.

tions of the general fact that goodness and badness are elements in social activities which sociology cannot overlook. This science attempts to describe and account for the *varieties* of prevalent and socially caused experience-activity. And in differentiating these varieties of experience the different value elements are a determining character. They are to sociology not unlike what degrees of cephalization are to zoölogy, or spectral lines to astrophysics—critical elements in the description of the phenomena compared. Sociology sets out, having laid aside every preconceived notion of "the good" formed by speculating with closed eyes, and opens its eyes to see what men in their experience have called good, what they have found in experience that to them was good, to discover if there be any "consensus of the competent" in the recognition of good experience as there is a "consensus of the competent" in sense perception, and if there be a general consensus only among men of a given range of experience, then to discover what is good to those who have the widest range of experience and the most highly developed powers.

These experiences are of great variety, and *the good* is found to be no one kind of experience but *life,* made up of, or including, those compounded and concatenated experiences in which the value element is found. Goodness, thus conceived, is unique and incommensurable with anything else, and undefinable in terms of anything but itself. It is no more describable than "red," that is, being an experience element it is intelligable only to those who have had such experience. At the same time it is as cognizable as "red." This goodness is the element in experience which makes it a thing desirable for its own

sake and contrasts with the badness which makes an experience shunned for its own sake.

In all of the foregoing, the problem of "the good" has been treated as one clearly distinguished from the problem of "the right." Early in our discussion of values it was pointed out that there are two aspects under which human activity must be considered. It must be considered both with reference to the values which it *contains,* and with reference to the other values which it *conditions.* When considered with reference to the values which it contains, our activity is called *experience* and is pronounced "good or bad" in itself. When considered with reference to the other values which it conditions, our activity is called *conduct* and is pronounced "right or wrong." The words "good and bad," therefore, when used in their *primary* or ultimate sense refer to experience as judged by the values which it *contains.* These words good and bad are used also in a secondary or derivative sense as equivalent to right and wrong, and as referring to conduct judged not by the values which it contains but by the results which it conditions. However, there is no ultimate value, no ultimate goodness or badness in anything that is considered purely as a means to an end, not even in our own activity regarded purely as the *condition* of values in human life, and essential to their attainment.

Before we can form intelligent judgments of *the right* we need to have an adequate view of that rich and varied and proportioned concept of *the good* which we have attempted to discuss. Certain limited forms of right, like gratitude and loyalty to friends, have, it is true, a beauty of their own, a power to evoke enthusi-

asm and desire, even in the absence of judgments about the consequences of the acts. And certain forms of wrong, like cruelty to friends, similarly invite instinctive repugnance and disgust. But the very existence of instinctive attraction for the right and repugnance for the wrong proves that there is a purpose in the acts instinctively preferred; for no instinct is developed that has not a biological purpose or function. The purpose or function of all right conduct, and of such instinctive preference for right as we possess, is to promote individual or group *life*. Life contains the good, to which right ministers as a vassal to his lord. And when developed moral judgments carry us above and beyond the promptings of mere instinctive preference and repugnance it is because ethical leaders and the folk sense have recognized the adaptation of conduct to secure desired ends which are included in the fullness of life.

Ethical instruction has commonly neglected the problem of the good because it has been absorbed in trying to get people to live up to the moral requirements already recognized, and not in trying to improve the ethical code of the group by discovering more fully the good of life and the method of its attainment. Thus, individual endeavor and the folk life have busied themselves with efforts to get the good and escape the evil that is already understood, but not with effort to get a more adequate vision of the good of life.

Moreover, since instinctive prompting of every kind is ignorant of its function and regards only the pleasures which instinctive activity contains, and not the remoter good or evil which instinctive activity conditions and which will be realized at a future time or by other per-

sons than the actor, therefore ethical instruction has been chiefly engaged in urging men to pay heed to the rightness and wrongness of their acts and not to their pleasantness. Thus it is that ethical teachers are prone to regard right and wrong as more important than the good contained in experience. It is more important than the good contained in the present experience of the actor. But it is this present good or evil *plus* the good or evil contained in future experience of the actor and in the experience of others which is conditioned by his conduct that alone makes conduct right or wrong. And progress in our judgments of right and wrong has always depended and must continue to depend on judgments of good and evil as distinguished from judgments of right and wrong. Judgments of right and wrong prescribe the method of attaining the good and of preventing the evil which must be perceived before the method of attaining the one and of preventing the other can be discovered.

To say that conduct considered as right and wrong is wholly secondary to experience considered as good or evil is not detracting from the importance of conduct, for, though its importance is wholly secondary and derivative, yet it has importance limited only by the importance of the end which it affects. And the importance of a certain act may be greater as conduct than as experience, that is, it may affect values greater than those which it contains.

It is no wonder, therefore, that ethical teachers have spoken as if it were conduct itself which was ultimately good or bad. In some of the most noted instances they have even declared that there is no problem of "the

good" aside from the problem of conduct. The fact, on the other hand, is that we can by no means take it for granted that the degraded or undeveloped or any who require moral instruction, even if they knew perfectly "what is right," would have in mind anything like an adequate answer to the question "what is good." The only way to advance our knowledge of the right, and the only rational way to make the idea of the right more winsome and propulsive than it is to untutored instinct is to show that it is absolutely subordinate to the good. Inexperience does not know that it is not in particular pleasures, but in the zestful exercise of our powers and in the deep tide of lasting social and personal satisfactions and in the harmony of life which omits no pleasure but includes each in due subordination to life's ideal completeness, that our true fulfillment consists. Painfully men struggle for vanities and pitifully they sell their birthright for a mess of savory steaming pottage, soon devoured. Ruefully they gaze upon the ashes that fill their hands, ashes into which the apples of Sodom crumbled at their touch. From the time when Solomon, having taken every "pleasure" that his royal power could seize, cried in the end, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity and vexation of spirit," down to Goethe and his Faust, the succeeding generations of men, impelled by the promptings of untutored instinct, have missed the real worth of life.

It has been a great loss that ethical instruction has been so almost exclusively devoted to teaching what is right and so little to teaching what is good. There has been some effort to teach what is disappointing and bitter but wholly inadequate teaching as to what is good and

satisfying. Education should consist largely in the effort to initiate the young into the good and satisfying experiences of life. Moreover, the deliberate organizing of community life for happiness rather than for money-making, for all the various forms of joyous and mutually helpful activity is something in which we have made notable beginnings, but beginnings only, and in which we still have very far to go.

The primary and fundamental problem lying at the basis of all ethical progress is the question what is good, what notion are we to form of the end of all rational endeavor. The answer to that question is a comprehensive concept including in harmonious proportion all the elements of value discoverable in human experience. They are discoverable only in and by expanding human experience. Their existence and nature and interrelationship are questions of fact, questions not to be settled by metaphysical speculation, but by living, and by acquaintance with the experiences of our fellow men, they are questions to be settled by the methods of experiment and comparison, aided by description resulting in a consensus of the competent.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF MORAL CODES AND THE NATURALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF DUTY, OR THE PROBLEM OF RIGHT AND WRONG

The study of comparative sociology reveals no more impressive fact than the amazing incongruities between the conscience codes of different peoples, and even of the same people at different stages of progress.

We cannot say that Abraham was less truly conscientious than we because he practiced concubinage and at one stage of his life believed in the duty of human sacrifice. The customs of wife-purchase, slavery, and private war that prevailed among our own ancestors were not the conduct of conscienceless people. Plato himself could not conceive of the absence of slavery, even in an ideal republic. Very recently many of our most charming and most Christian fellow citizens regarded slavery as a divine institution. And to note a smaller matter, the New England parson of two generations ago had to resist the hospitality of his parishioners if he wished to return from a round of parish calls quite sober. It is not necessary, in order to illustrate the divergencies between conscience codes, to detail the abhorrent vagaries exhibited by the practices which savages approve; we have only to remember the past of our own society.

Those accepted customs of our ancestors which now seem to us so immoral, and even the barbaric customs of

savages, do not indicate that they had no moral code, nor that such practices violated the moral codes which they had. The aged savage summons his next of kin to perform the customary act of parricide and after an affectionate leave-taking the final blow is struck. The savage and barbarous peoples have moral codes, sometimes extremely exacting in their requirements and enforced by barbarous punishments, by the sanctions of group opinion, by fear of supernatural powers and by the ingrained sentiments of the actors themselves. In some instances the savages would find it as impossible to approve our morality as we do to approve theirs. The Eskimos would regard our wars as incredibly wicked. And savages who sometimes starve rather than violate a food taboo, and who divide their scanty resources on rules of strict morality, would regard some of the provisions of our "common law," so largely devised for "keeping the ins in and the outs out," and our entrenched luxury just around the corner from the penury of squalid tenements as heinous. "What," they say, "can these men belong to the same tribe?"

Our ethical code not only has changed but at various points is still changing and to change. A generation ago men prominent in religious work, who were regarded by themselves and by their associates as conscientious, engaged in business practices which would not now be engaged in nor countenanced by their sons. New rules concerning the acceptance of rebates, and other matters have been introduced into the business game. It is not necessary to infer that the younger generation is composed of more conscientious men, but only that social evolution has been in progress.

A few centuries ago an ambitious Dane would say to his neighbors: "Come, I have a good boat, let us sail to a village down the coast and burn it, carry off the fairest of the women, pillage the church, plunder the houses, and live all the rest of our days in comfort and become, besides, the most respected men of this region." And after the exploit they would return to their admiring friends singing of their own glory as "wolves" and "sea thieves." The time will come when any great war will be as impossible as it now would be in peaceful Denmark to carry out such a project as that of the vikings. Yet it was but yesterday that Christendom regarded the right of possession by conquest as beyond question, and approved that nation as most admirable which enacted on the grandest scale the infamies of war. It is not too much to anticipate that our descendants will look upon the ethical code that measures business success by *acquisition* rather than by *production* much as we now regard the code of the vikings.

The Origin of Moral Law

Conscience codes are as typical and characteristic products of social evolution as languages or political systems. This truth is illustrated not only by the fact that conscience codes vary from group to group, as languages and political systems do, and progress from age to age, but also by the fact that "the ethics of amity" were long felt to be binding only in the treatment of fellow members of the same group while "the ethics of enmity" applied to outsiders. Throughout the longer part of social evolution all manner of deceit, ravaging,

and murder has been looked upon as being as truly glorious when practiced on victims outside the group as it was reprehensible when perpetrated upon a fellow member within the group. A moral code, instead of being a universal requirement applicable to the treatment of all mankind, was first the requirement devised by a group, and inculcated and enforced by a group for the benefit of that group and its members. When it came to be regarded as expressing the will of God it was generally the will of a tribal God or Gods who, while demanding justice and mercy in the treatment of fellow clansmen, rejoiced in the utmost barbarities when they were inflicted outside the circle of group partisanship.

No man is born with a conscience any more than he is born with a language. Though every normal person is born with capacity to acquire both a language and a conscience. One will acquire the conscience of a group in which he has membership as he will acquire the language of a group in which he has membership. A barbarian, or the child of a barbarian, is as capable of acquiring a Christian conscience as of learning the English language. As many people have opportunity to learn only a debased and corrupted speech, so also there are many who never have opportunity to acquire a normal conscience.

As two persons, if they could grow up from childhood with no other society, would begin the formation of a language, so also it may be believed that they would begin the formation of a conscience, though the latter process would be greatly impeded and perhaps prevented if there were no disinterested bystanders to judge their

treatment of each other. As we have inherited from generations of sociable ancestors capacity for speech, which, nevertheless, does not determine whether our speech shall be English, French, Greek, or Choctaw, so also we have inherited capacity for conscience though it does not determine whether it shall be the conscience of a Christian, a viking, or a Turk.

Conscience has its roots in reason which discerns the relation between causes and effects, between conduct and its consequences. The victim recognizes what hurts him. The bystander recognizes the injury and its cause and says: "If such conduct is allowed to continue in the tribe I may be the next to suffer. Such acts must be repressed." The chieftain and the patriarch recognize remoter connections between actions and their effects that tend to weaken and disintegrate the group. They recognize not only injurious deeds but also that conduct which must be required if there is to be food enough for all, if there are to be order, comfort, and protection. Ruling classes recognize the conduct necessary to secure their own privileges and often succeed in loading on the consciences of men burdens which they themselves do not touch with a finger. But in general the group solidarity is such that on the whole the group code is far better than none for all the members. However, there has never yet been a group that did not have some accepted customs that were bad for it. The conscience code is gradually improved, as in the process of social evolution the hard lessons of experience are rubbed into the folk sense, or as socially-minded prophets and seers discover the conditions upon which the life which is at once social

and individual can avoid blight and decay and can realize its possibilities of good.

But reason alone does not suffice to give us conscience. A conscience code is suffused with feeling. Emotions of instinctive altruism as well as of prudence move the disinterested bystander, and prompt the social-minded patriarch and prophet to feel and act upon the judgments which reason passes upon the consequences of conduct. Moreover, anger and esthetic discrimination are instinctive reactions included in our inborn capacity for the development of conscience. Both the victim and the sympathetic bystander are incensed at wrong. The instinct to combat and destroy, the emotional phase of which is anger, is aroused when reason has identified injurious conduct. And the instinct to approach or to be repelled, felt either as repugnance and disgust or as esthetic appreciation, applies not only to material things but also to human beings and their acts;[1] to our own acts as well as to those of our associates. And when these feelings gather about a judgment passed upon a type of conduct judgment and feeling together make up a complex reaction tendency, an established sentiment, and of such sentiments conscience codes are composed.

These facts account for the rise of a conscience code in any human group. But it is not necessary to recapitulate this whole process in the experience of every individual who becomes characterized by the group conscience, any more than it is necessary in learning a language to invent its words and grammatical forms. Social suggestion and sympathetic radiation suffice to impart ready-made the moral sentiments of the clan to

[1] Compare pages 242, 243, 244.

its members, and those of the family and the neighborhood to those who grow up in them.

Here an advanced society is different from a primitive one because the member of a primitive society usually meets but one consistent conscience code in all his passage from the cradle to the grave, while the child of civilization encounters in servants, parents, neighbors, schoolmates and college mates numerous minor and major variations of conscience code, by all of which he is more or less influenced in proportion to the prestige which at the time these various associates have with him. Particularly when the world is becoming a "melting-pot," and all the fruits of social evolution are on every hand subjected to critical test, conscience may become almost as bewildered as language at Babel.

Conscience codes that are handed on ready-made prevail as bundles of sentiments in which feelings of approval and disapproval are far more vivid than the rational judgments by which these feelings were originally evoked. These sentiments are transmitted from generation to generation by social radiation which does not depend on explanation of rational grounds for these feelings. It is on this account that leaders who enjoy prestige have been able to inculcate some "moral" requirements which were based on judgments that regarded the interests of the rulers rather than those of all the members of the group and to perpetuate requirements that uphold the privileges of ruling classes after these special privileges are no longer required in a more democratic age. Similarly, the reasons for those requirements most essential to the present social welfare may be but dimly apprehended. That which the individual lacks of

recapitulating the evolution of conscience is mainly the perception of the reasons that underlie the judgments which form the basis of any conscience code. Children catch strong feelings for proprieties, the reasons for which they by no means understand. And probably there are few persons to whom a lifetime of observation and experience adequately discloses the reasons that underlie those moral judgments which have been slowly formed by the folk sense under the hard tutelage of experience and the guidance of the social-minded seers. Only dimly and inadequately do the multitude apprehend the reasons for such moral judgments as those which lie at the core of our sentiment for truthfulness or for chastity.

Conscience codes improve in two ways: First we develop a set of requirements, then we widen the circle within which they apply. The first of these two processes is essential, it is the rise of moral law as such, and it consists in recognizing good and bad experience and the conduct by which it is conditioned. The other, the extension of the boundaries of ethical group consciousness, comes relatively late. Moral judgments originally and essentially are common judgments and sentiments of approval and condemnation for the conduct *of members of the group toward each other* and toward the actor's own interest. Moral judgments have application no farther than the words "we" and "our" extend. To the persons and property of outsiders, as already noted, early morality gives no protection. Morality groups are at first small clans. In time ethics become ethnic. At length barbarian as well as Greek, Gentile as well as Jew, Cythian, Parthian, bond and free, Bushman and Boer,

Indian and settler, are more and more included in the widening circle of moral society. Both of the methods of progress in conscience codes illustrate their social character. The former is original, never absent, and discloses the essential character of moral law. That essential method of the development of conscience codes is the tutelage of experience, whether by the groping of common sense or by the insight of moral leaders, which gradually perceives more and more clearly the natural consequences of conduct in promoting or destroying the good that can be realized in human experience, and so learns what to condemn and what to approve and require in order that human conduct may fit into the course of nature so as to result in good and not evil.

The Nature of the Moral Law

The question is now often asked: If conscience codes vary as they do from place to place and from age to age, what are they more than pure conventionality? And may not the conscience code of the Zulu be better adapted to the general conditions of Zulu life than the code of Socrates or of Christianity? Is there in any sense a moral absolute? This question carries us from the first part of our chapter's theme, "the social origin of moral codes," to its second part, "the naturalistic interpretation of duty."

There have been three conceptions of the nature of moral law: First, to the question, What is the moral law? theology replies, "The moral law is the will of God." And throughout Christendom it usually adds, "The revelation of Scripture imparts to us a knowledge

of the requirements of the moral law." But the question still remains, Why does God lay upon us these requirements and not other and different ones? Are these actions made right by an arbitrary decree of divine will, when by a different decree God might have made these actions wrong and others right. Do our own sentiments and the divine approvals sanction these actions and condemn others as a mere matter of taste or of caprice, or is there a difference inherent in right conduct that distinguishes it from wrong so that no decree could reverse their designations? Are these acts right because God says so, or does God say so because they are right? If conduct is right merely because it conforms to a divine decree which might have been made different without interference with anything else in the universe, then the inquiry as to the nature of moral law can go no further. But if right conduct differs inherently from wrong so that no decree could reverse their designations, then reference to a decree is not a final answer to the problem, and we may still inquire wherein that inherent difference consists. We may be unable to answer the inquiry, and if we know what God decrees, our failure to comprehend the basis of His discrimination between good and evil will not impair our obligation to conform to His law. But the problem will remain, and since it so vitally concerns us, we have no right inertly to assume that it is an inscrutable mystery, without having applied to it such powers of comprehension as we have.

Second, the metaphysical answer to this problem is practically identical with the theological answer. To the question, What is the moral law? it replies simply,

"The law is the law." It stands apart, an independent, abstract, unrelated entity; its nature is simply to demand that which it demands. To the question, What beneficent purpose does obedience serve, what end or aim does obedience attain? it replies, "The good of obedience is obedience; beyond that we may not inquire." The only difference between the metaphysical and the theological reply to the query, What is the nature of moral law? is that theology adds, "The moral law is God's decree."

Third comes science and asks, What is the nature of the moral law? and for its answer looks at the facts of life. It observes political law, which is sometimes tyrannous, cruel, and immoral. And it observes religious law, which also is in part immoral or nonmoral, requiring sometimes acts which are gross or cruel, and often acts which are merely ceremonial or ritual, intended to please vain and arbitrary deities, and to secure selfish rewards, to avoid pains and penalties in basket and store, or punishments after death. And both political and religious law it distinguishes from moral law; for, though the three may tend with progress to coincide in their requirements, they are seen to be distinct in origin and nature. Moral law itself is not always good and wise in its requirements, as judged by the standards of our own morality. At times, as we have noted, it has tolerated and even sanctioned polygamy, infanticide, the murder of the aged, head-hunting, war, and slavery. But the people who practiced it as their moral law believed that it was good for them, and as soon as they ceased to believe that it was good for them its foundation as a moral requirement began to crumble. It is not a part of the nature of political law that it must seem

to those who obey it to be good for themselves. It seems to them necessary in order to secure the approval of a power that will do them harm if they disobey, and so indirectly obedience may be good policy, and it may be dictated by affectionate loyalty to the sovereign. But it is no part of the nature and definition of political law that it prescribes conduct which by its own natural consequences secures good to the subjects. Political law may be tyrannous. Religious law, also, has demanded bitter and cruel sacrifices and penances as well as mere laudation and ritual, which were yielded by the obedient out of fear of penalty, hope of reward, or affectionate loyalty. Like political law, it was indirectly good for the worshiper to obey the religious law because it secured favorable, and avoided unfavorable, action by a ruler, in this case a divine ruler; but it was not the essential character of religious law to be shaped by the idea that the act of obedience itself, by virtue of its *natural consequences,* was good for the obedient. On the other hand, the moral law, varying as it does from place to place, and from age to age, has always this character, that it originates in belief that it is good, by virtue of its own nature and natural consequences, for the population upon whom its obligation rests. As a matter of fact, after an action, till then regarded as a moral requirement, *is seen* to be bad or unimportant for the population on whom the moral requirement has been thought to rest, it ceases to be regarded by them as a moral requirement.[2] And if

[2] If it is regarded as a religious requirement it may still *borrow* moral quality from the fact that irreligion is thought to be immoral. Moreover moral *sentiment* about an act may survive for a time after the moral judgment in which the sentiment originated has been questioned, if not quite reversed.

the same population agree that an act previously unheard of, or regarded as trivial, is essential to their welfare, then they begin to inculcate that act as a moral requirement resting upon each of their number. This does not mean that moral conduct is always regarded as good for the *individual* who performs it, but that it is regarded as good for the group of which he is a member; that is to say, its total net result is to prevent evil or secure good to some member or members of the group that outweigh any sacrifice which it may entail.

Every moral being belongs to a group whose members think of themselves as united and speak of themselves as "we." A permanent "we" group develops a set of judgments as to the conduct which is good or bad for the group as a whole or for all those members of the group whom such conduct may affect, and these are the moral judgments of that group.

It may be objected that in the contrast just drawn between political, religious, and moral law, we have compared lower forms of government and religion with more highly developed group morality. There is justice in the objection, as the statement stands. Law, religion, and morality may be said each to pass through three stages of development. In their lowest stages religion, law, and morality are scarcely distinguishable from each other, and merge into the undifferentiated requirements of custom, all of which are enforced by gods, men and conscience. But as they evolve into the second stage they take on more or less distinct characters, government as might-made law, prescribing the will and primarily serving the interest of the more powerful, especially the will of conquerors; religious law, as equally might-made,

dictated by an invisible sovereignty, requiring subservience to his arbitrary decrees and the exaltation of his glory; morality, as right-made law, demanding the conduct that by its natural consequences, independent of any external power or will, promotes the welfare of the group and of its members. Even if this concept of moral law had never been perfectly disentangled in men's minds, it is a perfectly clear concept when once formulated, and is here set forth as the only correct concept of moral law. When they reach their third stage the three forms of law tend once more to coalesce, because political power, being taken more and more into the hands of the group as a whole, enforces some portions of the moral law and nothing that is admittedly against the moral law; and because in the highest forms of religion God is believed to have at heart the interests of his creatures, so that inasmuch as good is done to one of the least of his own it is done to Him, and that which the welfare of the group demands is regarded as the will of God. In proportion as progress takes place the moral law brings religious and political law into harmony with itself.

The individual in society is, in fact, subject to four forms of law, religious law, political law, the law of public opinion, and the law of conscience, but the two last are in the closest relation to each other. This is because the individual is a member of the public, and that which, as a member of the public, he demands of others, his own conscience demands of himself. Personal interest may blind him somewhat and make him more lax in conscience than he is as a representative of public opinion. But in so far as he has a conscience its requirements coincide with the demands of public

opinion in *his* group. The demands of conscience are simply the demands of public opinion, turned inward upon himself by each member of the group, and so the two are identical, save in so far as the blinding of self-judgment by self-interest, or the fact that the individual is a little duller or a little brighter in insight and sensibility than the many, may make his conscience requirements vary from the general standard of public opinion, of which, after all, his conscience is in general a manifestation. Barring these exceptions, whether his conscience approves infanticide, murder of parents, polygamy, head-hunting, war, and slavery will depend upon whether these forms of conduct are approved by the public opinion of the group into which he has been born, and in which his personality has been formed.

We who live in a complex civilization, in which the contrasting conscience codes of many races and social classes are more or less represented, differ from one another in the conscience requirements which we admit, and the spirit of individual liberty once having asserted itself in matters of judgment, the sway of a unanimous public opinion is more or less broken up. Yet, it remains true that no rational being can admit that he has two standards, one by which as an individual he judges himself, and another by which as a member of society he judges others who are like himself and under the same circumstances. And it is still true that our standards, such as they are, are developed by social contacts, whether these contacts are in a homogeneous society having a uniform conscience code or in a heterogeneous society with more or less of mixture and contradiction in its standards of personal judgment. Conscience is

the set of judgments which we hold as a result of our native sensibility and insight educated by such participation in society as we have had, the body of standards by which we judge the conduct of men—ourselves included—so long as we admit or claim that both we and they are men.

The Relation Between Moral Law and Natural Law

We now have before us the three views, theological, metaphysical, and scientific, concerning the nature of moral law. Each of these includes a characteristic notion of the relation between moral law and natural law. The original theological view held that moral law is superior to natural law and overrides it so that good and not evil will befall the righteous, in spite of natural causes which might otherwise have brought him evil and not good. This is the view represented by Job's comforters, who held that the patriarch must have violated the moral law else he could not possibly have suffered so. Even the voluntary blindness of faith has not been able to shut out the fact that in this world the moral law does not so override the natural law as to prevent good men from having boils, and from catching trains that run off the track or from going fishing in boats that overturn.

The second, or metaphysical view, holds that the moral law and the natural law are separate and distinct. According to this view, we must obey the moral law for the mere sake of obedience and without regard to the natural consequences that may follow our deeds;

obedience does not require to be justified by its consequences, and in fact cannot be so justified.

The third, or scientific view, is that the moral law is the natural law, the law of cause and effect, as it applies to the production of results in human experience.

Scientific thinkers often admit that there is no absolute moral law, but that all moral requirements, whether those of the Zulu or of Socrates or of Christ, are relative. There is, however, a sense in which moral law is as absolute as chemical law or physical law or any other natural law, for moral law is natural law, the law of cause and effect, as it applies to the production of results in human experience. It is true that the accepted requirements of conscience vary enormously from place to place and from age to age. But this is due not to the absence of an ultimate basis for moral law but largely to the failure of men more than partially to discover it. The phrase "moral law" may be used in two distinct senses: First, to designate those approvals and disapprovals actually ingrained in the sentiments of a group as a result of practical judgments formed by the folk sense or by the insight of leaders; second, to designate the requirements which would have to be met in order to make the best progress toward the realization of the greatest net total of good experience. In other words, the phrase moral law may mean either what a group actually *does* approve and disapprove, or what they *would* approve and disapprove if they were thoroughly wise. The former varies with human ignorance. The latter is determined by the facts, principally by the facts of human nature. Conventional methods of agriculture vary from age to age but this does not mean that meth-

ods of successful agriculture are matters of conventionality with no basis in inflexible, natural law. It means, in part, that an imperfect knowledge of the laws and hence an imperfect obedience to them, yielding less to the acre, are gradually replaced by more intelligent and complete obedience yielding richer production. The same is true of man's obedience to the laws in accordance with which the life he lives in society can bear its harvest of satisfying activity. The laws are as absolute in one case as in the other, and in precisely the same sense. Moreover, discovery of the laws and obedience to them are as truly applied science in the one case as in the other.

The Position of Ethics in Science

We are often told that the formulation of an ideal and of moral rules is not a scientific procedure. But the ethical task when truly conceived is seen to be not a matter of subjective speculation but rather to be first, the discovery of an ideal which is objectively defined by the nature of man and his position in the larger whole of nature; and second, the formulation of moral rules, rules for the realization of that ideal, which are not matters of speculative conceptualism, personal preference, or arbitrary caprice, but simply are the requirements of natural law for the causation of that which to human consciousness is the best attainable within the limits set by reality. The ethical problems could be answered by an investigator who had no ethical interests but only scientific interest, and who never asked what ought to be but only what is—provided he were able to take and understand the testimony of normal men. The

various forms of good human experience actually exist, their values to consciousness are realities, the methods of their conditioning are realities, and these methods fall within the scope of natural law.

The highest function of sociology is to *discover the conditioning* of the varieties of experience-activity which prevail in society. Just in proportion as that task is advanced we secure well-grounded judgments of the goodness and badness of conduct as conditioning human weal and woe. To discover this conditioning is the problem of right and wrong. Sociology is committed to the attempt to discover whether in this quest science can go further than common sense has carried us. Sociology seeks to give to conduct the guidance and motives of enlightenment.

That conduct is right which is the condition of experience that is valuable. And what conduct it is that leads to experience that is valuable is a question that can be answered only by experience and observation, and by inference based upon past experience and observation, and to be tested by further experience and observation. That conduct is right which, "on the whole," and "in the long run," and "taking into account all the interests affected," most augments the value of experience; and that conduct is wrong which, thus broadly considered, appears to make the value of experience less than it would be made by other conduct.

It may be that not many are able to form judgments of such broad and far-sighted expediency, judgments which neither unreasonably discount the future and the unintended result, nor excessively regard the clamorous interest of the immediate actors, and which are so gen-

eral in their application as to forearm man to meet the vicissitudes in which he must play his part. It may be that only the few are able to make any valuable contribution toward the equipment of duty-judgments prevalent in the society of which they are members. But after these judgments of the wisest, most far-sighted and constructive minds have become traditionally accepted rules of duty, they are enforced by priests, potentates, and teachers of a lesser caliber. These enforce the traditionally accepted duty code of their society by appeal to every conceivable sanction natural and supernatural, enforce them by smiles and frowns that greet the earliest choices and impulsive acts of childhood, enforce them by the continuous pressure of the social approvals and disapprovals in which we are immersed as in an atmosphere, enforce them by the self-approval and remorse that turn in upon ourselves the judgments which they have taught us to pass upon others, and enforce them, and at the same time explain them after the manner of the prescientific theological and metaphysical stages of thought, by calling them the fingermarks of God upon the soul of man, intuitions of our nature, corollaries deduced from the nature of the absolute. Every broad and far-sighted judgment of expediency is a corollary of the nature of things, but man has derived his knowledge of such laws of conduct experimentally from his own failures and successes and not from antecedent knowledge of the absolute nor from implanted intuitions.

If the foregoing argument has received assent it is now clear that the varying moral codes of different societies are typical social phenomena of the kind which

sociology aims to explain. Their natural history is a history of social evolution. Progress in the formation of such codes is progress on the part of moral leaders, or of the folk sense, or of both, in acquaintance with valuable varieties of experience and in understanding the effects of conduct in promoting or preventing these values. These judgments concerning what is good and what is right are spread by social suggestion and they give rise to sentiments of approval and abhorrence which also are socially radiated. And such moral judgments and moral sentiments as are thus evolved and socially radiated within a given society become the conscience code of those who are born and reared in that society. It is, therefore, a part of the business of sociology, to apply the methods of science to answering the questions: Whence comes this and that traditionally accepted and socially enforced moral judgment and sentiment; why do these judgments and sentiments differ so astonishingly in different eras and in different societies; and how, from having first prescribed duties only towards the members of the group within which they arose, leaving liberty to steal with a clear conscience, or even with a sense of merit, the property, or the wife, or the head, of any member of another group, do they tend to widen their scope till they inculcate the universal brotherhood of man? And sociology must approach in the scientific spirit not only the question of tracing the natural history of existing moral codes, but also the further question: Do these existing moral requirements actually prescribe the wisest judgments of expediency; and if not, can they be further amended so as better to prescribe the

method of promoting complete and harmonious experience within the conditions of actual society?

Thus, in addition to the two problems "what is good" and "what is right," a scientific ethics includes a third, namely, the problem of tracing the natural history of existing conscience codes; and also a fourth, namely, that of constructive criticism of our own code. This third and this fourth task theology and metaphysics do not attempt. Each has an easy answer to the question, Whence come our ideas of right and wrong—the one answering, "From divine revelation," the other usually answering, "From intuition." And as to the fourth question, How can our own conscience code be bettered? to ask it is an affront to unscientific traditionalism.

But it is in the solution of the third problem, the problem of the social evolution of conscience codes, that science made its first important contributions to ethics. First it pointed out the fact that there are many and various conscience codes, that codes which are abhorrent to each other are equally satisfying to those who have grown up under them, and that the group sense "can make anything seem right" to those bred and born within the group. It showed also that the various and irreconcilable conscience codes of different peoples are products of their respective group life. It has been able, moreover, to obtain a considerably detailed knowledge of the methods by which these codes develop and acquire their character and their power.

As a result of these studies it seems clear that all the existing conscience codes have been derived by the process of observation, inference, and experience. And this sufficiently indicates that the fourth task of ethics,

namely, our further progress toward a more perfect knowledge of moral requirements, must be accomplished by the same method, the method of induction from experience and investigation and not the method of deduction from speculatively formulated premises. And the fact that past progress in morality has been progress toward recognition of the conduct that is *causally effective in promoting social welfare*, is good evidence for the proposition that the ultimate moral law is nothing other than the law of cause and effect, and that the ethical aim and standard is that social welfare, which in its fullness and harmony is more and more perfectly conceived with the advance of human knowledge derived from broadening experience.

Are Moral Requirements "Categorical" or "Hypothetical"?

There are no requirements that are not "hypothetical." That is to say, it is the nature of duty to serve an end. The classical distinction between the "categorical" and the "hypothetical" imperative is the supreme example of the hypostasis of the instrument.[3] Right is the instrument of good, and good is good human experience. This is true or human life is either a sacrifice to a world-end

[3] "Hypostasis of the instrument" is the philosopher's name for the absurdity of treating the means as more important than the end, or as having importance for its own sake when its real importance is derived from the fact that it serves the end. This is what is done by those who teach that moral law is "categorical," that is, that it must be obeyed for the mere sake of obedience, not because any good is accomplished by obedience beyond the mere obedience itself. An hypothetical imperative prescribes the condition which must be fulfilled if a good result is to be attained.

outside of man, or else it has no rational end, and life is a nightmare, and the search for a reasoned law of conduct is vain. No one is justified in adopting the pessimistic conclusion that the conscious life of man has no rational end, nor the semipessimistic conclusion that man's earthly experience has no end save one that is beyond the scope of human observation, until the attempt to discover the end *in* human experience has been exhausted and has failed. No one shall warn us off from that attempt.

Moreover, even though there be also an end attained by human life which is not in human life or discoverable by human intelligence, certain it is that there are values in human experience. If they do not constitute the whole end of human action, they are at least a definite and highly important class of phenomena, the complex and peculiar conditioning of which can be investigated. This justifies the existence of a scientific study of human values, to compare them with each other, to formulate out of the elements furnished by experience a more and more adequate concept of them in their harmony and completeness, and in the light of experience to distinguish those forms of conduct which are promotive of human values from those that destroy, disorganize, and degrade life by preventing the realization of such value-phenomena.

If the laws of conduct thus derived were subject to higher laws involved in a nature-of-things not revealed in human experience, then, if anybody could by any possibility get at the content of such absolute laws, they would be superior to the laws prescribing the conduct conducive to human-experience-values. The latter would

be only laws for the attainment of a part which is subject to the greater whole, and the science of human-experience-values would then be a science of a part, yet a true science, since human-experience-values are a distinct kind of phenomena rising from a special complexus of conditioning. And no other values of which they can be a part are discoverable by the human mind. The whole harmony of values realizable in human experience is the highest and largest end that can be formulated by human intelligence for the guidance of human action; and ethics, if it is anything intelligible, is the formulation of that concept and discovery of the method by which those values are conditioned. Any trustworthy concept of these values must be an induction from knowledge of that which already has been, though the induction may outrun all that ever was in any single instance, gathering elements from the widest observation, and inferring the possibility of new combinations from knowledge of fragmentary realizations. And any trustworthy knowledge of the conditions under which those values can be realized must result from experience and objective research. Furthermore, such values, though grounded in man's inborn nature, are now found in socially evolved activity; they are conditioned by social coöperation; knowledge of the methods of their conditioning is mainly knowledge of social interaction; and the development of such knowledge into prevalent and dominant sentiments is a process of social evolution. The science which deals with the four ethical problems, whatever it is called, is a science of social life.

In so far as such knowledge is attained we have no need for speculations as to the "ground of moral obli-

gation," but clearly see moral obligation in the conditions of human good, and see the basis of the moral law to be as absolute as the law of cause and effect is absolute in any other realm. Reason and courage forbid us to be blinded by a dolorous present and insist that we have faith that better knowledge of life's practical requirements will be the source of motives to nerve coming generations to achieve a nobler civilization,—motives that will replace the more or less artificial ones offered by ancient poets and philosophers and the more or less waning incentives of supernaturalism. It is the pitiful "illusion of the near" to think that in the millions of years that our sun will continue to shine there is to be no progress. The lesson of the past is that progress is cumulative. And the greatest opportunity for progress is not in bettering machines but in improving ideals of general welfare, knowledge of the methods by which such welfare can be attained, standards of individual and social success, and motives to conduct. It would be irrational and craven not to hope that the new common sense [4] born of advancing science will include more adequate knowledge of the ways in which all sorts of good and evil are to be sought and shunned as fruits of our social interdependence, of what values are at stake in life and how our actions forfeit and violate the good, or secure it. Upon such science there may be based an art of life that will tend to release men from fruitless striving after mistaken ends; and spread abroad standards of approval and condemnation that will give a new and

[4] It is elsewhere noted (p. 313) that the phrase "common sense" has two meanings. Here it has its social, not its psychological, signification.

nobler definition to the word success, a worthier bent to ambition; turn the stimulations of applause, the urgency of duty, and the zest of self-expression into wiser ways; and thus discover new levels of human possibility and satisfaction, impossible to the isolated individual human will, made possible only by a social situation created by the presence of a social mass enlightened as to the ends and means of life, as no great population as yet has ever been. The standards of conduct thus disclosed we shall enforce upon others with a determination proportioned to our recognition of their necessity. And because we thus enforce them upon others they will bind themselves upon our own consciences with the logic of consistency. Open-eyed conviction and sane vision of the forms of human peril, possibility, and worth, might then inspire more stirring poetry and nobler art than ever sprung from the cathedral-building mysticism of the medievals, and sustain a steadier devotion and fidelity adequate to the strains of a complex and towering civilization. Give us a few generations in which the new food for heroism and joy in life has not only been discovered and adequately set forth, but backed by authority, glorified by art, and established in common consent, and then let us see to what society can rise. Our symbols of art and ritual will then stand not for a merely metaphysical absolute, nor for an arbitrary divine decree, but for all the weal and woe, the blight and fulfillment, the waste and worth, the good and evil of which human life and possibility are compacted, and they will stir the heart and command the conscience with devotion to the very ends that stir the soul of God, if there be a God whose name is Love.

Why should the sociologist be afraid of losing caste with scientists by acknowledging the hope that the knowledge which he seeks will be of use to men? It may be easy to lose sight of that hope when studying mathematics or material things, but the sociologist, if he be a real man, is daily reminded of it, because his object matter is human experience itself. And if he be a real scientist, that very hope will make him the more on guard to see the objects of his study in a dry light, knowing that the application of truth must often be long deferred, that no uses can be truly served by him or his science, nor true progress made in it save by the disinterested search for objective reality, even when reality seems to shatter faiths and baffle hopes; and that to vitiate his process by haste for application would be the more deplorable in proportion as the practical good to be anticipated from genuine objective comprehension is the greater.

Much more might be said concerning the practical advantages of the scientific conception of the nature of moral law. Is it not possible that one of the most mischievous delusions that has ever entered the mind of man to paralyze justice and drug conscience is the belief that sometime, somewhere, a law other than that of cause and effect will intervene to right wrongs, to reward innocent victims for their sufferings and repair the ruin wrought by malice, selfishness, ignorance, and the negligence that "meant no harm." When we look upon the millions who miss life's values, if we are aware that the differences in human experience are results of causation, we shall be inspired, as students, to investigate that causation. With adequate realization of that fact, even cruelty would

pause to sow broadcast the seeds of woe, and generous humanity would waken to its task, and would discover a new enthusiasm and a new motive to devotion, in the fact that whatever a man soweth that shall many reap. We are cast upon an age in which the mystical motives have declined, and we must discover new motives or life will become sordid and desolate, and society a trough, a sty, and a slaughter pen. A little knowledge has proved a dangerous thing. We miss the stars that once we sailed by and must look for the sun. All that ever made right right, and all that ever made wrong wrong, is eternal. Men know but dimly why right and wrong are right and wrong and so appeal to conscience with every fanciful sanction that their ingenuity can devise, not only to impose motives upon the consciences of others who required control, but also to satisfy their own souls with tonic, for there is no tonic like a lofty motive, and without it life is flat and stale. We shall discover new inspiration not by shutting our eyes in meditation, but by opening wide our eyes and raising them to look abroad, straight into the facts of life, fearless of the light. And if subjective fellowship with anthropomorphic idola grows less inspiring and is not easily replaced by truer notions of the immanent unseen, then from the seen, when seen more fully, will come our inspiration. And if at first, missing the more familiar light, some men feel that nothing matters now, and the unlighted world looks one monotonous gray, then let us remember that in that gray is all the white and all the black. And from that whiteness of human purity and love and constancy and worth was taken all the white glory of our thought of the God of love and righteousness, and from that blackness was

borrowed all the blackness of the devil and of hell. The whiteness and the blackness are still here—the glory and the blight. The strife of Ahura-Mazda and Ahriman does not cease because men loose their superstitious faith in those personifications. Let "God" and "The Devil" become names for the sum of all that is good and that makes for goodness, and all that is evil and that makes for evil. Thus the acts of man will be more clearly seen as of God or of the Devil.

The Intelligible Imperative

In many minds the old foundation for a life of worth and dignity has crumbled, the old fountain of earnestness and noble zeal has dried up, for the typical son of the twentieth century the categorical imperative is no more. If that foundation was sand where is the rock? The only unassailable basis for an intelligently conducted life is sane general apprehension of life's values and the relation of our conduct to their realization.

As the thought of a single anticipated experience may move us to a single act, so the most general survey of human weal and woe which our experience and imagination enable us to make may stir us more effectually. It is true, the small concrete instances completely presented to the mind may stir us more directly and emotionally than any general survey of life's values. Yet the comparatively unemotional admission that the whole is greater than that part which moves us so will incite the well-trained man to fulfill the requirements of the larger vision. If the emotion that we feel at a single instance were multiplied by the whole number of in-

stances of weal and woe, we should be overwhelmed and driven mad. The emotion that is aroused in us by a single instance serves to propel us in activities calculated to ward off similar instances of evil or to secure similar instances of good in a thousand repetitions. Moreover, the realization that the world can be delivered from chaos and its rich possibilities fulfilled only as men act upon these general perceptions of reason, produces in the well-trained man the support of feeling for these reasonable demands, and a revulsion of feeling against disobedience to them. Further, our own self-sense reënforces this prompting, and one rebels at the thought that *he* should fail to be one of those who play the reasonable part. The motive of moral consistency adds its propulsion to any recognized requirement, but the generalized social imperative is peculiarly adapted to be reënforced by the whole power of that motive. Such causes may arouse in us the prompting not merely to a single act, but to a life of reasonable purpose.

The motive thus inspired is the prompting of the general conclusion of practical reason. Every practical judgment is hypothetical: If I put my hand in the fire I shall be burned; I shrink from burning, therefore I shrink from the act which would involve such consequences. If I follow one course I shall add to the sum of evil; if I follow the other I shall add to the sum of good and be a part of the force that makes for the fulfillment of the good possibilities of man. We all want the general good to be secured, but if the boat laden with the hopes of us all comes duly to harbor it will be because each one pulls an oar. Can I be boring holes

in the bottom of the boat while others row? No force is adequate to hold each man in his place save each man's perception of his own duty. No law will suffice but the law of freedom by which each one is a law unto himself. The lawlessness of one undermines the fidelity of others while each faithful soul is a center of soundness—this is the salt which saves the world. It is the sight of the self-imposed fidelity of the faithful that keeps alive man's faith in man wherever that faith does not die. The more others do not see, or seeing do not obey, the law of our common life the more cause for the fidelity of the one. Where others prove unfaithful he alone cannot achieve the ends which by their coöperation he might have reached, but failing so, though at the stake or on the cross, he will be a savior. Let each so play his part that if all should play their parts likewise, the good possibilities of the group in which he moves, and of humanity, would be fulfilled. There is no other way to save the world. The generalized rational, or hypothetical, imperative has all the majesty without the incomprehensibility of the categorical imperative.

No follower of the rational social imperative can ever think that it imposes a merely negative responsibility requiring him to do no harm. The source of life's reasonable motives is not merely that there is harm to be prevented but also in the fact that there is always potential good to be achieved, and that this potential good must largely be a coöperative social achievement, in which each man's work and the suggestions emanating from his personality play a part. The logic of the generalized hypothetical imperative requires him so to act

as to fit into the general method of the social realization of good. In entering upon any situation in life, in joining a moonlight stroll or a parlor festival, in accepting a place on an athletic team, or membership in a home, in taking employment with a firm, or engaging a workman, or opening an office in a city, it is reasonable to ask both what can I get out of this situation and what can I put into it. Not to ask the latter as well as the former question is to be base and parasitic. *Every social situation is a coöperative undertaking in which each one depends upon the rest and must be depended on,* which each one can and must make either worse or better. This realization makes men real. Moved by it one cannot make goods "just to sell," one will not speak or write moved only by the thought of the reaction of the public upon himself with praise or blame, reward or penalty, but he will speak and write and work for truth and righteousness.

Whatever may be true of women, with men it is the generalized social imperative rather than particular sympathy that evokes the highest devotion and lives of consistent and dependable usefulness. Saints, missionaries, and reformers are not likely to be persons whose benevolent life-purpose depends wholly upon sympathy with particular instances that chance to come within their observation, but they are likely rather to be persons who can feel enthusiasm for a general social campaign. So also is the ordinary good and fit citizen of an advanced and advancing society. Personal, as distinguished from social, sympathy will not do. It is too short-sighted, it can feel a social pin prick, but it cannot see a thirteen-

inch gun aimed across the social battlefield. Milkmen who would die rather than strangle one baby have murdered innocents like Herod. Corporators who would passionately defend the property rights of an acquaintance have appropriated millions for which they have made no return. In the mind of the good man the generalization of the requirements of humanity must go beyond the particular instance. Suppose certain corporations are bound to use money enough to kill a bill which is pending before a legislature, and that the bill ought to be killed. Shall the legislator say: "I will take the thousand dollars offered for my negative vote; it will make no difference except that the money will be in my pocket instead of some other"? Or shall he say: "Bribery and the perversion of representative government can be stopped only when legislators refuse bribes. There is vastly more at stake than this strike bill. All strike bills, fit city charters, administration of health laws that could save thousands of lives annually; all laws, the general promotion of welfare realizable by pure legislation and administration, all are at stake—more than men have died for on many a battlefield is at stake. Progress waits for soundness. It is for me to help perpetuate the existing rottenness by being a part of it or to be one center of soundness and give back to the man who offers me the bribe his faith in men. It may do no good in the present legislation, but my sacrifice will be part of the cost of the coming better day." This is the meaning of the saying of Christ, "If any man will come after me let him take up his cross and follow me"—let him pay his part of the cost as I pay mine on my cross.

This, then, is our conclusion: It makes a difference what men believe. With truer ideas we shall have a better world. The fond imaginings of the past, though necessary in their day, have become obstacles to progress. If the officially advocated creed of the good loses hold upon earnest and intelligent youth and leaves them to blackness and wandering when a newer, better creed would recruit them to righteousness, then fidelity to that old creed and opposition to the creed of reality becomes a work of the devil. While we are interested in past speculation concerning ethics, as a portion of the history of human thought, yet from this time on the study of ethics should be definitely taken over from the realm of speculative philosophy to the realm of objective science. And while some of the men who pursue that study may be called philosophers and some may be called sociologists, they all will be engaged in building up that which we call sociology, though some of them may give their work another name.

Whatever may be thought of Comte's famous doctrine of "the three stages of progress" in other connections, it applies neatly to the development of ethical theory. Ethical theory had its "theological" stage, in which the moral law was regarded as the voice of God in the soul of man. It then had its "metaphysical" period in which moral law was conceived of as a sublime abstraction emanating from the *"Ding an sich"* which lies beyond the range of human observation. And now it is entering upon the "positive," or "scientific, stage, with the recog-

nition that the rise of the various and conflicting conscience codes of different peoples is no more mysterious than the rise of different languages or different political systems; that conscience codes are the products of human instinct and reason trying to find the essential requirements of successful life, the avoidance of death, pain, and sorrow, and the attainment of happiness in the organized struggle for social existence. Conscience codes are typical products of that complex but methodical reaction between human nature and its natural and social environment which constitute social evolution. They evolve and progress from crude and rudimentary forms toward loftier and more rational types, as other institutions have done and will continue to do. And if after scientific study they no longer seem to derive authority from "supernatural" or "ultrarational" sources, they will be seen instead to have such authority as they do intrinsically possess and will even appear with a certain sublimity as the supreme expression of human powers of thought and feeling and of the immutable laws of nature as they apply to the life of man.

"Modern science does much more than demand that it shall be left in undisturbed possession of what the theologian and metaphysician please to term its 'legitimate field.' It claims that the whole range of phenomena, mental as well as physical—the entire universe in so far as it can be known by man—is its field. It asserts that the scientific method is the sole gateway to the whole region of knowledge. The touchstone of science is the universal validity of its results for all normally constituted and duly instructed minds. Because the glitter of the great metaphysical systems becomes as dross when

tried by this touchstone, we are compelled to classify them as interesting works of the imagination, and not as solid contributions to human knowledge." [5] "Each one of us is now called upon to give a judgment upon an immense variety of problems, crucial for our social existence. If that judgment confirms measures and conduct tending to the increased welfare of society, then it may be termed a moral, or, what is the same thing, a social judgment. . . . It cannot be too often insisted upon that the formation of a moral judgment—that is, one which the individual is reasonably certain will tend to social welfare—does not depend solely on the readiness to sacrifice individual gain or comfort, or on the impulse to act unselfishly; it depends, in the first place, on knowledge and method. The man who gives a thousand pounds to a vast and vague scheme of charity may or may not be acting socially. . . . The 'philosophical' method can never lead to a real theory or morals." [6]

I do not claim that sociology has already solved the four problems of ethics; on the contrary, the glory of sociology largely consists in the fact that so much of opportunity for useful intellectual achievement lies before it especially in discovering what men are required to do. The end of that quest may well be almost as remote as the cessation of progress.

When Comte set out to write a *Positive Philosophy* he discovered the necessity of a sociology. When Spencer set out to write a *Synthetic Philosophy* he made the same discovery. That is to say, when the attempt was made to focus the light of the sciences upon the

[5] Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science*, 24. London, 1899.
[6] *Ibid.*, 26.

problems that are of deepest interest to man and that till then had been treated by speculation rather than by the accumulation and interpretation of facts, it was discovered that a large area of the facts most closely related to those problems had not been made the objects of scientific treatment, and that the sciences would not be ready to throw their light upon these problems until this area of reality had been investigated in a scientific spirit and by scientific methods.

Spencer pointed out that the long delay in applying scientific methods to this field of realities had been due in part to the great complexity of their causation and the corresponding difficulty of investigating them; and in part to the fact that the very depth of their interest to man had rendered them the subject of cherished prejudices which resisted the deliberate and impartial appeal to the investigation of facts, a process always dangerous to prejudices, even to those noble prejudices which are cherished as essential parts of a theory of life that has been speculatively evolved, and adapted to serve the interests dear to those who first formulated and later defended them. To this it may be added that the complexity of their causation even allowed men to deny that they were caused in any scientific sense, and that the most cherished of the prejudices in regard to them was the belief that they were, instead, the expressions of causeless freedom springing *de novo* in every human breast.

There are two ways in which contributions to philosophic thought have been made. The earlier and more characteristic method of philosophy has been the metaphysical. That is, to state a vast and fundamental prob-

lem in the abstractness appropriate to its generality, and then to reflect upon it in the light of such knowledge as might chance to be at the command of the thinker and of such hypotheses as might chance to form themselves in his mind. The other and more scientific method has been to start with some single fact or class of facts and painstakingly to accumulate particulars related to that fact or class of facts, as *elements* into which it might be analyzed, as *conditions* of its manifestation, or as *consequences* of its presence, so that these facts of observation and the hypotheses which they seemed to demand, might be knit together in thought into a correlated unity, believed to correspond to a portion of the unity of nature. Scientific generalization does not start from the vast problems of "being," "essence," etc., and come down toward specific realities which require to be explained, but starts with the specific reality and carries its explanation out and out as far as it can. It never gets beyond the causal conditioning in which all phenomena hang together. Some phenomena have more complex conditioning than others and could not come into existence till previous combinations and recombinations had ripened the situation for them. Their explanation requires a very inclusive survey of natural conditioning, including a recognition of previous combinations that were necessary antecedents to their appearance.[7]

The attempt to account for the varieties of concrete content in the experience-activity of men in society, in the light of their conditions, would synthesize a large portion of the results of all sciences. It would not

[7] The justification alleged for Comte's hierarchy of the sciences of which he makes sociology the highest.

retrace the *investigations* of other sciences but it would accept results from many, perhaps from all, for the more complex the causation of any class of phenomena, the more the science which explains that class of phenomena must utilize the results of antecedent sciences. This biology well illustrates. Sociology illustrates it still further. Each of these sciences carries on an investigation of its own, but in the pursuit of its own investigation it synthesizes results of antecedent sciences. Sociology aims to correlate all discovered processes which play a part in the conditioning of social life. The more rich and complex in its constitution, and in the conditioning which it implies, and in the manifestations or consequences in which it issues, the particular class of facts which is chosen as the center of investigation, the wider the circle of correlated phenomena; that is, the larger the portion of the unity of nature that is made comprehensible to the mind as a result of the investigation. And the life which is lived by men in society is the reality, a study of which brings into intelligible correlation the largest portion of the unity of nature that can be thought together by the human mind. Therefore, sociology, if successful in its intellectual undertaking, will be, in that sense, the most philosophical of all the sciences.

This is the same sense, however, in which physics and chemistry and biology are philosophical. Every science, in this sense, is philosophical in proportion as it correlates a large body of constituent conditioning and resultant phenomena in the explanation of a distinct class of problem phenomena. It is in this sense that sociology may become the most philosophical of the sciences. Physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy and biology are

the modern successors of the ancient ontology and cosmology; psychology, of the ancient epistemology, and sociology, of the ancient ethics.

Sociology, if successful in its great task, must be the most philosophical of the sciences. Sociology, however, is not, and should not be, philosophical in any other sense than that in which the material sciences are philosophical. It is only more so in degree because it carries the process of explanation by the correlation of phenomena a step farther.

CHAPTER X

THE MOTIVES TO RIGHTEOUSNESS: I. THE ETHICAL FUNCTIONS OF HUMAN PREDISPOSITIONS

After the appeal to the facts has answered the four questions: What is good? what is right? whence come moral codes? and how should those codes next be amended? there still remains a fifth, namely: Upon what motives can we rely to secure conformity to the adopted moral code?

Religious writers declare that good conduct requires of the individual so much sacrifice of his own interest to the interests of others that no one can be expected to be good unless he is controlled by religious motives which induce him not to follow his own selfish desires for this life, but to practice the conduct that secures the welfare of others and his own soul's salvation at the cost of diminishing his natural gratifications. They have asserted with the greatest emphasis that man must mortify his natural desires in this world in order to secure divine favor and reward and to escape divine retribution, and that in the absence of religious motives, built on faith, men could not be expected to be good enough to maintain an advanced and advancing society.

This is the burden of the brilliant argument of Benjamin Kidd. He avers that a scientific or rational basis for ethics is utterly impossible and that man is, therefore,

irresistibly impelled to seek for supernatural and ultrarational sanctions for right conduct. An observer of human history from another planet, says Mr. Kidd, would everywhere find men "clinging with the most extraordinary persistence to ideas and ideals which regulated his life under the influences of religions, and ruthlessly persecuting all those who endeavored to convince him that these conceptions were without foundation in fact. At many periods in human history, also, he would have to observe that the opinion had been entertained by considerable numbers of persons, that a point had at length been reached at which it was only a question of time until human reason finally dispelled the belief in those unseen powers which man held in control over himself. But he would find this anticipation never realized. Dislodged from one position, the human mind, he would observe, had only taken another of the same kind which it continued once more to hold with the same unreasoning, dogged and desperate persistence.

"Strangest sight of all, the observer, while he would find man in every other department of life continually extolling his reason, regarding it as his highest possession, and triumphantly reveling in the sense of power with which it equipped him, would here see him counting as his bitterest enemies worthy of the severest punishment, and the most persistent persecution, all who suggested to him that he should, in these matters, walk according to its light." [1] His thesis is thus asserted by this author: "No form of belief is capable of functioning as a religion in the evolution of society which does

[1] Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, 98. New York, 1895.

not provide *an ultrarational sanction for social conduct* in the individual." In other words, "a rational religion is a scientific impossibility, representing, from the nature of the case, an inherent contradiction of terms." [2] His conclusion may be summarized in two propositions: First, we must have religion; second, we cannot get it by the exercise of reason.

But in many minds, at least, the rational process does and will dominate. The exercise of those faculties on which in every other realm of thought we rely for guidance will not be suspended in the interest of faith. Moreover, the minds thus dominated by reason include a considerable number of the most instructed and the most gifted, who could become exceedingly mischievous and destructive or highly useful and constructive members of society. It even seems likely that the dominating class in modern society will be composed of such individuals who walk by sight rather than by faith. It is not impossible that in some of the most advanced nations, like France and Germany, this condition has already been reached, and that it cannot be permanently postponed in any great nation. Never till recently has science had so compelling a voice. Never till recently has her voice been so clearly heard by large masses outside the esoteric circle of the learned.

The question which we ask is: What guidance and motive is there for one who must live by observation and reason rather than by "ultrarational" or "superrational" faith? Can such an individual be expected to live, not like a splinter or a parasite in the social body, but like

[2] *Ibid.*, 108.

a functioning part helping to sustain and promote the social life from which he himself derives his individual life? Can a society made up, or at least controlled by such individuals, dominated by reason rather than by faiths devised to suit the social need, maintain an advanced and advancing social life in which a high level of human experience can be attained, and if so, what are the motives that can secure such good conduct on the part of men from whose minds the motives of supernaturalism and of all ultrarational dogmas have faded away?

The commonest answer to this question by those who believe that an affirmative answer can be given is that such men will be intelligent enough to see that their own interests can be secured only in a good society, and that for the privilege of living in a good society they will do what must be done to help maintain such a society, yielding whatever of sacrifice is required as the price of all the advantages they gain from the developed social state.

That is like saying that intelligent men would pay their taxes if there were no compulsion. But would they, or would they say: "At this particular time I need the money more than the state does; if I keep my money I get the whole benefit of it, while if I pay it I get only a little share in what it buys; besides, my paying taxes will not insure that others will pay theirs"? It is true that if all pay as they should, then, although the taxpayer gets only a little share of what *his* money buys, he gets a similar share in what is bought by the money of other citizens, and so on the average by the coöper-

ation he gets more than his own contribution by itself would purchase. On the average he gets more than he gives. But there is no averaging of the payments of moral duty. There is, in the first place, no certainty that without compulsion others will do their part, and that my idealism will not cause me to perish in an unideal world. And in the second place, moral duties are not assessed on any basis of equality of sacrifice. Instead, duty requires of certain individuals at certain junctures sacrifices that no mere calculation of their private interest in maintaining the social situation can be relied upon to prompt. It is no doubt often necessary to social progress that gifted youths should prefer usefulness with self-respect and the love of a few to money and place. But will that realization uphold the resolution of a given youth when tempted, like Jesus in the wilderness, to follow the easy deviation that leads from service to conventional respectability and wealth? It is, no doubt, socially desirable that an engineer alone in the bowels of a sinking ship should do his duty till the last passenger has been removed. But will that generalization keep this particular engineer at his post? Men do such things from altruism, self-respect, and social discipline, but not from calculated interest in maintaining the social order for their own benefit. We cannot be content with the easy answer to the present question which merely says that each intelligent man, in the enlightened pursuit of his own interest, will do his duties for the sake of living in a society in which all men do their duties. A man will not lay down his life for the sake of living in a society in which all men do their duties.

And men must sometimes lay down their lives. Pure selfishness, however enlightened, would rather live, rich and conspicuous, in a world made slightly worse by its own sins than crucify any strong desire for the sake of a coming kingdom of righteousness.

We must, therefore, take a careful and somewhat anxious inventory of the resources on which we can depend for moral motives in a world that walks by sight. In doing so we do not here propose to attempt an evaluation of all the propensities of human nature with reference to their social or antisocial character, but only to enumerate those which play the chief rôles in causing good and evil. Moreover, our analysis is qualitative rather than quantitative. The preponderance of good is not insured even though we find that man has tendencies which, when they dominate his conduct, make him behave like a good and social being. A single evil prompting may triumph over any number of good ones, just as in another instance a single good tendency may triumph over any number of evil ones. The only question which we attempt to answer is: Has man tendencies which will secure good conduct provided they can be made dominant? If he has, the practical problem will remain of creating a social situation in which the better tendencies will be called into action and in which individual opinions, sentiments, and habits will be formed in accordance with the socializing tendencies of man's nature. If this result is attained it will be both through unplanned social evolution and through conscious organization of society and education of its members.

Natural Resources of Righteousness: Sensitiveness to Social Approval and Disapproval

The motives of religion are all social motives. That is, they depend on our thought of some other person who approves or disapproves our conduct. The fact that this other person is thought of as Divine, the Judge of all the Earth, or the Divine Companion, is what gives to religious motives their superiority over motives supplied by earthly rulers, by public opinion, or by regard for friendship. There is no essential difference in kind, but only in degree, between fear of Hell and fear of the hangman, between desire for Heaven and desire for position in good society on Earth, between regard for the favor toward us and the grief or joy in us of God and regard for the favor, grief or joy of parents and friends.

Not only do religious motives have incalculable emotional power, but "the eye of God sees everywhere" so that regard for Him deters from secret sins in which men think that the human beings for whom they care will never detect them, and even quenches sins of the heart. Moreover, the standards of the Divine Associate are perfect while the men and women about us may condone, or even approve, conduct that is below the best we know. In these three things lies the tremendous value of religious motives and their power to ennoble the individual and to uplift and stabilize society. It would be well for every man, whatever his faith or lack of it, to live as he would if he were always in the presence of a Divine Companion.

To subtract from the world religious motives in their highest form would be an incalculable loss, but it may be

that other motives to right conduct, as social evolution proceeds, will greatly gain in definiteness and power, as well as in the universality with which they will be inculcated. And the loss of supernaturalism would by no means leave us bankrupt of social motives, for human associations would remain and regard for the rewards conferred and the punishments inflicted by our fellow men, for their favor or disfavor and for their grief or joy in us, is identical in kind with regard for the punishment and favor of God. The rewards and punishments of men are far from negligible. Success and happiness in this world depend on conformity to social standards. The power of men to detect our character is by no means slight. Even when none know all our deeds of good or evil they are not likely greatly to misapprehend our true quality. And the men and women whose favor and friendship is best worth having judge us by exacting and ennobling standards. Even if they are not able themselves to embody the ideal they are at least able to appreciate in others either departure from it or conformity to it. The ideal which we attribute to God first arose in the minds of men. Gods have not always been noble and are never nobler than the ideals dictated by the hearts and minds of the men who worship them. The religious motive at its best is only the apotheosis of the social motive. And in a world of men who walk by sight the social motive to right conduct would be both ennobling and powerful. The ideal would be one of social service, enforced by all the hopes and fears that gather about our fellow men. The social motive, even without a Divine Associate, is still the strongest that sways us,

stronger in normal life than hunger or sex. Men "seek glory e'en at the cannon's mouth," and find in their relations with their kind both happiness and despair.

There are also other sources of motive to right conduct that will remain, whatever may become of the poetry of the Invisible, motives that are inherent in human nature and of which we cannot be deprived, motives, moreover, which, like the social motives, increase in social serviceableness with social progress. Counting as first among the natural resources of righteousness man's tremendous sensitiveness to social approval and disapproval, the other elements of human nature upon which we must mainly rely are, second, altruism; third, self-respect or pride; fourth, ethical feelings of repugnance and disgust, attraction and enthusiasm; and fifth, reason.

While the motives next to be discussed are distinct from the social motives, they, like all other ethical motives, depend for the *direction* in which their power impels us upon the particular society or societies from which we derive the content of our life. As has been clearly pointed out, we should not have an ethical code any more than a language except as members of a society that has an ethical code and a language. But our problem here is not whether men can have an ethical code without supernaturalism. That question no longer troubles us. The present question is whether without supernaturalism we can have adequate motives for obedience to such a code.

We have just seen that society which, through common experience and the insight of moral leaders, more

or less perfectly discovers the requirements of social life, has power to enforce those requirements upon us by every form of earthly reward and punishment, including the penalties and rewards of social exaltation and debasement, love and despair. While, however, we depend on society so largely for the conscience code, we are by no means equally dependent on society for motives to obey the code. There are motives that prompt us quite irrespective of whether our fellow men approve or disapprove, reward or punish. The force of these motives is as independent of the detection of our evil or the recognition of our good by men as is regard for all-seeing Divinity. Even repentance before God is reënforced by shame before men, and the social pressure backs up every kind of motive to good, as good is understood by society, but the motives now under discussion are no more *dependent* on the pressure exerted by human society than is the fear of God. The weary mother in the night does not hasten to minister to her crying baby out of regard for any one's approval or reward, or fear of censure or penalty. Human nature is social nature. We have developed in the horde, the clan, the family, the neighborhood, and the neighborhood is widening to include the world. The altruism of its members has survival value for the group and, therefore, has been fostered by natural selection. Groups exterminate many of their parasites, and groups of individuals who were mere parasites upon each other could not well survive. Here we are, the products of our past; we should not be here if we were wholly unfit by nature for that coöperation which is the condition *sine qua non* of human life.

Altruism as One of the Resources of Righteousness

It is true that sheer altruism is often pitifully feeble in comparison with other promptings and must be supplemented by other motives of our nature and by social pressures if coöperative social life is to succeed. It is not equal to all the tasks of social order and progress, but neither is it our sole dependence for order and progress. All order and progress depend upon a high degree of mutual serviceableness, but mutual service is not solely dependent on the instinct of altruism. Instinctive altruism is only one of four elements on which, *in addition* to social pressures and incitements, including the matter of fact inducements of *quid pro quo*, we depend for securing services. Native altruism, however, though only one, is a highly important one among the factors of the situation.

Altruism, like other instinctive promptings, may even at times go to excess and require to be moderated and controlled, as notoriously it does in the case of parents who "spoil" their children when they have the power to do so much for them as to foster parasitism, inhibit the exercise of altruism on the part of the children, or remove the occasion for developing self-reliance and self-control.

The idea that egoism is sin, if not indeed the sum of all sin, and that altruism is righteousness, if not the sum of all righteousness, taken without qualification or analysis, embodies a pernicious blunder. It is indeed true that most people are not altruistic enough to meet the

demands of social organization without the aid of social pressure and, in consequence, preachers of righteousness exhort us to altruism and warn against egoism. But it is far from true that desires for our own life and happiness are wrong. Neither is it true that every altruistic impulse should be obeyed. The type of altruism is in the relation of mother to child, and there are many mothers who would spoil their children if there were not a father either less altruistic or more reasonable. "The greatest thing in the world" is not altruistic impulse but justice, that is to say, the rectification of the impulses by reason.

From one point of view it may even be argued that altruism is itself a form of selfishness. It would be pain to a normal mother to hear her baby crying while she was prevented from ministering to it, and when freed to do so she would rush to it with a sense of relief, and would gather it to her with joy in the action that brought back its smiles. It would be painful, more or less, for a normally altruistic man to refuse direly needed aid to any one whom he included in his circle of fellowship, and helpfulness is rendered to those within our group with a certain gratification to the person ministering. From these facts it is possible to argue that in order to be logical we must say that altruistic experience, being a good in itself, is as selfishly sought as any other, thus arriving at the paradox that there is no such thing as unselfish motive, because the man who obeys a sympathetic prompting is gratifying the craving of his own nature as truly as he who satisfies any other appetite.

That is true to the extent that all of a man's acts are the expression of his own nature. If by egoism we

mean the sum total of the individual's promptings, then egoism includes all man's vices and all man's virtue: cruelty and gluttony and also magnanimity and devotion. Used in that sense, the word egoism loses all ethical significance. And this line of argument is superficially employed by some to obscure the existence of ethical distinctions. But it remains true that just as there is a difference between a bright man and a stupid one, or between a brave man and a coward, so there is a clear difference between an altruistic man and a selfish man.

It must be remembered that, from the evolutionary point of view, gratification is not the *raison d'être* of instinct but only a subordinate element in it. Instinct is the inherited capacity and tendency to perform necessary functions in the presence of appropriate stimuli. The social instincts are predispositions to perform the functions necessary to maintain group life and to secure advantages to *the species*, but not necessarily to the actor. Purely instinctive acts are not performed from balanced calculation of anticipated gratification, but as organic reflexes. "I hate to get mad," said an undisciplined young woman, "but I just can't help it." The man of ungovernable temper often deplores the fact and in swashbuckling times he involves himself in combats so unequal as to invite suffering and even death. He does all this, not because the pleasure of getting angry excites such strong desire, but because the organic impulse functions. The altruistic man, like the angry man, in spite of calculated recognition that the cost will far outweigh any advantages to himself, or in complete oblivion of all calculation may obey his promptings to self-devotion. The angry man and the altruistic man might behave as

they do because of an instinctive delight which they expect to find in rage or altruism, if it were true that they anticipated such delight. But altruism is so characteristically costly to the actor and rage so characteristically perilous that it is no wonder if nature has given up attempting to make these instincts specially delightful and has depended chiefly on sheer organic propulsion. Typically, neither anger nor altruism, neither the desire to destroy nor the desire to preserve another, depends merely on the pleasure contained in the angry or the altruistic act. A man who is capable of such instinctive altruism has in that respect a high degree of adaptation to social life. He is very different from the man who is dominated by other instincts which show themselves in gluttony, laziness, lecherousness, and cruelty and who is incapable of devotion; just as in respect to anger the natural fighter differs from the natural coward. With these facts in mind the statement that altruism is a form of egoism amounts to the triumphant claim that normal mothers and some men are so adapted to group life as to be powerfully prompted to serve others at whatever cost of personal comfort or gratification.

However, it would in no wise detract from the excellence of altruistic conduct if it were more highly gratifying to the actor than it is. To think that is simply to misapprehend the nature of virtue. The old notion that virtue is will triumphing over our depraved nature is false. Altruism as a form of instinctive propulsion is as real, though not as conspicuous, a part of our nature as any of the forms of selfishness. Moreover, will is an even completer expression of our nature than anger, lust, or any vagrant impulse, for what we mean by "will"

as contrasted with "mere impulse" is action that expresses a judgment as well as an unjudged instinctive prompting. Thus, the courage that is most heroic is not the mad fury of the angry man but that which overcomes fear by the motives of self-respect and of deliberately accepted duty. And the cowardice that is mean is not instinctive fear but rather the inability to overcome fear by these higher motives. And altruism itself is most noble when the generous impulse is guided by rational judgment. The virtuous act may be preferred in full consciousness that it costs the sacrifice of some less noble prompting, both because of the power of instinctive altruism and also because the altruistic impulse may ally itself with other elements of our nature. Virtue is not triumph over self but the exhibition of a nobler self triumphing over some impulse that is merely the functioning of some fragment of our nature. The newer and truer view of will and virtue does not deny nobility; it denies only that nobility is inconsistent with our own nature, that it is the triumph of a momentary fiat over settled depravity.

Righteousness includes altruism, but it is more than altruism: it is the balanced operation of all normal motives under the presidency of reason.

If righteousness were merely altruism, then each of us would be normally responsible for the values to be realized by others, and none of us responsible for the values to be realized in his own experience, when the fact is that each is morally responsible in proportion to his power, and our power is greatest over the fulfillment of our own good possibilities, and those of our own household. The Golden Rule would be reduced to an

absurdity if it were made to mean that I and mine shall have no more of my income or of my effort than every neighbor, to the remote Samaritan. The Golden Rule means that we must estimate the values realized in the experience of every neighbor, to the remotest, at its full worth, and instead of caring only for the good to be realized by ourselves and our nearest, we must have regard for all the interests that can be affected by our deeds, and be governed by regard for them in proportion to our power over them.

Although one's responsibility for the worth of his own life is greater than for the life of any other one, yet his responsibility and power over all the other lives he can affect may in the aggregate exceed that which he has for his own life, and the other values that may be realized by his effort may far exceed those attainable in his own experience. Hence, one who plans his life work with exclusive regard to his own good is a recreant member of the commonwealth. If each would be guided by reference to all the values which he could affect, in proportion to his power over them, then all would work together in the attainment of a general well-being, no values being disregarded or violated, but all values sought, even though realized by the Samaritans, and at cost to ourselves. There would be no fat obesity greedily gormandizing in the presence of the living skeletons of want. Not money only but the inestimably more precious thought, work, power of men would be spent in the coöperative enterprise of realizing the values which none of us in isolation can attain.

Though altruism is not the whole of righteousness, yet the judgment of the world is not wrong in giving to altru-

ism the first place among the virtues, provided by altruism we understand not merely the instinctive prompting but the instinctive prompting married to that which we have called "the rational imperative." Altruism, thus defined, is living as if we were what in fact we are, members of society, not isolated individuals, not independent in the attainment and enjoyment of our own happiness nor irresponsible in the exercise of our own powers.

The distortion of life to which we are most prone is selfishness. The rebalancing which life most needs is rational altruism. The cult we need is the cult of service. Here we come again within sight of the great truth proclaimed by Professor Josiah Royce in his *Philosophy of Loyalty* that man becomes fully man only in loyalty to some object greater than himself, "to some cause," said Professor Royce. To his group, the sociologist would say, his group, which on one occasion may be a company of two or three, and on another occasion may be his city or his nation or humanity, but always loyalty to his group, not to some lesser group, which is only a larger and more dangerous form of selfishness, but to the whole group of human beings whom his present act affects. *Membership* is the characteristic of humanity, from the primitive horde to cosmopolitan civilization. All the human life we have, that is, all the life we have that is over and above the functioning of our animal organisms, all we have that is distinctly above the life of the highest of the dumb brutes, is a *participation.* This participation implies a loyalty, and without loyalty that rises upon requirement to devotion men are less than human in character. Without such loyalty it seems that they cannot be

humanly happy. Men can have pleasures without happiness. They can find a degree of pleasantness in life and yet miss its satisfaction, which many of the wisest aver comes only to those who are dominated by the social spirit, the spirit of service.

What is it that makes the heart sing? is one of the profoundest of questions, and its answer is not obvious to inexperience. Our discussion brings us here once more face to face with the truth to which John Stuart Mill has testified in his autobiography already quoted, where he says that after years of experiment with the attempt to live in accordance with the utilitarian philosophy he had learned that the happiness of the individual could not be caught when pursued, but came as the incidental result of pursuing some other aim. Goethe's Faust is by general consent of the competent the supreme literary expression of the great century of literary expression in which it was produced. It holds this place by virtue of being the supremely impressive presentation of the true answer to the great question: What is good for man? And the answer given is that the hour to which the heart of man cries, "Tarry for thou art fair," comes not in carnal pleasure, beauty of art, wealth, power, or fame, but in *service to our kind* which enlists our energies with full consent of our social nature, and full conviction that it is worth while because it ministers to the largest values which we can affect. To share in the common life is the good, to share its pleasure, beauty, wealth, and power while helping to create them. From the time of Solomon to that of Goethe, Mill, and Royce the same verdict is reëchoed, which, if true, is the profoundest lesson of human experience; namely, that though one be the

wisest of men and the richest of kings, though he build himself houses of cedar, provide men singers and women singers and deny himself nothing that heart can wish, all his self-indulgence and self-seeking is "vanity and vexation of spirit." "He that seeketh his life shall lose it" and only "he that loseth his life shall find it"—find it in escaping from the paltriness and futility of mere individualism to the satisfaction and worth of constructive participation in the social life, of which each one of us is in fact a part; and from which in fact we each derive all that lifts us above the level of dumb brutes. It is individuality alone that has worth, but the individuality that has worth is attained only by participation.

The religion of supernaturalism has not been predominantly altruistic. In general, it has sought first the salvation of the individual soul, prosperity on earth through divine favor, and an eternity of bliss in heaven. To live the altruistic life in the spirit of participation in the process of social activity is itself a religion. And when its comradeship with all that is noble in the life of our kind, and its concert of endeavor in bringing to realization all the values that are to be lost or won in human experience, are made the central cult of a new religion, who shall say that it will leave the heart cold, or righteousness without propulsion? Such a cult can be fostered with no strain between the heart and the intelligence. It is not as the symbol of a mystic creed which many honest souls cannot accept, and to which many cling with dubious faith, but it is rather as the embodiment of this ideal of service that the cross of Christ draws all men unto Him.

Ethical Idealism as One of the Resources of Righteousness

Besides that native altruism which in fainter or stronger degree is characteristic of all the gregarious mammals, another natural foundation for social order and progress exists in ethical idealism. There are no savages so low that they do not display esthetic susceptibility. We trade with them by offering colored beads which they prize as we prize diamonds and rubies. In decorations on Australian boomerangs, in flowers twined in the Papuans' kinky hair, in the rhythmic dance and chant and tom-tom beat and mystic ceremonies to feared or friendly gods is shown the same trait of human nature which is manifested in our more developed arts and ceremonies. And *ethical* estheticism is as early developed as that which responds to material beauty. Gratitude that never forgets a kindness; vengefulness as a cherished obligation that never forgets an injury that has been inflicted on a fellow clansman; obedience to taboos that dominate the appetites for food and sex; fair play that makes the savage Maori at night lay bundles of weapons at the entrance to the defenses of a beleaguered foe, that the fight may be renewed with chivalry in the morning; the stoicism of the tortured Indian; fidelity to chiefs and everywhere loyalty to the horde, appeal to the sense of ethical idealism, while their opposites excite repugnance and disgust. Just as there are some material objects too disgusting to smell or taste or touch and some that attract and hold us in enjoyment, so also there are forms of conduct that are repugnant and others that inspire us to emulation and enthusiasm. Just what material

objects will seem attractive and what repugnant, whether we relish Limburger cheese and horse flesh or hate the thought of eggs or milk as some Africans do, depends mainly on social influences. Likewise, just what conduct we shall regard with disgust and what with enthusiasm is equally dependent on social causes. But the capacity for these discriminations, and the disposition to form them, is one of the inherent characteristics of human nature. We shrink from shattering beauty and rejoice in the creation of it, whether that beauty is material or ethical. We hold him a vandal who ruthlessly dashes in pieces a beautiful vase or bedaubs a lovely picture. To send cannon shells crashing through the windows of the cathedral of Reims seems to us as dastardly as to take human life. And there needs to be no watching policeman nor spying Mrs. Grundy to make us shrink from shattering our own moral ideal or to win at times our willing obedience to it.

It is true that there is so much that is hideous in what men do and what men make, in unkempt country hamlets and in squalid city slums, that we may be tempted to say that in these people, at least, there is no sense of beauty. That sense may indeed be little awakened, and overwhelmed by other motives, but the capacity for it in some degree is a part of normal human nature. Similarly the conduct of men is often so sordid and so mean that we are tempted to say that they have no ethical sensibility. It may be undeveloped in many, and other motives may dominate their habits of thought and action. But who of them is unable to detect meanness in others if not in himself? The capacity for ethical loathing and admiration is as inherent a trait of human nature as the sense of material ugliness and beauty.

Response to moral beauty and ugliness, as a guide to conduct, is far from infallible. When has the power of supernaturalism itself been infallible to keep men from sin and win men to righteous deeds? And are we sure that in placing our chief reliance upon motives drawn from faith in the unknown we have strengthened our appeal more than in future we may do by reliance upon the inherent tendencies of human nature, upon sensitiveness to social approval and disapproval, altruism, ethical idealism, self-respect, and reason?

Self-Respect as a Motive to Righteousness

Esthetic idealism which sees beauty in righteousness and ugliness in sin is closely akin to self-respect or *pride,* which is the third element in human nature on which we may rely to furnish a part of the motives to righteousness. But, though closely akin, pride and ethical idealism are not one and the same. We can be proud only of our own conduct or of that of some one belonging to our group with whom we share a common identity; but we may feel esthetic approval for the conduct of an Indian or a Maori or a Samaritan. We may revolt at the violation of the ethical standard and kindle toward obedience to it as objectively and unselfishly as we admire a stained-glass window. The revulsion or the tug of ethical ugliness or beauty, unlike pride, is not dependent on the fact that these qualities belong to me or mine. Pride involves an additional element and is the expression of an additional trait of our nature. A carpenter may be induced to build a beautiful table partly because he has the capacity to appreciate its design and partly because he

has a capacity to delight in his own skill and the exercise of it. Similarly, men may be induced to build a beautiful life partly because they have the capacity to distinguish between beauty and ugliness in human conduct and partly because they have the gift of pride. Although we can scarcely be conscious of beauty in our own conduct without being proud of it, yet the consciousness of beauty and the pride are not one and the same.

It is not always the appreciation of beauty that gives direction to our pride. We may be proud of conduct that is not beautiful. We may be proud of folly, of scalps, of success in crime, of ill-won dollars, as well as of the worthiest achievement. We may be proud of anything that we can identify with our own deliberate intention. But in proportion as we are neither unreasonable nor unesthetic we do not identify ourselves with what is morally ugly or absurd. Provided we have adopted developed ideals and reasonable intentions as our own, the realization of those ideals and the fulfillment of these intentions are urged upon us by our pride. Thus, pride may become noble.

Not only is the capacity for ethical idealism native to man, and pure altruism on certain occasions as spontaneous and uncalculated an expression of human nature as anger or hate, but also right conduct which our impulses otherwise would not prompt nevertheless becomes a form of self-expression through the intervention of the inhibiting and impelling power of pride. Just as a soldier, unlike the angry individual who in his madness rushes into self-destructive single combat, may force himself in spite of trembling knees to face the foe according to his ideal of soldierly conduct, so a husband or friend

or citizen may recognize that his relationship demands of him generous behavior, fidelity, constancy and sacrifice that he cannot withold without forfeiture of self-respect. One of the most ingrained propensities of man is to strive for a satisfying self-sense. This propensity exhibits itself in the most trivial and in the noblest forms of self-judgment, in the fop before the mirror, in the trickster gleeful over his craftiness, in the lone savage exultant over his kill, and also in the martyr serene before the headsman's block and in every man who realizes what are the demands of social relationship and prizes his own integrity. Such a man, perceiving that the good of humanity cannot be attained without certain forms of restraint and of coöperative endeavor on the part of individuals, concludes: "Then I, for one, must practice these restraints and these endeavors or forfeit the right to be in my own eyes a normal member of society."

One reason why pride is so generally regarded, not as an ally to virtue, but as a vice, is the fact that men may glory in rudimentary, unformed and even grotesque personal ideals. The ideals of virtue itself, among primitive peoples, are often rudimentary, unformed and grotesque. Pride in ignoble forms of success for the most part is merely evidence of lack of cultural development, either of the society or of the particular individual. Whatever the ideals and aims of the individual are, pride furnishes a motive to realize those aims and ideals, and if the result is bad the fault is not in pride as a human trait but in the low aims and ideals. The major fault of pride that makes it so often array its power on the side of evil and not on the side of good is that pride tends to be invidious. We have an instinctive tendency to re-

joice in superiority and leadership. Leadership is a social necessity, and the disposition to strive for excellence and leadership is as truly a desirable social instinct as the disposition to glorify and loyally follow acknowledged superiors. But the former instinct, when it is mere untutored instinct, finds gratification when others are inferior as well as when we ourselves are excellent. This causes the meanness of gossip, which talks down the absent. It prompts efforts to impede the success of others, which is the meanness of a runner who fouls a rival in a race. Pride when it is noble measures success, not by the failure of others, but by the conformity of its possessor to a fixed objective standard. Invidious pride prompts men to deceive themselves by exaggerating their own comparative excellence and unjustly to disparage others. The only pride that is a vice is that which measures itself by other men and not by any fixed standard; and the only humility that is a virtue is humility, not before other men, but before the ideal standard to which all men should aspire.

Pride becomes the ally of virtue when social culture is adequate to secure the recognition and adoption of ennobling ideals and aims. The vices of invidious pride need only to be exposed for what they are to be condemned by pride itself. Pride brings to the reënforcement of our ideals and aims, whatever they are, whether rudimentary, unformed and grotesque or reasonable and splendid, one of the most powerful of the motives of human nature. The pride of a reasonable being, reared by a society that holds and inculcates developed standards, is an ennobling and powerful motive to righteousness.

The satisfaction of our sense of personal power and

personal worth is so large an element of human happiness that the Stoics—the wisest men of Greece and Rome—maintained that in comparison with this satisfaction all others are relatively negligible, and held that if this deep serenity be retained all other losses should be unable to overwhelm the calm of the philosopher. "No one can deeply harm you but yourself," they said. "You are the keeper of your life's worth. You could make yourself a liar or a thief, or otherwise despicable and base in your own eyes, but no other can make you so. And while you keep the personality with which you alone are entrusted unmutilated by any act of your own, you retain the deepest source of human happiness."

The values that enter into the sum of human happiness, as we have seen, are of five kinds: physical, intellectual, esthetic, social, and personal. And we are entitled to add that desire for each of the five with the exception of the physical, tends, with the progress of social culture, to become the ally of virtue. Of pride, or the desire for personal satisfactions, we have just seen that it readily comes onto the side of righteousness. It can sink as low as crude and perverted aims, but rises as high as ethical idealism and intelligence rise in defining those aims with which in their inmost thought men identify themselves with full consent. Before that we saw that the esthetic interest, the love of beauty and hate of ugliness in human conduct, is on the side of virtue. And before that we saw that desire for social satisfactions turns virtue into the best policy, and if it is a selfish motive it is no more so than the desire for heaven or the hope to prosper in basket and store by supernatural favor or to live on terms of friendship with a Divine

companion. Human love and desire for the favor and dread of the disfavor of human kind, in normal life furnish the motives which, possibly excepting those of pride, are the most powerful, universal, and unremitting of all, and the ones on which, if physical health be taken for granted, the happiness of human life, which is social life, most largely depends. And the social motives are with all their might on the side of so much virtue as the society to which we want to belong appreciates. And finally, we shall point out that desire for the one remaining type of satisfaction, that is, curiosity, interest, the craving for mental experience, the intellectual prompting, is distinctly on the side of virtue.

If all this be true, why is it that there is so much evil-doing in the world and so great need of more social conduct? Why is it that man is so often and with so much reason regarded as "born to evil as the sparks fly upward," and as "totally depraved" by nature and capable of adjustment to the social requirements only through a supernatural rebirth?

It is in part because men are governed not alone by their calculated desires but also by wayward instincts that do not depend for their power upon plans for happiness. In part it is because the physical desires are non-moral, that is, ethically neither good nor bad. Most of all it is because man becomes human in any complete sense, only as a result of social or cultural evolution, and the masses of men, even yet, are far from having reached the culmination of the process by which our idealism, our pride, and our social ambitions and desires are enlisted to their utmost on the side of virtue. Finally, it is in part because the economic means of satisfying our

desires are limited in supply and what one has another cannot have, and because economic services often cost irksome effort.

Expanding a little the first of these four statements, we observe that such promptings as those of fear, anger, hate, and altruism do not depend for their power upon any balanced estimate of pleasure to be obtained. Normally a man no more gets angry or frightened because he wants to than he sneezes because he wants to. We are equipped with certain instinctive promptings that do not need to be reënforced by desire. These impulses are by no means wholly bad. They even include altruism itself. Indeed, they are, none of them, wholly bad. What are commonly regarded as the worst of these impulses are a large part of the time on the side of righteousness. Even anger and hate are evoked against what we regard as wrong and prompt us to resist evil. But all of these impulses, from anger to altruism, require the guidance of enlightenment. The instincts of an insect are excited by obvious stimuli, but the stimulations of human instincts are often obscure and remote. When man is stimulated only by the obvious, he errs and sins, he is the victim of "misunderstanding," "prejudice," and "shortsightedness." But enlightenment tends to mitigate hate till it resembles our repugnance against deformity and disease, and tends to turn anger into zeal in overcoming obstacles to the execution of wise purposes. Not that enlightenment and social culture will ever banish all antisocial conduct. The horde-beast man may never be perfectly adapted to advanced society. But the best individuals show what human nature is capable of, and some of these best owe nothing to the motives of

supernaturalism. It would probably be quite unwise to wish away any of the instincts of man.

As to the second of the causes named above for the prevalence of antisocial conduct, the worst that can be said of the physical pleasures is that they are in themselves neither right nor wrong, but are heedless of ethical considerations and urge us to seek gratification when gratification is not, as well as when it is, in accord with ethical requirements. This is indeed bad enough, but it is not a mark of depravity. Depravity appears when the nonphysical motives are not strong enough to regulate the physical. And even then, what we call depravity is not a fall from a previous high estate but is rather underdevelopment. The underdevelopment sometimes is physical, as in the feeble-minded and the born criminal, but in general it is social underdevelopment. However prevalent failure at this point has been, millions of individuals have shown the adequacy of other impulses and desires to bring the physical desires within the limits required by social welfare.

The third cause for antisocial conduct which we named above was the incompleteness of the ethical evolution of society and of the ethical education of individuals. The character that is required by advanced society can be expected only of those whose individual life is participation in a developed social culture. It may be the Christian culture, or the culture of the Stoics, of the scientific culture that will prevail in coming centuries. It cannot be doubted that culture of all three of these types has produced characters of lofty nobility. Nor have these three types of culture alone produced nobility. As savages in their weaving and pottery have exhibited

admirable beginnings of esthetic arts, so also they have begun to produce ethical cultures. But lofty character, adapted to the requirements of an advanced society, must always be a product of social evolution. The more matured and the more scientific the culture of a society becomes, the more clearly will be seen the differences between the socially destructive forms of conduct and those which are socially constructive. And when the ethical judgments are not confused and bewildered but far more clearly formed than now, and formed not only in the minds of scientists or seers but adopted and inculcated by a developed common sense, and the sanctions for these requirements are acknowledged to be rational and not merely conventional nor supernatural, it may be that we shall succeed better than now in keeping the gratification of physical appetites within the bounds that reason and experience prescribe, and in mitigating hatreds. We may even hope to reduce the temptations to wrong-doing that arise from the scarcity of economic goods and the irksomeness of economic services, by a wiser and juster organization of our institutions and customs. Our hope will not be in eradicating any human instinct or native tendency, but in eliciting human motives that have power to inhibit injurious manifestations and to prompt those which are in accord with the demands of social life.

Intelligence as One of the Resources of Righteousness

The last in our enumeration of the desires [3] was curiosity, the urge to know, interest, desire for intellectual experience. Intelligence may be made the instrument for

[3] As enumerated on pages 248, 249.

gratifying every other desire, good or bad, but the intellectual desire itself is characteristically on the side of right.

This is because the intellectual prompting impels us to search out the facts of life, and the meaning of our deeds, not distorted as love, hate, partisanship, and every other hot desire would have us see them, not as pointed out by an *advocatus diaboli* that would have us heed only the temptation of the passing hour, but as they actually exist. The mind is like the eye that sees what is before it even when we hate to see it. It is true that impulse may often make us blink and turn aside from seeing, yet the hunger to know is always urging us to look. And though individuals may blind themselves, in the long run society, conspiring with our intelligence, will hardly let us escape the facts. The mind with its eagerness to perform its function of knowing, and equipped with the results of past experience and observation, forecasts the future consequences of our deeds and their effects on all who come within the radius of our power. It protests against our cherished illusions and bigotries and discloses to us the injustice of our prejudices and partisanships. And if the average man refuses to discover the facts which conflict with his passions, his mind cannot always be so debauched as not to see those facts when they are pointed out to him by others who do not share the particular prejudices or interests that have turned aside his own vision. Pride and the social motives may be brought to the side of virtue, but the urge to know is always on the side of virtue. It is the urge to know, to see things as they are, that exposes the meanness of invidious pride which deceives itself by discounting the excellences of others and exag-

gerating its own, and that furnishes to pride its juster aims. It is this same prompting that pierces hypocrisy and goes far to purge social ambition of pretense. Virtue is nothing else than adaptation to the facts of life, which intelligence discloses. The demands of virtue are no other than the demands of the actual conditions under which human values must be realized, when those conditions and those values are estimated in precise accordance with all the observable facts. Thus intelligence defines for virtue its standards.

The chief natural resources of righteousness we have seen to be as many as the fingers on a hand: (1) Sensitiveness to social approval and disapproval, (2) altruism, (3) ethical idealism or esthetic discrimination between forms of conduct, (4) self-respect or pride, (5) intelligence.

Outlining in somewhat greater detail the principal facts mentioned in the foregoing analysis, we have the following list of elements affecting the contest between good and evil:

1. The most powerful and pervasive motives in ordinary life arise from man's sensitiveness to social approval and disapproval and the dependence of individual happiness upon the attitude of our associates.

2. We have certain instincts which do not depend for their power upon calculated desire, or the anticipation of pleasure, including *altruism and anger-hate.*

3. We have other instincts the functioning of which is so distinctly pleasurable that we deliberately plan to secure the pleasures which they bring; that is to say, we have desires. One important class of desires, though neither right nor wrong in themselves, often, though by

no means always, urge to unethical, antisocial conduct, namely, *the physical.*

4. We have also desires which, as a rule, come to the support of ethical requirements and act as motives to virtue. Among them are the desire for beauty and hatred of ugliness, which in the ethical realm may be called *idealism.*

5. The desire for "personal" satisfaction, or the sense of conformity with our own ideals and judgments, is distinct from that idealism which is esentially objective and disinterested, and with ethical culture it becomes a powerful motive to right conduct. In its untutored form, however, it is associated if not identified with invidiousness and jealousy. Our list must, therefore, include both *pride and invidiousness.*

6. How far anger and hate can be rationalized into repugnance to evil and resolute zeal in overcoming the obstacles to wise plans, how far physical desires can be regulated so as to promote physical life and health and humanized personal relations, how far invidiousness can be transformed into generous emulation, and pride equipped with worthy ideals, and how far the social ambitions and desires can be directed to coincide with actual social needs, depends on the stage to which the evolution of reasonable social judgments has been brought and the degree to which these judgments, and the sentiments of approval for them, have been inculcated in the members of the group by *social education* or *socialization* of the individual.

7. The purely intellectual desire impels toward the evolution of social, and therefore of personal standards, formulated in the light of the facts of life, in sight of the

actual conditions which prescribe the requirements of virtue.

Arranging *the principal* factors arrayed on the side of evil and of good in parallel columns we have the following lists:

Sensitiveness to Social Approval and Disapproval	Economic Scarcity, Greed
Altruism and Loyalty	Laziness or Weakness of Approved Impulses (of will)
Idealism, or Sense of Moral Beauty and Ugliness	
Pride, or Self-respect	Invidiousness, Jealousy
Intelligence, Justice	Stupidity, Bias, Ignorance
The Process of Socialization	
The Physical Desires	The Physical Desires
Anger-hate	Anger-hate

No natural tendency of man could be spared. Even laziness, which is partly, though not wholly, a negative thing, is a form of conservation of natural resources. The armchair before the fireplace has a place in life as well as the workbench. Anger-hate may become resistance to evil and vigor in combating obstacles. Altruism itself may do harm, and hate itself, or rather that instinct which in its cruder manifestations we call hate, may do

good. The difference in human motives which makes some of them appear to be allies of good and some to be forces of evil is largely in the degree of readiness with which they can be *socialized,* that is to say, adjusted to the requirement of advanced and advancing social life.

CHAPTER XI

THE MOTIVES TO RIGHTEOUSNESS: II. SOCIALIZATION THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF REASON

The progress which is now most needed by individual, national and international life is ethical progress. We should be glad of greater control over material nature, of more developed sciences, and of richer artistic and literary development. But the progress which we must have is ethical. The advances already made, with adequate ethical progress added, would suffice to bring about a degree of general happiness such as the world has never seen. Whether it shall remain beyond our realization while leaden-footed centuries drag on and the chill wastes of human blight and misery grow no less, whether the glimmering promise of that human happiness shall always be like the arctic sun that merely creeps along the horizon, or whether the sun shall ascend in the sky and spring shall really come, depends upon whether we can succeed in enlisting and controlling the resources of human nature so as to organize that effective coöperation, that universal teamwork, which alone can secure the realization of human possibilities.

To this end the world must adopt the realization that there is such a thing as moral progress. The time has come when men expect improvement in their mechanical devices, their business methods, and in their laws. They

no longer go on, generation after generation, practicing the same old clumsy arts with no thought of progress, suspicious of all change and looking into the past for their teachers. But this change has not generally taken place with reference to moral progress. Each generation tends to regard its moral code as finished.

When private war prevailed the man-at-arms had a moral code and a personal ideal. Loyalty was its essential feature, loyalty and obedience to both temporal and spiritual masters. That moral code did not call in question the morality of private war. Certain private wars might be wicked, but private war, as such, was taken as a matter of course, and was often regarded as glorious. Not merely such relatively minor evils as the drunkenness of the Saxon and the dueling that prevailed for centuries among all proud men in Europe and was cherished as a "code of honor" have been practiced with no sense of bad conscience, quite unforbidden by the existing code, but also the greatest of evils like slavery and international war. Indeed the greatest evil of any time is likely to be uncondemned by the moral code of that time. Evils like polygamy, slavery, private war, and absolute monarchy are likely to be greatest when the evolutionary necessity for them has passed but the prevailing moral code has not yet condemned them.

Just as polygamy, slavery, private war, and absolute monarchy may have been necessary steps in social evolution, though now outgrown and condemned, so also exploitive economic organization, acquisition rather than production as the standard of business success, the prostitution of the press to commercial aims and competitive nationalism, may have been necessary steps in

social evolution. All temporarily justified customs may survive for a time in their full and ripe strength not only after they have ceased to be necessary and have become wholly mischievous, but also after the most social-minded leaders have begun to condemn them.

As slavery, polygamy, private war, and absolute monarchy are now condemned, though they were a part of the slow and costly process of progress, so the time will come when war as a means of international competition will be universally and effectively condemned, as private war is now, and when the idea that a legitimate business career can be animated solely by the desire to get rich without reference to the performance of any social service will not only be repugnant to the moral sense of ethical leaders but will be so condemned by prevalent sentiment that only men of the criminal class will regard such wealth as success. Sir John Hawkins won great glory among English folk, a seat in Parliament, and the favor of Queen Elizabeth, by his success in the slave trade. Modern England would hang him for it.

The coming reorganization of business and of international relations will not be brought about primarily by laws and treaties, but will rest upon a raised level of moral common sense that will condemn exploitation and war as we have learned to condemn polygamy, slavery, private war, and political absolutism—a level of common sense which has not yet formed but which is forming. The solution in the international field will never result from a balancing of the national conceit and greed of one people against that of another, but from the growth of a spirit of internationalism: the honest recognition by

peoples of their own past faults and of the common virtues and common interests of humanity. Under the guidance of ethical leaders there will develop in the breasts of the masses a sense of that human kinship which is not affected by political boundaries and a determination to enforce the requirements of national goodwill against the survivals of a less evolved morality. And the solution in the economic field will not come by the process of class struggle, in which now this and now that party takes its turn at the trough, but it will come through honest recognition of the needs and of the services of all and through the dominance of a group, at first perhaps of a minority holding the balance of power between the contestants, who have regard for the interests of all parties and who advocate and enforce policies not in the spirit of greed but in the spirit of justice.

Two aims must be held in view in promoting moral progress, one social, the other individual. The first of these aims is approximation toward a *social situation* in which, under ordinary conditions, it will be recognized as disadvantageous, if not imbecile, to be bad, and in which social opinion and sentiment will define success in terms of socially desirable character and achievement. The second essential aim of moral progress is the development of *individual members* of society equipped with ethical discernment that will enlist on the right side the natural tendency to discriminate between human traits and conduct as beautiful or ugly, and that will enlist self-respect, or personal pride, in support of a reasonable ethical ideal, individuals with established habits of altruistic response and enlightened as to the remoter consequences of their deeds.

The realization of these two aims must go hand in hand. Common men cannot be fully socialized except in a society in which it is recognized as disadvantageous to be bad, and in which success is defined in terms of serviceable achievement. And such a society cannot be realized until a considerable proportion of men are highly socialized. The principal difficulty of ethical progress lies in the necessity of realizing these two aims simultaneously. Either would be comparatively easy if the other could first be accomplished.

In a thoroughly developed society it would be easy to be good. The price of progress is that some must be better than is demanded or desired. Conformity is the usual method of success. The world and the kingdoms thereof are offered as the reward of conformity. The world is ruled from the crosses of the past, not from those of the present.

Hope lies in this: the facts are on our side. We need only to see. An ethically developed society is one that perceives what it is that hurts it and what it is that helps it, and knows what to insist upon, what to reward and what to condemn. In such a society it would in general be imbecile to be bad, and success would be defined in terms of serviceable achievement.

We can easily imagine a situation in which it would be imbecile for any nation to go to war. An eloquent writer has argued that it is so already and that nations are prevented from realizing it only by the belated survival of entailed hatreds and mistaken policies and of absurd myths concerning national glory. If war is not already imbecile a situation in which it would be unmistakably so can readily be devised. Whether this or any

other great improvement in the social situation can be realized, depends largely upon progress in the socialization of individual ambitions.

Every ethical improvement in the social situation tends to socialize individual ambitions. The first of the two aims mentioned above was called social and the second was called individual. But in reality the second is as truly a social aim as the first, so largely is the individual a social product. That individual ambition, to a great degree, is socially defined is one of the established conclusions of social science. The ability regularly to punt a football fifty yards is an ambition recently developed among American university students but absent in France and Germany. The vikings' ambition to pillage and slaughter, the Philippine Igorot's ambition to gather human skulls or the American's ambition to amass dollars in millions beyond the possibility of personal use, are other instances in which a natural propensity is given specific direction that is no part of the propensity, but is determined by social conditions which can be altered whenever society so determines and substitutes condemnation for applause.

When a type of social ambition is once established it is not easily modified, but is, nevertheless, as modifiable as general opinion and sentiment. And if reason continues to function and its simpler results become the common property of society, then opinion and sentiment are bound, in time, to be modified in the direction prescribed by the actual demands of general welfare.

Ethical progress has been impeded because it has been too much mingled with superstition and speculation and too little guided by the recognition that existing codes

are not final and sealed by divine authority, and by the realization that character is to be formed not by miraculous agency but by intelligent utilization of the tendencies of human nature. And it has been impeded by lack of comprehension that ethical progress, like progress in agriculture, medicine or any of the lesser practical arts, depends upon clear-eyed search for the actual conditions of human welfare. The sun may be expected to shine for a million years to come; it is blind stupidity to think that ethical progress is at an end. And who is justified in estimating by the past the dependence of righteousness upon superstition or faiths concerning the unknown? Less than a century ago men would have said that ships can never dispense with sails.

The socialization of the individual does not imply an ascetic ideal. On the contrary, it keeps steadily in mind that nothing is demanded as right which does not add to the net total of human happiness, and nothing is forbidden as wrong which does not in general and on the whole diminish the sum of human happiness. Nothing is praised as beautiful which is not so as a manifestation of human traits and as a promotion of human welfare. And the responsibility of the individual to himself is recognized as fully as his power over the welfare of others. We have witnessed the capacity of human nature for heroism and beneficence in too many instances and among peoples too diverse to tolerate the artificial creed of depravity. At the same time we have witnessed too much of meanness and baseness to take the task of progress lightly. We do not assume that the time will ever come when all men will be good. But we cherish the hope of progress and the determination to promote it in the rea-

sonable assurance that it is not dependent upon illusions nor the elaborate misleading of mankind but rather on enlightenment.

The progress of socialization implies not only discovery of the social conditions necessary to human welfare, but also the development of these discoveries into a body of traditional judgments and sentiments which shall be as much a social product and a common possession as language. This implies, along with the gradual improvement of the moral tradition, the inculcation of that tradition in the individuals of each rising generation. Those who are to practice and perhaps improve the moral tradition must first have received it, and that not merely as a body of doctrine but as a set of habits and sentiments. It is not difficult to impart to the young the moral sentiments actually in vogue in the particular groups by which they are influenced. That will almost take care of itself. The difficulty is in improving the moral code and embedding in the sentiments of each new generation a morality which as yet is practiced only by the best.

When men tell us that this and that desirable reform is utopian and impracticable because it would require a change in human nature, they forget how vastly the prevalent ethical sentiments have changed. They forget how largely distinctly *human* nature is *second* nature.[1] All men who fit to any tolerable degree into civilized society have been born again. They are first born of the flesh, and then of social tradition. Physical reproduction gives us babies but it never gives us men. And

[1] Compare an article by the present writer, entitled "Education for Personality" in *The Educational Review for 1914*, 475, also the Section on "Education and Progress" beginning on page 666 of his *Introduction to the Study of Sociology.*

whether a baby grows into a real man depends upon whether he becomes a product not merely of biological evolution but also of social evolution.

Childhood and youth are the time for acquiring a socialized personality. The miracle of conversion does take place. Sometimes a criminal becomes a saint. But oftener he who might have been a saint, being once a criminal remains so all his life, and the chimney sweep who might have become a musician remains a chimney sweep. Conversion is pulling out a different set of stops in the complex organ of the human soul. But the soul itself is not wholly inborn, for the soul is a sum total of capacities for action largely acquired.[2] Sentiments are as truly ingrained organic tendencies as instincts, but they are acquired tendencies. In this respect they differ from the emotional element in instincts as habits differ from the motor coördination in instincts. No man is born with a sentiment for the Stars and Stripes or for the monogamous family. But all normal men are born with a capacity to acquire sentiments, habits, and ideas. And no man can set limits to this capacity for adaptation to social life. The adaptability of the human animal to social life is not limited to acquiring mechanical arts and crafts but applies to the whole range of higher powers that separate him from the brutes. The difference between a naked nature-man gleefully beating on a hollow log and a virtuoso at the piano is not wider than the difference between the inherited ethical nature and the socialized individual. Instincts somewhat aided by customs and the power of social approval and disapproval suffice in most instances to furnish the ethical essentials

[2] See definition of soul, pages 130 note and 316.

for family coöperation. We have reached the time when greater possibilities of both good and evil than existed in a patriarchal age must be realized or forfeited by the development of, or the failure to develop, sentiments of social approval and disapproval adapted to secure co-operation between individuals in a society where there is extensive division of occupations, and between social classes and nations.

Is It Reasonable to Be Good?

The defenders of fostered mystery as our hope for goodness, not content with declaring that man has not the natural resources for goodness, have gone further and asserted that the exercise of reason is hostile to righteousness. Under this influence it has become common for men to say that, since goodness often demands sacrifice of individual to social interests, therefore, pure reason does not sanction goodness on the part of the individual. They say that right conduct is what all men demand of their neighbors but what no purely reasonable being would do himself if he could escape it. They believe that when men are good it is because a supernatural and superrational influence controls them. Thus religion so far agrees with the Nietzschean philosophy as to assert that the guidance of reason would make life a struggle of unmitigated individualism.

There is no need of argument to prove that man is not a merely reasoning being. And the foregoing chapter made it clear that the other elements of human nature are by no means wholly on the side of the Devil. But there is occasion for some added argument to show how

far reason goes in bringing the other elements of human nature to the side of right.

Ethical progress like all other progress consists largely in the accumulated triumphs of reason. If religion and Nietzscheanism are right and if the more intelligent people become the more certain they are to perceive that right conduct is irrational and to be followed only under compulsion, and that the requirements of law and morality are to be evaded whenever opportunity and private interest prompt, if progress in scientific comprehension of life is to bring with it the general conviction that willing conformity to law on the part of the individual is unreasonable subserviency, what in a scientific age will become of society and social order? If this be true, then progress will consist in increasing skill in unmitigated strife in which each struggles to thwart the will of others and to put through his own.

We have witnessed a general adoption of this view not only by believers in the depravity of man and his dependence upon supernaturalism but also by such writers as Bernhardi, Treitschke and Nietzsche. Even the early sociologists of Germany and Austria draw a bellicose picture. Conspicuous examples are Gumplowiez,[3] with his doctrine of "conflict as the method of progress," and Ratzenhofer,[4] with his teaching that "absolute hostility" is implied in the very nature of all social evolution.

It is argued that an individual or group can have only such rights to property or privileges as that individual

[3] Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf*, Part IV. Innsbrück, 1909. Also *Outlines of Sociology*, 89, 121. Translated by F. W. Moore, Philadelphia, 1899. Compare Simmel, *Soziologie*, 145, 151.

[4] Ratzenhofer, *Die sociologische Erkenntnis*, 153, 245, 249. Leipzig, 1899. Also *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, i. c. vii. Leipzig, 1893.

or group can defend; and that rights are therefore exactly proportionate to power; that to regard any economic or political "right" as an ethical wrong is therefore not only practically futile but also scientifically false; that it is false because conflict is the method of progress; that the world must be ruled, and is best ruled by the ablest who are therefore the strongest; that the only way to determine who is ablest and strongest is by struggle for supremacy; and that therefore no "rights," political or economic, that can be defended are ever anything but right ethically; or rather that ethical right loses its significance swallowed up by rights, which are limited and defined only by might as proved in the struggle.

This doctrine is rendered more or less popular in all civilized countries by its supposed analogy, if not identity, with the method of biological evolution. We are told that whether we like it or not, it is useless and foolish to try to repeal a law of nature, and that it is a law of nature that conflict is the method of progress and that for sane and scientific men the issue of unmitigated conflict is the only right.

This so-called "social Darwinism" has not even the support of biological analogy, whatever such support may be worth. The phrases "struggle for survival" and "survival of the fittest" have conjured up a picture so dramatic as to have captured the popular imagination and sometimes even to make biologists forget their knowledge of biology when social problems are discussed. That dramatic but imaginary picture represents two eagles tearing each other in mid-heaven or two tigers, one disemboweling the other in the jungle. But two eagles do not commonly tear each other, they tear rab-

bits; tigers do not commonly tear tigers, but antelopes. Talon and fang are not weapons of war but of the chase. The carnivora kill for food as we butcher beeves or sheep or swine. An eagle sits on the top of a solitary pine in winter when food is scarce and snow is on the ground. He has such telescopic eyes that he sees a white rabbit moving over the snow half a mile away and such swift wings that he catches the rabbit before it gets to cover. Another eagle in the next county sitting on a pine has not such telescopic vision and such swift wings and so he starves. These two eagles were struggling for existence and the fittest survived. The struggle for food is not a battle of tooth and claw between members of the same species. It is not like a fight but like a race in which the prize is survival. It is competition and not combat. The only point at which actual combat between members of the same species characteristically plays a part in biological evolution is the struggle between males for mates. But even this is more characteristically competition than combat. And among men it goes on in every peaceful society, offering no justification for war but only for rivalry between individuals.

If biological analogy is to be invoked in this discussion, its weight is not on the side of "absolute hostility" but on the side of the ethics of coöperation. Nature exhibits various methods of securing survival. In the lowest forms she depends upon mere multiplicity of buds, spores, seeds, or eggs, but in mammals, upon extreme protection of a few offspring. In some creatures now extinct Nature relied for survival upon mere floundering stupid bulk. In others still surviving the dependence is placed upon specialized individual efficiency like that of

the solitary eagle and the tiger. But, finally, in the highest animals Nature adopts the method of coöperation. Coöperation is the most efficient of Nature's methods. In general, the most intelligent animals are gregarious, and gregarious animals have proved their fitness to survive. Lions have long been extinct in Europe but wolves still exist. Till man arrives with firearms, antelope and buffalo form vast herds. The most intelligent animals, being gregarious, are endowed with the beginnings of sympathy, altruism, and loyalty. Of this, the highest of nature's methods, man is the supreme type.

Man is a gregarious animal equipped with a group of social propensities, such as sociability, disposition to communicate, imitativeness, dominance and subordination, partisanship, sensitiveness to social approval and disapproval, loyalty, and altruism. These propensities, though not so cut and dried an adaptation to social cooperation as the instincts of "the selfless bee," are, nevertheless, a definite inborn adaptation to social coöperation. The gregarious animals, including man, exhibit instinctive adaptations that are wanting or rudimentary in the solitary beasts. The cat "walks by its wild lone" but the gregarious creatures manifest chilly discomfort or even distress and dread in solitude and find satisfaction in the presence of their kind. Group loyalty makes the herd of wild pigs, when one of their number is attacked, more formidable than a lion; makes the baboon risk his life for an associate, and laboriously rear the orphans of the group. The social instincts are strong enough in man to establish a kind of social order and coöperation in the primitive horde. Savages are not savage toward the members of their own group. Though other instincts

from time to time triumph over the gregarious instincts, even within the clan, yet sociability, sympathy, loyalty, and mutual aid are strong enough so that travelers among primitive peoples often express amazement and even compare their kindliness and mutual help with ours quite to our disadvantage. But toward those outside the clan they are likely to be savage enough; especially since the outsiders, even we ourselves, are equally likely first to be savage toward them.

The objector may say, granting that coöperation within the group is profitable and nature's highest law, do not groups fight with each other and does not such combat play an essential part in evolution? The fact that intergroup war may have played an evolutionary part in the past would not prove that it must do so forever, any more than the fact that slavery was a factor in progress justifies its perpetuation. Social evolution has consisted largely in widening the circles within which coöperation prevailed, from primitive hordes of a few hundred at most, to populations of millions and at least one empire on which the sun never sets. The limit to which this expansion of coöperation will go will ultimately be decided by the facts. It will go as far as it is profitable. Historic hatreds and fostered prejudices cannot forever triumph over the fact that coöperation is advantageous. Even now, nations suffer when friendly intercourse is interrupted and reciprocal benefits cease. And sooner or later it will be seen too clearly to be disregarded that for great organized groups of men to be divided from each other by tariff walls and barriers of invidious prejudice and historic misrepresentation, denying the common faults and virtues of humanity, is as preposterous as it

would have been for the thirteen American colonies to fall apart into rival and warring states. "The union" on a world-wide scale will some day become the issue, possibly of a greater war, possibly only when war has become a grotesque anachronism.

The doctrine that whatever can be enforced as "a right" is ethically right is nothing better than confusion of thought between legal rights which are based upon force and ethical right which is based upon reason. Legal rights can be created by custom or by a sovereign's decree however tyrannous and absurd. Ethical right must be discovered by intelligence and is the method of general welfare. Might-made privileges are called "rights" by a euphemism intended for the very purpose of confusing them with ethical right. Ethical right is often discovered and asserted as a claim long before it can be enforced, but it is as truly right before it can be enforced as after. Ethical right is a perfectly definite concept. It is action which adds to human happiness more than it subtracts therefrom. Many things that have been put through by force were in this sense demonstrably not right.

It is true that legal rights must be enforceable. It is desirable that ethical right should be enforced. Our hope that right can be enforced is based upon the facts that: (1) Right is always the interest of some one though it may be only of the absent or the unborn; (2) usually it is the interest of the greater number; (3) usually also the nominally disinterested bystanders are more numerous and powerful than the aggressing party and these bystanders fear aggression, for it may be turned against them; (4) apart from their fears the bystanders have an interest in justice which, though it may be weaker than

selfishness, is, nevertheless, strong enough to arouse indignation and make men fight. For these reasons, in an enlightened and aroused community, an individual acting on the principle of "absolute hostility" as a rule would be opposed by so many that he would be placed in the position of an outlaw and criminal. There is no superman who can do his own will without the consent of others. Success is essentially and inevitably social and coöperative. Reasonable conduct in human society is and must always be the devising and carrying into effect of a system of coöperation.

For these reasons a certain degree of coöperation can be secured as a result of pure self-interest. Honesty becomes the best policy. Most men can get more, or at least can enjoy what they get more comfortably, by doing something that other men want done and will pay for, than by stealing. The predatory individual is likely to be ostracized, hated, and even jailed or hung. A predatory group may succeed longer. But even a predatory nation finds its potential victims too many for it. Hardest of all to deal with is a predatory system within a nation, psychologically fortified by fostered ideas and sentiments, prejudices, and loyalties. Even such a system will at length be understood and modified by those whom it victimizes. Society is bigger and more powerful than recalcitrant or predatory individuals or groups, and tends to develop arrangements for coping with any predatory group. With modern intelligence and modern facilities for communication the very existence of a predatory group tends to call into being an organization powerful enough to crush it. Society can create a situation in which wickedness will in general be imbecility.

But society cannot use its power except by the exercise of intelligence. Reason creates the power of right. The society must be intelligent enough to discover what hurts it and what helps it and to organize its system of control and coöperation.

There may be no possible system that will produce only good, but society has incalculable power to suppress what it sufficiently condemns and to promote what it sufficiently appreciates. There is nothing mean about working for pay, nothing despicable about self-interest. And these motives can be evoked in all their power by a system adapted to secure the general good. If such methods have failed till now to secure a satisfactory level of general well-being it is largely because society in general has not been intelligent enough to see what hurt and what helped it, and to organize its system of control.

But we have seen that ethical progress requires not only the development of an adequate system of social control in which honesty is the best policy and men will work for pay and serve others for praise, but requires also the socialization of the individual disposition. And while supernaturalists and Nietzscheans may concede that reason promotes the former they still deny that it contributes to the latter. On the contrary, they obstinately maintain that the exercise of pure reason prompts the individual in his own interest to struggle against the system of social control that loads him with duties. They may even concede that man, being the most evolved of gregarious creatures, is equipped with numerous propensities adapted to social life—a life of teamwork. But they point out that the further away we get from the state of nature the severer the strain upon these social

propensities and the less adequate they are to meet the new requirements of the highly differentiated and wide-reaching social relationships. And to this they add that reason, instead of supplementing this inadequacy, tends only to lay bare the radical conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of the society that seeks to control him.

In opposition to this view we are prepared to maintain that pure reason tends progressively to extend the operation of the social propensities to the group of a hundred millions, and to remove the indifference of ethical idealism to the ugliness of sin in the impersonal relations of business and politics and to assert the claims of a rational imperative which makes the personal ideal and the promptings of altruism include the duties essential in a developed society.

Let us use the words reason, or intelligence, or cognitive urge, to mean the capacity and disposition to know, abstracted from every other human instinct, interest, or tendency. Of course, reason does not exist apart from the other tendencies of human nature, but it may be thought of apart from them in order to estimate its peculiar share in the resulting conduct. By reasonable conduct we shall mean conduct that is guided by regard for all the recognizable facts that bear on the issue in hand.

With reference to the problem before us two points of view are possible: First, the happiness of my neighbor is nothing to me; second, the happiness of my neighbor is as real *to reason* as my own. If the former point of view be the true one, then no sacrifice is ever sanctioned by reason; that is, no service can reasonably be performed

and no indulgence can reasonably be foregone for another's sake. And whenever such service or sacrifice takes place it is because some other element in man's nature than reason is in control or because he acts for some form of recompense or under some form of fear or compulsion. And in proportion as the preponderance of reason in the control of conduct is increased, disinterested service and sacrifice will tend to disappear.

Now, while the happiness of another is nothing to me as a feeling of my own, it is as real to me as an objective fact as any other objective fact. Though I do not *feel* my neighbor's experience I may know of its existence. Reason is not a matter of feeling. It may be that abstract reason apart from feeling never becomes a motive to conduct; that point we will discuss presently. But that pure reason admits the reality of the experience of others cannot be doubted without wholly distorting the concept of reason. The power and tendency to know, like every other human power, is a tendency to perform a given kind of function upon presentation of the proper occasion. Abstractly considered, it is the tendency to perform its own function and nothing else, it is the tendency to look, listen, explain, think, reason, know. Its function is to supply us with ideas, and ideas furnish the stimulation for every one of our tendencies. Therefore, the knowing tendency is fundamental to every other, except mere chemicophysical biological reactions that take place without any antecedent idea. As the knowing function is fundamental to all other tendencies, so also it is impartial as between all other tendencies. The knowing tendency seeks only to know, and at worst is absolutely indifferent as to what we do about what we know. It

simply impels us to know things just as they are and just as far as we have the power to know them.

At worst, then, pure reason is absolutely indifferent as to what we do about our knowledge. It seeks ideas without asking which of our instincts will be stimulated to action by those ideas. It will call into action the propensity that is most strongly evoked by the facts presented, whether it be our most generous or our most selfish, our most serviceable or our most socially destructive propensity. Desire may pervert reason and make it squint, welcoming some ideas and reluctant to recognize others. But pure reason itself is impartial as between good impulses and bad and just because it is impartial it is on the side of right. No impulse is bad unless it sacrifices some other and usually remoter interest to the present gratification. It is reason that widens the horizon to take in the future effects of our conduct and its effects upon others than ourselves. We do recognize the reality of happiness and misery on the part of others, though we do not feel them, and we do foresee our own future happiness or misery though we do not yet experience them. And though desire so often makes reason squint we do often see unwelcome facts. We tend to see red as red and not green, however much we may desire to see the green signal of safety instead of the red warning of danger on the path toward some instinctive gratification. Herein lies the value of reason. Thus, reason recognizes the fact that robbery impoverishes the victim as well as enriches the thief. It recognizes, in so far as its operation is not inhibited, the results of our conduct to all the parties affected. The practical judgment, "this is the path of the greatest satisfaction," in so far as it is a

purely cognitive judgment, recognizes as realities the experiences of all those who are affected by the deed.

Since these things are so, reason becomes the parent of justice, which is the supreme virtue. Justice is simply reasonable conduct with reference to the conflicting claims of different persons. By reasonable conduct is meant that which expresses a practical judgment formed by regard for all the pertinent facts, not by regard for those facts which pertain to this party while disregarding those facts which pertain to the other party, but weighing in equal scales the facts both of my neighbor's experience and of my own, my friend's experience and that of my enemy.

Reason transforms the other instincts. It does not abolish instinct. All conduct remains instinctive. That is, it remains the expression of man's inborn propensities. But reason by equipping the instincts with ideas transforms their manifestations so that while unrationalized instinct could never raise the life of man much above that of the chimpanzee, instinct under the presidency of reason produces saints and martyrs, personal and social idealism in conduct.

Reason transforms the manifestations of instinct in two ways. First, reason discovers the occasions for instinctive action. Thus the reasonable man finds incitements to action, not only in the sense perceptions of the present but also in reasoned conclusions concerning the future and the absent. Second, reason invents modes of conduct which become a part of instinctive conduct as soon as their fitness to promote instinctive activity is perceived. For example, the angry man does not merely bite and strike as untaught instinct prompts. He may write a violent letter or poison a well. And the altruistic

man may not simply give alms but enact factory laws and building regulations or endow a newspaper.

The most important point in the present connection is the way in which reason exalts altruism and widens its scope. It is true that instinctive altruism functions only within the circle of fellowship, and that the boundaries of that circle are very fluctuating. Beyond that circle as it is drawn at any moment the social instincts do not function and cruelty may prevail. The inborn altruism of kind-heartedness, though infinitely precious within the radius of personal intimacy, until reason widens its scope, does not extend to all those, often of different caste and race, who are affected by our conduct in the wide circle of business and political relationships. The political boss who corrupts the institutions upon which our welfare depends or the titanic malefactor in business may possess instinctive kindness that binds in friendship to him his partners in spoliation, but because of lack of social education he is without the rational altruism which is adequate to humanize our big impersonal relationships. It is true, as we have pointed out, that the original boundary of instinctive altruism is the circle of the horde, beyond which fear and hostility reign. It is reason that expands the circle of fellowship within which altruistic propulsions stir till it includes all those who experience the values common to mankind and of whom reason affirms "their experiences, too, are real and must be counted and weighed among the pertinent realities that determine practical judgments."

The assertion that there is no sanction in reason for doing good to another at cost to the doer, and that altruism depends upon a nonrational supernatural sanction is

an abysmal absurdity. If my action affects the welfare of another as well as my own, then to act in disregard of his welfare is to choose my course in disregard of a part of the consequences, to "reason" while deliberately ignoring part of the pertinent facts, which contradicts the very definition of reason, and to be governed not by reference to the facts in the case but by emotional partiality and to be prompted not by reason but by some other passion or propensity. It is to claim that good is good only when realized by myself, and that the only suffering is my suffering, for if the good and the suffering of others are real they cannot be ignored in a rational balancing of the consequences of conduct.

The major premise of justice is the equal reality of good and of harm, in one person or in another, not the equal extent but the equal reality as far as it extends. Justice is built by reason upon this premise. And he is not just or reasonable who affirms the equal reality of good and harm between his two neighbors, but not between himself and one of them. If, when judging between my two neighbors, A and B, I must perceive that good and harm are equally real in the experience of both, then the fact of that equality does not evaporate and become nonexistent when A is judging between himself and B. He alone is just who can enforce justice between himself and his neighbor.

It is false to teach that sacrifice is never reasonable. In fact, sacrifice is never duty unless it is reasonable, that is, unless a sufficiently farseeing and impartial balancing of values would show that from the sacrifice a net gain in experience-values can be anticipated. To say that sacrifice is not reasonable from the point of view of the actor

is the same as saying that the actor is expected always to take a partial, a one-sided, an unreasonable view, swayed by his own private interest and denying the equal reality of the interests of others. Impulsive instinctive and unreasoned goodness, precious as it is, will not suffice to save the world.

It seems false to experience to teach, as now is commonly done, that what seems most like reasoned sacrifice is subtle selfishness, because altruism is itself pleasurable. It was pointed out in the foregoing chapter that instinctive altruism is no more dependent upon desire for any pleasure it contains than anger or fear. However, the conflict between the private interest of the good man and the demands of righteousness upon him is mitigated by two considerations: First, in proportion as society becomes wise enough to identify its benefactors and its malefactors, it makes the way of transgressors hard, and rewards the well-doer with approval, esteem, promotion, and advantage. It is true that society does not yet dispense its penalties and its favors with wisdom and justice, but it has made progress in that direction and will make more. Second, in making sacrifice the good man does only what he knows any man in his place is reasonably bound to do, and should he refuse he would violate his own reason and murder his own personality. Seeking his life, he would lose it. He would lose his self-respect, would cease to be the man that he could countenance, would sacrifice his own peace and worth, and his zest in the pursuit of life's aim, and that loyalty to values wider than his own experience which is the heart of the life of a social being. Every true man knows that it is war time, that war

between good and evil is always on; and for the true man in war time sacrifice is a condition of the highest happiness. He is happier playing his part in the strife of good and evil, just as the loyal Dodson felt that it was but natural for him to ride behind to toils and perils when his Montmorency went to war, and though he went for loyalty and not for happiness, yet he was far happier so than he would have been skulking at home.

Idealism and pride, as ethical motives, are quite as dependent upon reason as altruism. The purely instinctive esthetic reactions are vague and uncertain. It is largely the judgments of reason that by discriminating between forms of conduct according to their consequences, including their remoter consequences in the future and to others, determines what acts shall excite disgust, abhorrence, and detestation and what shall excite approval, admiration, and enthusiasm. And pride, as we have seen, may be vain and invidious. It is reason that builds an ennobling personal ideal and makes self-respect and pride a propulsion to heroism and devotion. Thus, it is the light of reason that shows the path to truly human conduct, that not only widens the scope and defines the manifestations of altruism but mitigates hate till it becomes zeal against wrong and the obstacles to progress, makes emulation generous, attaches pride to ennobling ideals and cultivates the moral esthetic sense till it equips men with detestations and with enthusiasms.

The reasonable man perceives that the social situation in which the greatest total of good human experience is realized can be created and maintained only by compliance with the conditions which are set by nature, by human nature and by the existing social status. His

obvious conclusion is that to will the greatest good is to will compliance with those conditions. It is irrational for him so to act as to veto the greatest good. It is the surrender of mankind and treachery to human hopes, as well as murder of his own personality, to shirk his duty.

Men do right when right costs, go to scaffolds for liberty, or to the cross for a kingdom ruled by love, partly by instinctive altruism, partly by personal idealism, but mostly by reason which transforms idealism and widens altruism into the sharing of universal hopes, makes each an incarnation of the character and purposes of God, if God has purposes for the people of the earth, and makes each one of us, not a clansman shut in by narrow loyalties ringed round by hate, a son of Anac or even a child of Abraham, but instead a son of Man.

From the biological point of view, only the propensities have power to determine conduct. But, since the propensities function under the stimulation of ideas, from the psychological point of view, only ideas are motives to any conduct that widely distinguishes men from brutes. From the biological point of view, a propensity can determine nothing but its own functioning, and hence from that point of view it may seem that the idea-seeking propensity can motivate no conduct but the search for ideas, the look-listen-think function. But since the ideas which it provides stimulate all the other propensities, there is another sense in which the idea-getting propensity motivates all distinctly human conduct, and the character of the conduct is determined by the adequacy with which the idea-getting propensity functions. Honest thinking is, therefore, the supreme virtue and the mother of vir-

tues of every kind. Honest evaluation of conflicting interests carried over into conduct is justice.

We have been speaking of the idea-getting propensity, by abstraction, as a thing existing and functioning by itself. However, it does not exist nor function by itself, but in connection with all our other propensities. In this is its weakness and its strength. This connection is its weakness, because the other propensities influencing and often even inhibiting reason may make it blink the facts that are remote from our other impulses or hostile to them, facts that relate to the future or to the experience of others. And this connection with other propensities is the strength of reason, because it turns the conclusions of reason into practical judgments. Of all matters of fact the one of chief concern is the relation of all other facts to human weal or woe. Most spontaneously our intelligence first questions the relation of all facts to our private happiness, but it cannot be blind to their relation to any human experience that comes within the compass of our mental vision.

We have now seen that reason (aside from the inherent satisfaction of its own functioning as one of the essential values of human experience, the satisfaction of being mentally interested, of knowing and understanding) reveals *occasions* which call into play all of the human propensities and discovers *methods* by which all of the other propensities respond to occasions.

There are still two other ways in which reason may furnish a motive to right conduct that have not been adequately brought out by our discussion. First, we acquire a powerful sentiment for rationality as such. Even if it be true that from the biological point of view a propensity

prompts no action but its own specific functioning and therefore the cognitive propensity directly prompts no activity but that of looking, perceiving, thinking, yet *to act* rationally becomes a part of the personal ideal. For to make a practical judgment and not to follow it opens a breach in our own being, a hiatus in our normal processes, a violation of our own nature. To disobey the verdict of reason is ugly, repulsive, an affront to self-respect. It is to surrender the orderliness of human life, and to despair of any normality in the life of human kind. Kant's great rule, So act that you could will that all men should be guided by the same maxim, however formulated or even though not formulated at all, refers, I think, to the profoundest of all the motives of righteousness. I mean the rational perception that there is a way of life obedience to which secures the weal of human kind and abandonment of which would wreck all hopes. Every highly rational man says to himself: I for one must so act that if all men acted likewise the good of humanity would be attained; not to do so is to be a traitor to human hopes. This is the "intelligible imperative." [5]

Nor is this all. There is possibility of a second special relation between reason and conduct in addition to its power to show occasions for the activity of every other propensity and methods for their functioning. Every practical judgment is the beginning of a process that is normally completed by execution of the judgment. If there is any truth in the doctrine of ideomotor action, that the thought of an act unless inhibited is the beginning of the act, then, above all, the thought of an act accompanied by a rational approval by its own nature may be the

[5] *Cf.* page 211.

beginning of an act. Some hold that the tendency to act upon a practical judgment is as truly, though it may not be as strongly, established in human nature as any propensity. From the biological point of view it may seem at first sight that for theoretical neatness the cognitive propensity should impel men only in the direction of its own single function—to know the facts. Yet, on a further look, it appears not incredible even from the biological point of view, that the tendency for the conclusions of reason to go over into action should exist, that there should be an open sluice for natural energy to run from the rational conclusion into action. If such a sluiceway exists it may be deepened by the acquired sentiment for rationality and the habit of obedience to the rational imperative. While some hold that there exists an inherent tendency for practical judgments to go over into action by their own momentum, it is not necessary to prove that such a tendency exists in untutored human nature in order to see that reason is in all the other ways we have mentioned the chief promoter of ethical progress. For to disclose the facts, including the remoter consequences of our conduct, consequences to be anticipated in the future and in the experience of others, and so to supply motives to every other propensity, is a sufficient function for the cognitive faculty. The typical function of reason by virtue of which it has been selected in the process of evolution is the *practical* judgment. And the natural function of the practical judgment is to issue in conduct whether by its own momentum or by awakening the other instincts and habits. In practical life we regard the proof of such a judgment as persuasion to action.

To summarize: (1) The very fact of a practical

judgment appears to many to constitute an initiation of conduct—unless there is some other inhibiting cause. (2) We acquire a sentiment for rationality which reënforces every rational propulsion. (3) The primary function and *raison d'être* of reason is to disclose the occasions and supply the guidance for every other propensity including altruism, idealism and self-respect. Thus it is that reason, which alone enables social control to define its requirements or to devise the methods of their enforcement so as to create a situation in which it will be recognized as disadvantageous, if not imbecile, to be bad, and in which success will be defined in terms of social service, also becomes the parent of that individual virtue without a large measure of which no such social situation can be set up.

Man's Prime Necessity or the Functional Importance of the Idea

"Ideas rule the world or throw it into chaos." So wrote Auguste Comte. No epigram tells the whole truth. The life of society is molded not by one but by four types of causes: first, by the biological—or psychophysical—traits of human organisms; second, by the varied geography of the earth; third, by dugouts and wigwams, palaces and slums, weapons and tools, pictures and libraries, railroads and ships, crowds and populations, and all the rest of that artificial material environment by which men surround themselves; and fourth, it is molded by the causal interplay of the social activities themselves, ideas, sentiments, and practices which furnish to each

individual and to each social movement the most effective of all the determining conditions.[6]

Yet ideas, although they be but one factor, are so characteristic and so predominant a factor in human life that it remains one of the truest of epigrams that "ideas rule the world or throw it into chaos." Of the four factors that mold social life, the first, the psychological organism of man—as distinguished from the organism of a dumb brute, is a capacity for forming ideas, for responding to them with emotions and sentiments, and for expressing them in speech and action. The second and third factors in the molding of social life, the natural and the artificial physical environment, are to man not merely food and warmth but the sources of ideas, the mediums for expressing ideas, and the stuff that ideas utilize in action. And, the fourth factor, man's social environment, social activity, is composed of the ideas and sentiments of associates and the practices in which these ideas and sentiments are expressed. It is because his ideas are different from those of the dumb brutes that man himself is not a dumb brute.

[6] The third and fourth of these classes of conditioning phenomena are closely related; they are two parts of the social whole. Analysis would be incomplete, however, if it slurred over the distinction between them for they give rise to distinct types of causation. The artificial physical environment affects us largely in the same way as natural geographic facts, while the fourth type of conditioning is that investigated by social psychology. Moreover, to recognize the distinction between them brings out the most difficult and most important of all sociological truths, namely the psychic character of all customs and institutions, that the essential social facts live in the minds and hearts of men, and that social change is a psychic process, that institutions in their most fundamental aspect are states of mind, and even mechanical inventions are of such a character that if all the typewriters were taken from America and given to untutored savages they would not have the typewriter and we still should have it as a social possession ready to express itself in steel.

And practically all of those ideas which differentiate the life of man from that of a dumb brute the individual man has by virtue of the fact that he belongs to a *society* of men. Let us fully recognize the power and worth of individual man, now that man has a life molded by socially evolved ideas, but let us also recognize that except in society and by association he never would have developed any such life or have become a personality to which we should willingly give the name of "man." Practically all that he possesses that is human and not bestial he possesses by virtue of his membership in a unity of which he is but an element. And this was never truer than to-day nor of any son of man than of the latest born. Neither the ideas that raise man above the brute nor even the language in which these ideas are formulated and expressed can be had save by association. Language, itself, is not inborn. It is only the power of acquiring language that is inborn, and those born deaf remain dumb. But for membership in society no one of us would ever "have a soul" [7] in Helen Keller's meaning of that phrase. The concatenated series of experiences which we call "human" life, the life of a "soul," is not the property in fee simple of the individual. He holds only a right of entail and usufruct in so much of the common life of society as he can appropriate, and perhaps enhance by some infinitesimal accretion. Or if he be one of the few who enrich life by some notable addition, he could not do so if he had not first inherited a million times more from those who have preceded him.

Biological organisms born of ancestral protoplasm derived from the highest of the primates, as mere biological

[7] *See* page 49.

organisms, are not human personalities. We do not derive our humanity by biological inheritance but by social inheritance. Our biological organisms are only the complex mechanisms capable of those reactions that condition the states of consciousness which we call human life. Those reactions would never be evoked save in a society which has been produced, not by biological evolution, but by social evolution. The finest biological organism belonging to the highest genus of the primates, if it developed from birth without society, would be as incapable of producing a suit of woven fabric as of producing a language. The arts involved in the production of a suit of clothes run back across the ages. He would be as incapable of producing a conscience code or a system of political institutions as of rearing the pyramids of Egypt single-handed and without tools. Unless he were a member of society that finest biological specimen of the genus homo would remain a dumb brute, as naked in mind as in body.

Nevertheless, the individual for his brief threescore years and ten is supreme. Society has no life apart from the lives of individuals. The total accumulated wealth of humanity's life, at any given moment, is not only possessed by individuals, it exists as the life of individuals. For the time being, these individuals constitute humanity. The life they live is as old as the race; their language, their creeds, their arts, their institutions are ancient. And they are still young, for the present generation, supreme for a day and enriched with all the accumulations of the past, is the first hour of a future that may be far longer than that which has crept by since the first man stood

erect. Human life is at one and the same time individual and social.

For a time biological and social evolution went on *pari passu.* Those physiological traits of the organism were selected for survival which enabled it to utilize the resources that resulted from association. The distinguishing characteristics of organisms belonging to the genus homo which enable them gradually to amass that system of interstimulated activity which raises them so far above the dumb brutes is this: *They are organisms preëminently adapted to function under the stimulation of ideas.* As the locomotive engine runs by steam, man runs by ideas. Give me the idea that there is a cobra under my bed, or a fire started in my attic or a friend ringing at my door, and the idea sets me in motion. It makes no difference whatever whether the idea is true or false; so long as I believe it, it impels me.

Man's conduct differs from that of animals partly because in so great a proportion of cases it is aroused not by simple perception of natural objects but by perception of artificial objects, that is, objects that embody the ideas of his human associates and predecessors. Above all, his conduct differs from that of animals because it is so often aroused not by any mere percept but by more elaborated ideas, and because his instincts express themselves not in acts that are the hard and fast prescriptions of some inherited neuromuscular coördination but in ways that he has learned so that both the stimulus and the manifestation of instinct are what they are by virtue of ideas that are not inborn but socially acquired.

For civilized man even so primitive a function as eating is thus transformed. Instead of devouring raw, when-

ever and wherever he finds it, beast, bird, insect, fruit, or root, as a bear does and as some savages still do, he eats at regular intervals, seated in a chair, at a table, spread with linen, lifts his food with implements of silver from receptacles of glass and china, and partakes of viands elaborately prepared by the aid of fire, by the subtle combination of many ingredients and by the use of many mechanical devices. When he fights he shakes the earth with thunders, turns the atmosphere to poison; prowling beneath the sea, he launches missals to which the trident of Neptune was a toy; and he rains the bolts of Jove from heaven. His fighting is still instinctive but no longer with naked hands and gnashing teeth alone, but with an endless panoply that embodies his socially evolved and disseminated ideas. And what is it that he is fighting for? It may be for trade routes on the other side of the globe, or it may be to defend a form of political organization which he regards as the means of welfare for himself, for his posterity, and for the world.

The tendency of natural causation is to produce in every species of plant or animal certain characteristic organs of adaptation. Each organic type—so to say—specializes on a particular mode of adaptation. The oyster in his shell, the squid with his ink, the fish with its air bladder and fins, the bee with her sting and her instincts for coöperation, the eagle with his talons and telescopic eyes, has each a particular type of organic and functional adaptation. So also has man. He is especially adapted to form ideas that outrun mere perception and to establish correlation between his actions and his environment by acting under the prompting of ideas. Even for mere biological survival man's prime need is for

ideas. Without them he would be not only a mere beast but a feeble beast unadapted to survive, instead of a world-ranging, world-dominating being.

Man's appetite for ideas and propensity to formulate them is the distinctive form of biological adaptation which equips him for survival. The highest of the subhuman species depend in part upon ideas for survival, and since they must have some ideas in order to survive they are provided with a natural hunger for them. Curiosity is a truly instinctive prompting in many of the creatures below man, but in man, whose dependence upon ideas has become extreme, that hunger is more highly developed. He hungers not merely for new sense percepts but for explanations. He is a thinker, dreamer, reasoner. Because the many think so much less than the gifted few, and so much less than would be desirable, we are tempted to deny that the mass possess this trait. If they did not they would be apes and not men. A sufficient evidence that they do possess it is the newspaper eagerly waited for by the young and by the middle-aged and by the old men in the chimney corners, who not only pore over the news on the first page, but even welcome the puzzles on the back page that have no practical content, but only afford an empty exercise to the eager propensity of the mind. This idea-hunger and the functioning by which it is gratified, constitute as true an inborn predisposition as any instinct. For convenience and because of its preëminent development in man it may be called the specifically human instinct,[8] as characteristic of man as the shell is of the turtle, or as the amazing instincts of organized

[8] It is left to the intelligence of the reader to interpret the loose meaning in which the word "instinct" is here employed.

coöperation are of the ant and the bee. It is a part of the description of *nearly* [9] every instinct that its functioning carries a peculiar satisfaction, distinctive of that instinct, and that it also serves a definite biological purpose. The gratification is not the biological purpose or *raison d'être* of the instinct. The gratification is only a means of securing the performance of the function. The animal eats to satisfy its appetite and does not know that the biological purpose of its action is to nourish the tissues and maintain the vital heat. It mates with no foresight of offspring. So far as the instinctive consciousness of the animal is concerned, the gratification is the main thing. So far as natural or biological causation is concerned, the gratification is nothing but a bait to promote the performance of the instinctive function. No instinct would have evolved that did not perform a function essential to the survival of the species. So far as mere survival, the purpose [10] of nature is concerned, it would do just as well if the functions of an animal were as destitute of accompanying gratification as those of a tree are supposed to be, provided the animal would perform the functions.

Here life divides into two distinct and interdependent sets of manifestations, the succession of conscious experiences and the succession of biological functions. For the biologist and physical nature, the latter are the important realities and the former are significant only as baits or guides to secure their performance. But for the psychologist, the sociologist, and for the practical reason of

[9] Compare pages 235, 236, also 151.

[10] It is hardly necessary to say that the word "purpose" is here used in a figurative sense.

every conscious and reasoning being, the former, that is, the succession of conscious experiences, is the only ultimately important matter and the physical functioning is valued only as the necessary condition of those experiences. Life, for the biologist, is functioning. Life, for the living man, is the experiences of activity. The former life is a product of biological evolution; the latter life by social evolution acquires a richness and content which physical evolution could not produce. The social evolution introduces no new instincts and no new *kinds* of satisfaction. But through the acquisition of new ideas it diversifies and enriches even the satisfaction of eating, and develops the more distinctively human satisfactions from germs to their flower and fruit.

This efflorescence of satisfactions is made possible only by the supplementing of instincts by ideas. But the most characteristic service of ideas is not thus to diversify and enrich the activities and so the satisfactions known to man, but to *show the path* to those satisfactions whether in their cruder and undeveloped state or in their higher stages of development. Paradoxical as it may seem, as soon as satisfaction, and not mere functioning and survival, becomes the predominant purpose of life, the satisfaction contained in *the present* act ceases to be an adequate guide. Instinct, as we have seen, was not developed for the sake of gratification, but for the sake of function, and when gratification becomes the aim instinct requires the guidance of ideas. To obey each present instinctive prompting precludes that planned conduct guided by foresight which is essential to personal development and personal satisfaction, and which is

equally essential to the development and maintenance of an extensive and efficient social organization.

The stimulation of instinct takes place on three levels, according as the stimulus is (1) perceived in the present, (2) remembered from the past, (3) anticipated in the future. On the lowest level the stimulus is *a mere percept.* For example, the monarch butterfly is stimulated to deposit her eggs in the milkweed by a mere perception of that plant without any help from previous experience or anticipated consequences. Similarly, the smell of food, or the sight of a mate, arouses the instinctive response. On the second level an *idea presented by memory* arouses instinctive response either in the absence of any present percept or by adding a remembered idea to that presented by present perception so as to produce the instinctive response. Thus, the puppy that yesterday was whipped for taking forbidden food may shun it to-day, or, if yesterday he was rewarded for jumping through a hoop, to-day he may promptly make the leap in gleeful anticipation of approval and reward. Even the chickens refuse the cinnabar caterpillar after one experience with it, or Mr. Morgan's tame moor hen comes running when he takes the spade with which he had dug her worms. Sight of the spade plus memory of yesterday's feast have the same effect as would the sight of worms. On the third and highest level the idea which arouses instinctive response is a *calculated anticipation* of what cannot be remembered because it has never been perceived. As on the second level, the remembered ideas may combine with present percepts to elicit instinctive response, so also on the highest level the ideas of calculated foresight may combine

with memories of the past and with present percepts to make up the state of mind that elicits instinctive response. Memory and reason unite to secure foresight. Only by the addition of reason does the calculated foresight described become possible. Reason identifies in advance occasions for action and conditions that would secure a desirable or undesirable result. The propensity to reason would never have been evolved if it had not a function. The biological function of reason is to discover the path of success for all the other instincts, to discover obscure and remote occasions and roundabout methods for instinctive action. The pleasure peculiar to reason—or the cognitive instinct—is the gratification of curiosity, the satisfaction of being mentally interested, the experience of seeing, hearing, guessing, corroborating, solving, explaining, and it accounts for the newspaper and travel for pleasure. It is the primary motive of science and exploration. Without the opportunity for this gratification mankind would be desperately impoverished and would be hideously bored by existence. But the gratification of an instinct we have learned to distinguish from its function. And the function of this, the characteristic propensity of man, is to furnish the ideas that determine *which* of all man's instincts shall function in a given juncture, and *how* it shall function.

Life a Problem in Proportion

When we rise above the level of unrationalized instinctive promptings to the level of truly human existence, life becomes a problem in proportion, first, between the vari-

ous kinds of satisfactions; second, between the present and the future; third, between the individual and the group.

First we must work out a proportion between the various satisfactions. The instincts often conflict and compete with each other. The angry man may fear to strike. The frightened man may be ashamed to run away. The hungry man may be too bashful to eat or too stingy to buy, and a boy may resist the temptations of peanuts and pink lemonade in order to gratify his curiosity as to what is in the side shows. Not only are there five different kinds of instinctive satisfactions, physical, esthetic, intellectual, social, and personal, but each of the five includes many variants, and there are innumerable objects by which they may be called into exercise. It may seem for a moment that "personal" satisfaction is an exception to this statement on the ground that it can be derived from but one object, the self. But there are many potential selves between which we may choose, and numberless specific excellences or particular feats from which we may derive personal satisfaction. The good of life, as we have clearly seen, is the realization of satisfactions of every kind, none excluded, and none in such excess or so misplaced as to prevent the realization of the others, but all in a harmonious and proportioned totality of rich and varied experience.

Second, every rational life involves also the solution of a perpetual problem of proportion between the present and the future. A good present must have been prepared for by a rational past. This means that we are obliged to

live in well-nigh continuous preparation for the future. Yet all realization must be found in the moving present. The present must be the servant of the future; yet the present alone is the master of life. In the present alone are ends attained. Too much subordination of the present to the future would sacrifice all ends to means. Too much sacrificing of the future to the present would prevent realization of ends in the future when it shall have become the present. We rise from savagery to civilization and from animals to men only by solving the problem of proportion between the present and the future.

Finally, each must work out a problem of proportion between his own individual life and the life of society of which he is a part. Self-realization is possible only in a society of individuals who coöperate to secure the general good. Reasoned altruism and personal idealism, as well as the favor and disfavor, rewards and punishments, of reasonable society demand it. The very formation of a personal ideal includes some tentative solution of all three of these problems in proportion, the third no less than the other two. No rational self-judgment can escape it. The social instincts are aroused only by the "consciousness of kind," the perception of some degree of likeness—of we-ness, of one-ness—by mental apprehension of the experience of others as being like our own. This recognition takes place at first only when the resemblance of others and the experiences of others to ourselves and our own experiences are exhibited in clear resemblances of appearance and expression. The inner resemblance of experience may be obscured by an outer difference in the color of the skin, or in dress and man-

ners, so that races and social classes fail to be moved by their common humanity. And mere absence from view may prevent the awakening of the social instincts until imagination has been vigorously aroused.

Thus, the promoter of bogus mining projects who robs school mistresses of the painfully accumulated provision for their old age, and the corrupt politician whose administration raises the death rate of a city and annually causes the death of thousands of old and young may be "kind to their own families" and "good-hearted" in their dealings with friends and neighbors. It is reason that not only discloses the causal relation between our present acts and our future experiences but also demonstrates to us the relation between our acts and the suffering or joy of others besides ourselves. It does more, it convinces us of the similarity between their experiences and our own, so that we must admit the reality of joy and sorrow in people whose skins are not of the same shade as our own and whose manners and tailoring do not conform to our standards, and even in those whom we have never seen. Once let this resemblance be clearly apprehended and altruism and other social instincts begin to function. It is thus that reason extends the brotherhood of man beyond the family and the horde to the nation of millions and ultimately to mankind.

The extension of the field from which instinct derives its stimulations so as to include our own future gives us prudence. Its extension, so as to include all those who are affected by our acts, gives us social morality. Without ideas supplied by reason there is neither prudence nor social righteousness.

Résumé

Rectitude is the pursuit of happiness. But it is not pursuit of present happiness alone nor of individual happiness alone, nor its pursuit by direct means alone. The purpose of reasonable endeavor is to secure the greatest *net* total of satisfying human experience.

Reasonable conduct is that which is guided by regard for all the pertinent facts so far as they can be descried. It is the wholeness of the view and the proportion in the response that constitute virtue. No instinct is bad except when it is followed in blindness to some of the facts which might suspend or redirect its expression, or evoke another instinct to compete with it. It is the complexity of the problem of proportion and the lack of balance between the instincts that make virtue difficult to secure. Not depravity but the very richness and variety of life's possibilities render it easy to make a mess of it. The very strength of egoism and the comparative weakness of altruism are not necessarily bad, for each of us has chief responsibility for his own welfare, and society is able to turn ambition, pride, and even desire for gain into serviceable channels. The whole difficulty is in securing a properly developed social situation, and the socialization of individuals through reaction with such a situation. For this we must rely upon knowledge of the actual consequences of conduct.

But it is not necessary to socialization that the individual must in every case discern the consequences of his act. That would be too much to ask. It is social opinion, growing up under the leadership of the intellectual and moral *élite,* through the experience of generations that

forms the general rules of conduct and builds the system of coöperation by which the individual is guided. It becomes intrenched in the sentiments of the individual who has been reared by society, and becomes as automatic as language, though, like language, it is subject to progressive change. And though the individual would never have originated those judgments or devised that system of coöperation, he is able to understand them and to approve them by his own judgment. The soul of man is the whole bundle of his propensities and powers enriched by the sentiments and judgments with which he has been equipped by the process of social evolution and individual socialization. Acquired ideas and sentiments, and the developed tendencies to express them in action, are the most distinctly human part of human nature. Sentiments originate in ideas and judgments. Distinctively human conduct is the expression of tendencies humanized by response to social tradition and evoked by ideas that present the existing condition. Moreover, the existing situation is a social situation, and a rational apprehension of it includes facts which relate not merely to the moment and the individual but to the future and the group. Yet every trait of second nature is the development of an inborn capacity. Every voluntary act is in this sense instinctive. Only it is instinct awakened and guided by judgment and modified by such responses into something more complex than heredity made it. Truly human conduct is the explosion that results when ideas touch off propensities which themselves have been modified by previous practice in reacting to ideas socially evolved. Society is the great mother of truly human nature.

Disorganization is inevitable when social tradition is disconcerted by the outbreak of free criticism in a period of transition. However frantically the social tradition may defend itself, the recurrence of such periods is inevitable so long as the social tradition is largely based on illusion, speculation, or faith. And even when the social tradition is solidest the disquieting activity of heretics and dissenters will not be wanting until the social tradition itself is formed by the exercise of free critical intelligence. Only so can the largest attainable harmony be reached between the untrammeled intelligence of individuals and the traditions of the group. Then the activity of free and critical intelligence will move, not against the main foundations of the social tradition but only to perfect and exalt a structure with the plan and principles of which it is in harmony.

Of all the achievements of reason the chief in practical importance is morality or the discovery of the method, not of mere survival, which is largely prescribed by reasonless instinct, but of happiness, that is, of balanced realization of the values of experience in their harmony and totality. This realization is achieved only by social coöperation of which morality is the method, not invented, but discovered, not prescribed by authority, but prescribed by the laws of nature and slowly discovered by human reason. A society that had not discovered the methods by which nature allows fires to be made, metals to be smelted, fabrics to be woven, and shelters to be built could hardly rise above savagery. A society that had not discovered the methods of agriculture which are prescribed by nature's laws could not rise above barbarism. A society that had not discovered nature's laws

for utilizing winds and waters, steam, and electricity, for combating the assaults of microbes, stilling pain under the ministrations of surgery, abridging distance and giving permanence and pervasiveness to the thoughts and sentiments of the most gifted minds could not rise above a semimedievalism. A society that has not discovered the methods prescribed by nature for organizing the coöperative activity of men, women and children into an harmonious system in which all achieve for each what none could achieve for himself cannot rise above a poor halting place on the path of progress toward the realization of the possibilities of human life.

A society that is wise enough will so organize itself that the way of the transgressor will be hard and the path of the righteous will shine. It will appreciate and reward and aspire to every beneficent form of achievement and will elicit such achievement up to the very limit of the capacity of nature. Such is the law of the kingdom of good. No society yet has ever understood its own life and the conditions of good well enough to enforce them. Most individuals are still blind or misled or uncertain as to this most vital of all knowledge.

Above all, there is lack of *social agreement* because men have not yet clearly seen the meaning of the facts of life. And without social agreement there is little inspiration unless for some rare prophet or seer. We, being social beings, do not wholly trust our own uncorroborated judgment. Or even if we trust its truth we are not moved and swayed by it as when from childhood parents and teachers have echoed it, and in maturity we feel ourselves marching in cadenced unison with all

our group at its command. Now each pioneering individual halts and shuffles in his onward stumbling.

When adequate knowledge brings agreement we need not fear that men will merely do right while loving wrong and seek for the mere appearance and repute and rewards of goodness without loving goodness. Many will desire goodness as youths desire strength. Goodness, in the wise sense in which it then will be defined, will be the personal ideal approved by reason and enthroned in the sentiments. Men need only to have the *right ideas* as they are prescribed by nature *seen clearly enough* to command the consent of the competent, and disseminated generally enough, and they will fashion the sentiments as well as command the outward conduct of normal men. That which men will demand of each other they will demand of themselves. Righteousness will be a reality, not a sham. And that reality will have as its inmost essence coöperation, participation, the functioning of each in the close personal relations and wide impersonal ones according to nature's discovered method by which all secure the good of each.

Either there is no order of nature or there is such a method. Let us but have the ideas that correspond to nature's real requirements, and those ideas will be to life, both personal and social, what the sun is to the life of plants and animals—giving light as well as warmth, and purification as well as power.

This, then, is our conclusion: Reason is the chief dependence of mankind for the solution of both of life's great problems, for the organization of society and for the socialization of the individual. Supernaturalists and metaphysicians may assert that reason should be silent

in order that faith or what they please to call intuition may speak. But the natural science view of life inevitably asserts itself and proclaims that it is through the persistent exercise of reason that we discover the method of life and turn the propulsions of human nature into virtues.

Socialization depends upon the gradual discovery of those forms of experience in which life's values inhere and still more upon the gradual recognition of the natural conditions upon which the realization of such experience depends. That is to say, the method of ethical evolution is empirical. Experience is the great teacher, but experience must be interpreted by intelligence. And the judgments formed by intelligence must become the focus of sentiments and the incitements of instinctive response, for in socialized man the ideas that set the instincts in motion are not only those which are presented by sense perception but also those which are presented as the result of the intelligent interpretation of age-long experience. And the acquired sentiments, which become as truly ingrained in his organism as habits, supplement man's inborn propensities and become a part of his soul. These sentiments in which judgments combine with feeling give form to his idealism, pride, and altruism, and supplement the equipment of instinctive gregariousness so that it becomes adequate not only to the requirements of the primitive horde but also to those of the expanded and diversified relationships of advanced society. The capacity of man for the judgments which issue from the rational interpretation of experience and for the rationalized sentiments which radiate from any to each

is the measure of his possible advancement and of the realization of his possibilities of good experience.

In the course of hundreds of thousands of years the evolution of social instincts has equipped man for the life of the horde. It may even carry adaptation to social life somewhat beyond that point, but it does not equip man for participation in the life of an advanced society. The best we can hope is that it provides him with the capacity to acquire such equipment. As biological evolution has provided us with the convolutions of Broca and Wernicke, and so with the capacity for speech, yet leaves it necessary for each individual to learn a language which has been developed by the society to which he belongs, so also we have reason to believe that biological evolution has provided us with the capacity for an effective conscience adapted to bring to realization the rich possibilities of advanced social life. But it is as necessary for society to evolve a conscience code as for it to evolve a language, and it is as necessary for each individual to acquire that combination of judgments and especially of sentiments which we call a conscience as it is for him to learn to talk. As he remains dumb if he never learns the speech which his society has evolved, and is unadjusted to any given society if he knows only a language that is foreign to it, so he remains unadapted to participation in the social life of an advanced society unless a distinct moral ideal has been conceived by him, adopted by his judgment and intrenched in his sentiments. It must have become the model of the self he means to be, a participating social self.

The present task of progress, and always its greatest task, is to construct a social order built upon ethical

judgments that as yet are not clearly formed in the common sense of any great society and to form the consciences of individuals in accordance with true ethical judgments. Moral law is not a codicil to life; it is the method prescribed by the nature of things for man's participation in the necessarily coöperative task of realizing life's possibilities. The task of those who work to make the world better is not to promote faith or mystical experience, but knowledge and good work. Not "good works" added to life's normal duties, but the good performance of life's normal duties, in the full realization that all human life is social life, that conflict can never solve its problems, but that its problems will be solved in proportion as individuals seek their own good in ways consistent with the general good and know that each must do a daily task, as sailors on a ship or soldiers in an army do their tasks, as participants in a system of coöperation. Supernatural religion affords powerful secondary motives to righteousness, but the primary motives are in the facts that make right right and wrong wrong, and these facts are substantial and observable, irrespective of notions about the supernatural, and make their appeal to altruism, pride, and idealism, and guide the molding and forcing pressures of social opinion.

Ethics must be transferred from speculation to science, and preaching from observance and creed to good work. We must learn, what Confucius long ago taught, that righteousness is the justification of the names that designate our social relationships; the citizen must act like a citizen, the father like a father, the husband like a husband, the son like a son. We must recognize

that the line between the sheep and the goats, the good and the bad man, the Christian and the sinner, is the line between those who do and those who do not choose their ambitions and govern their daily endeavor by the realization that life is teamwork. Self-seeking must be within the channels formed by wise social judgment as to what constitutes success, and must not only consent to the requirements of general welfare but must glory in conformity to a reasonable personal ideal. Such preaching will not leave the heart cold. Only such life fulfills the requirements of our own social nature. Once enlightened and caught up in the tide of an enlightened social life, we cannot give ourselves with full consent and peace and joy to any other mode of life. As the face of many a rich and self-indulgent youth, well endowed with instinctive social virtue, first lost the look of cynicism and discontent when the Great War set him a truly social task, so our race will find itself and discover the secret of gladness when the current definitions of success and prevalent enthusiasms are formed upon discernment of our common task. Then we shall rally to the standard of humanity's great enterprise. We need only to listen to the voice of nature's laws of life and we shall find that they teach a religion that will evoke the most ringing eloquence, the most inspiring music, the noblest architecture, the most constant devotion, and the most zestful life.

The existence of all the tendencies which we have considered is beyond doubt, but our knowledge of them is not quantitative. We can get good men in a good society —men who are good according to the standards which

that society has adopted. Of this the stoic Indian, the hard but heroic Spartan, the loyal liegeman, the missionary, and countless martyrs, and vast numbers of common men and women, some of whom we each have known, give abundant proof. But whether we can get enough of goodness to fulfill our hopes of the democratic realization of human worth and weal, we may not be sure. Of this, however, we are sure, that to despair of that hope at this early day would be craven and despicable. The application of the methods of science to the mastery of material resources is very recent. Its application to the utilization of the resources of human nature has not yet had a fair trial.

The purpose of this essay has been to encourage the passage of ethics from the metaphysical to the scientific stage, from the realm of speculation to the frank acceptance of the matter-of-fact basis for moral judgments and the natural sources of ethical motives and so to help us face life as it is, not as it has been imagined by mystics and metaphysicians, to derive our motives from the actual not from the illusory, to escape the panic of the world at loss of the dreams which advancing intelligence dissipates, and to substitute serenity by accepting our world, acknowledging our limitations and girding ourselves to make the most of what nature has actually afforded us. Whatever the light shatters, we will let fall and will not stand like a housewife, weeping over a broken cup, but let the fragments drift down the stream of time. We see ourselves as we are, not anchored in a pool of placid eternity, but driving down the stormy flux of things. We rejoice that for a span we are not clods

but conscious life, capable of values, and aware that in the causal nexus our functioning is the efficient condition of values in the life of others, that for the moment we are the bearers of the social heritage and pass it on, worse or better, for the responses that we make to life's exigencies.

CHAPTER XII

SERENITY AND COMMON SENSE—PHILOSOPHIC IMPLICATIONS

This chapter is a mere appendix. It is unnecessary except for readers who have felt disposed to question the underlying concepts which have seemed to be implied in the foregoing discussion. One who has no pretensions to being a professional philosopher must venture with modest apologies upon the discussion of ultimate concepts. But it is not too bold for any one who speaks to define his terms. And all who speak on such a theme as this use terms that call for definition. The positive definitions of terms which follow will be intelligible and may win assent even if the negative criticism of other views should appear to some to be misdirected.

Common Sense

The phrase "common sense" has two meanings: first, the common sense of a society, and second, the common sense of the whole human species. The ideas and sentiments that are held in common by all the members of a society are almost sure to seem to those people to be inherently and obviously "sensible" sentiments and obviously and undebatably true ideas. But such ideas and sentiments may vary from one society to another and from one age to the next. In contrast with these local

and temporary sentiments and ideas, "common sense," in the second meaning of that phrase, refers to the features of experience that are so determined by the biological organism of the human species as to be common to the Zulu and Woodrow Wilson. Each suffers pain if burned, is startled by a sudden loud noise, experiences the promptings of instinct, the discriminations of pleasure-pain, the five kinds of sensation, and his ideas organize themselves according to the relations of time, space, and causal conditioning. The experimental evidence of such similarity, or of the common sense of the human species, is overwhelming. We know it if we know anything. It is in this second and more universal meaning that the phrase common sense has been employed in this discussion except in instances where "the common sense of a society" has been clearly indicated.

Common sense, in the first meaning of that phrase, is at many points easily discredited. Common sense, in the second meaning of that phrase, cannot be discredited for it is the method of man's mind, and he has nothing higher than his own mind to which he can appeal against his own mind. The reader is implored to remember always that the right to heap disparagement upon common sense, in the first meaning of that phrase, is not denied; and that it is in the second meaning of the phrase that it is employed in the following discussion. Common sense, in this second and broader meaning of that term, is as truly a characteristic of the human race as the mammalian reproductive system, the digestive apparatus, or air-breathing lungs. There is no reason to doubt that there is a common sense of dogs and a common sense of crows. And there is abundant evidence that

the common sense of the higher animals, so far as it goes, bears important resemblances to the common sense of man. Common sense, like digestion and breathing, is a form of functional adaptation to environment, a part of the life process. It is the method for securing the adjustment of muscular movement to our environment of folks and things.

The curious and amazing thing about it is that it is sense, that it is consciousness. This might be unnecessary if all those stimulations which must guide our conduct if we are to survive were obvious. A mechanism so complex as ours might conceivably be so constructed as to do all the right things as unconsciously as the amœba flees from a drop of acid and pursues a drop of beef juice, provided all the necessary stimulations were directly supplied by the external world. But they are not; the stimulants supplied by present external objects must be supplemented by stimulations which represent[1] the absent, the hidden, and the future. We must solve puzzles, and must escape the foe that lurks around the corner out of sight but whose presence is inferred from signs, and we have not only to seize the food before us, but to plow for the crop that has not yet grown.[2]

Mind, Consciousness, Soul

Common sense, as just defined, is only another expression for the normal functioning of the human *mind.* There are only two kinds of *observable* reality that can be

[1] The limited, but practically essential, way in which they "represent" the absent and the future is discussed a little later.

[2] But compare also page 334.

connoted by the phrase "the human mind," namely, one or both of the following: First, the concatenated ideas and feelings which are conditioned by the functioning of our psychophysical mechanism; second, the psychophysical mechanism which conditions this stream of consciousness. *"Consciousness"* has been defined above as the sum total of ideas and feelings. The word consciousness as here employed is simply a generic term for ideas and feelings. Consciousness is not something behind ideas and feelings which *has* them, or *in which* they exist. We have no knowledge of any such entity nor any occasion for assuming its existence. And the human *"soul,"* as we have employed the word, is the sum total of man's capacities, inherited and acquired, for conscious states, that is, for ideas and feelings.

The only peculiarity of these definitions is that they employ the terms defined to denote objects of thought which come within the compass of our experience rather than to symbolize what lies beyond our knowledge. Some may object to these definitions because they do not postulate the existence of a mind-stuff or soul-substance, but only observable things and events. But precisely therein lies their value. About ultimate substances we have no knowledge, and can make neither affirmations nor denials. The limits of our definitions should coincide exactly with the limits that bound our knowledge, unless we are consciously dealing with hypotheses about the unknown. To smuggle hypotheses about the unknown into the definition of facts is to rob our terms of their validity as instruments of thought.

It is impossible to define or describe consciousness in terms of anything but itself, for there is no material of

knowledge outside of consciousness, even for the knowledge of consciousness. The definition of consciousness in terms of anything outside of consciousness is further removed from possibility than would be the definition of color to a man born blind. However all normal human beings have ideas and feelings as the phrase *common sense* indicates. It is, therefore, intelligible to all normal human beings to say that consciousness is the generic name for ideas and feelings. It is this commonness of experience that makes any communication possible, any word of a speaker intelligible to a listener. The success of communication is a pragmatic test of the validity of common sense.

This would be enough in the way of a definition of consciousness, but there is one thing more that can be said of consciousness, that is, of ideas and feelings; namely, consciousness alone is immediate knowledge, or —which is the same statement—our ideas and feelings, and they alone, are known immediately. By "immediately" I mean independently of the *medium* of sense perception. We do not have to see, hear, smell, taste, or touch our ideas or feelings. Ideas and feelings are events in our own life process. They *are* our life process in one of its aspects. Any other thing is external to our life process, as trees, rocks, and beasts; or else it is our own organism perceived as the organism of a beast can be perceived. The sense organs are parts of our organism which can be so affected by trees, rocks and beasts as to set up the activities which we experience as ideas and feelings. We cannot be conscious of a stone or a chair. We can only be aware of it. We should distinguish between being *aware* of all other objects and their

qualities and being *conscious* of our own ideas and feelings. We can be conscious of nothing but our own ideas and feelings.[2] Being "conscious of" an idea or feeling means the same as the existence of an idea or feeling. Consciousness, let us repeat, is not something in addition to ideas and feelings. It is ideas and feelings.

As was pointed out above, the human mind, or common sense and consciousness, exists as the means by which we are stimulated to action adapted to the absent and the obscure. This is the biological function, purpose, or *raison d'être* of consciousness. In speaking of the process of life the word "function" is used in two senses: either to mean an activity, or to mean the purpose served or result attained by activity. Here we are using the word function in the second sense. To state the function, in this sense of the word, is not to describe or define the nature of the activity itself. However, just now some of the ablest of modern philosophers known as pragmatists[3] go so far as to declare that the very essence of consciousness is a "Functioning of the future in the present." They tell us that "Purposive control is demonstrably the very essence of knowing,"[4] and that "To be conscious is to have a future possible result of present behavior embodied as a present existence (!) functioning as a stimulus to further behavior."[5]

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[2] The objection that this is solipsism will be considered later. Compare page 339.

[3] Although the word "pragmatist" is used to designate those teachers who hold the view here stated, this view may not prove to be any permanent and essential part of pragmatism. *Cf.* pages 342, 343.

[4] E. E. Sabin, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method,* xvi. 493.

[5] B. H. Bode, in "Creative Intelligence," *Essays by John Dewey and others,* 240. New York, 1917.

One may venture to object to this definition of consciousness on the following grounds: First, not all consciousness is purposive; second, not all consciousness is ideas, feelings also are consciousness; third, the use of language in this definition of consciousness is monstrously distorted.

To the last objection the answer is made that any use of language is justified provided "notice is served" of the precise sense in which words are to be employed. But even if notice is served it still is objectionable to call three five, or to call present future. There is grave danger that the same word may be used part of the time in its regular meaning and part of the time in its arbitrarily assigned meaning. This is done by those who after defining present consciousness as "a functioning of the future" argue from that definition that conscious action is uncaused because controlled by the future and not by the present and past.

To the second objection there is, so far as I know, not even the semblance of a reply. Consciousness includes feelings as well as ideas. They are our heaven or our hell. They include all the values of life and can by no means be omitted in our definition of consciousness. It may be true, biologically speaking, that all feeling exists as an incitement or as a deterrent to conduct. Feeling, like all consciousness, exists to control conduct. That is its function. Even the feeling of beauty at the sight of a sunset, though not a direct incitement to action, is an adjustment of our being which fits us for behavior.

But even of bodily pleasures and pains and instinctive emotions, which of all feelings are the most obviously impulses to behavior, it is not enough to say that they

are impulses. As to their function as impulses, as deterrents or incitements to behavior, a smart may be indistinguishable from an ache, and the taste of a grapefruit indistinguishable from the taste of a custard. But as feelings they are not indistinguishable. There is "want more" in the experience of eating grapefruit, custard, or bonbons. They cannot be defined merely as "want more," for the "want more" is common to them all. The taste of grapefruit is not simply "want more." It is distinctly different as consciousness from the taste of custard or bonbons. This differing experience is precisely what feeling as consciousness is. Feeling as consciousness is not merely impulse to future behavior: it is present experience of a very definite sort. Moreover, there are hosts of impulses in the biological process which ordinarily are not separately felt, or are not felt at all. One who is otherwise sufficiently excited may even eat bonbons without tasting them, though, in such a case, there may exist in the subconscious an impulse corresponding to taste. Since there are many impulses to future behavior that are not felt, it is no definition of feeling to say that it is impulse. Feelings are specifically different from unfelt impulses. The quality of feeling which defines it is not that it is impulse to behavior but that it is felt. The definition of the pragmatist omits the essence of consciousness.

To the first of the three objections brought against the Pragmatist's definition of consciousness, the objection that not all consciousness is purposive, his whole argument is a reply. His argument does not apply to feeling, but he avers that all *knowing* is "purposive con-

trol" and a "functioning of the future in the present." "Suppose I hear a noise. The noise is just noise, and so far, we do not classify it as either physical or mental. But let us examine it further. It has a peculiar trait, a 'what-is-it' quality, so that I cock my ear, turn my eyes, perhaps step to the window to look out. The noise as heard has a peculiar inherent incompleteness (the 'what-is-it' quality); and hence it sets going activities directed toward getting a better stimulus." [6] And this is precisely what constitutes the essence and definition of consciousness.

But this is no more than saying that knowing is a functional process which goes on till the function is performed. Every item in *any* functional process is a going on to the next. Every part of a functional process controls future parts of the process and secures future results. This is true of the beating of the heart, the peristalsis of the abdomen, or the creeping of a potato sprout toward the light.[7] Any definition of consciousness must tell us something more about it than this which is true of every biological process whatsoever. Wherein does consciousness differ from the beating of the heart, the peristalsis of the abdomen or the tropism of the potato sprout, all of which have it as their function to control future parts

[6] Professor Bode in correspondence.

[7] Indeed everything in nature is known to us only as functioning or process. It is better, however, to use the word *process* for this universal fact, and not to speak of the functioning of a stone but to reserve the word *function* as the name for organic or super-organic, that is, biological and social process.

The writer was the first to introduce into sociology this conception that *all* is essentially process, writing in 1902. Compare the recognition of this priority by Dean Albion W. Small on page 3 of his *General Sociology*. Chicago, 1905.

of the process? In this, replies the pragmatist, that in these physical processes each act in the process, although it controls future acts, is itself wholly controlled by the past, while in consciousness there is always "a future possible result functioning as a present stimulus to further behavior." Let us examine this reply.

Absorbed in thought, one may sit down in a familiar chair and pick up his pen in pure unconscious automatism; but if the action is conscious he is aware of his chair as suggesting the act of being seated, and of his pen as that with which he is going to write. Knowledge of chair and pen, says the pragmatist, is "a pointing toward the future acts of writing and sitting down." No one denies that there is a difference between "a future possible" fact and a present actual fact. This difference is recognized by the pragmatists by saying that when "a future possible result functions in the present as a stimulus to behavior" the present actual fact is a "reference to" or "pointing to" a future possible result. "Reference to" and "pointing to" are substitute phrases for "idea of."

The pragmatist wants a substitute for the phrase "idea of" because that more familiar expression has been used with the implication that when the man sees his chair three kinds of entity are present: first, the physical organism of the observer; second, the object observed; and third, the idea of the object. In fact, however, so far as our knowledge goes nothing is present but the process of nature, part of which is living and functional in the observer, and part of which is physicochemical and embodied in the chair. We know nothing as to whether the metaphysics involved is monistic or pluralistic. The familiar phrase "idea of" has implied the

existence of a separate kind of entity a "mind stuff," [8] and it is time for us to avoid any such implication as to what lies beyond our knowledge and to realize that all we know is part and parcel of the process of nature, *ideas* being events in the life of the observer. All this is true and was an habitual mode of thought to some sociologists before they ever heard of pragmatism.

But does the formula of the pragmatist constitute a definition of consciousness or even of knowing as distinguished from feeling? It rightly absorbs consciousness into the process of nature, but a definition must distinguish consciousness from the other recognizable forms of natural event. The way in which the pragmatist proposes to distinguish consciousness from all the other events of life is to say that consciousness is an actual present event which "points to" a future event. Is this the whole truth about consciousness and adequate as a definition? Does consciousness point *only* to future events, or does it point also to past events and to other facts of the present?

As a matter of fact, consciousness always points to the past. It exists for the guidance of the future by the past. It arises caused out of the past. By virtue of the nature and causation of ideas and feelings they all have backward reference *whether they ripen to the point of having future reference or not.* Memory and mere musing on the past includes no awareness of the future. Much of the time when consciousness is going on we are unaware of any future reference. To say that future

[8] In the following discussion I propose to keep as far as any pragmatist from implying the existence of a "mind stuff," without resorting to the peculiar expedient which pragmatists adopt for that purpose.

reference is the essence of consciousness, therefore, is to say that something is the essence of consciousness which in many instances is wholly absent from consciousness.

To this the pragmatist replies: Your memory of yesterday's chair is memory of a thing to be sat on. It is *nothing but* memory of a "pointing" toward an act of sitting down which was future with reference to the act of perceiving the chair. You remember the chair only as a pointing toward an act to be performed.

This reply calls for two remarks:

First: What about ideas of our own acts: are they merely pointings toward other acts? Is the memory of being seated in a porch chair nothing but memory of a pointing toward some other action? If our idea of an objective thing is always a pointing toward possible behavior with reference to that thing, is the same true of our ideas of our own behavior itself, and of all our experiences, feelings, or thoughts, and of our ideas of the behavior and experiences of other men, are our ideas of these activities always and solely pointings toward our own future behavior? I trow not. To admit it would be to contradict our experience. And if not, then the doctrine of "pointing" or "future reference" as a definition of consciousness is again disproved, as it was disproved by its inapplicability to feelings. A statement which is inapplicable to our feelings and to our ideas of our own activity is impossible as a definition of consciousness, even if it be a true statement with reference to our ideas of objective things.

Second: As to our ideas of objective things, these ideas are events in our own functioning which may "point" to events in the process of nature which are

incidents in the functioning of other living beings, or in the existence [9] of inanimate objects.[10] The pragmatist devises his definition of consciousness with special reference to ideas of this kind, and declares that the idea of a stone or a chair is nothing but a pointing to our own future action. He does so not only because he is anxious to avoid the unjustifiable "mind-stuff" assumption, but also because he wishes to escape the epistemological difficulty of getting *in consciousness* ideas of *objects that are not in consciousness;* but this difficulty can only be dodged, or escaped ostrichwise. It remains unsolved and to us insoluble. Common sense merely describes the facts as they appear in experience and then stops, not attempting to go behind the facts in search of metaphysical explanations. Pragmatism seeks to render the metaphysical problem nonexistent by omitting part of the facts and by giving for those facts which it retains a weirdly unfamiliar description in place of the universally familiar description of common sense. When common sense says, "I see a chair," pragmatism says, "A chair is functioning as a pointing to your act of sitting down and this pointing of the chair is consciousness, and all consciousness is nothing but such pointings."

Thus Professor Bode tells us [10] that to perceive a razor is to experience a prompting to shrink from being cut, that being conscious in this case is simply getting the

[9] We can conceive of all existence as process. And the pragmatists are accustomed to speak of the "functioning" of a chair or of a stone. But although the existence of a chair and of a man may both be chemicophysical process, yet there is an important, though not a clear, difference between the living and the not living. It seems, therefore, to be an aid to discriminating thought to reserve the word "functioning" to the events which are included in the process of life.

[10] "Creative Intelligence," 202.

stimulus "will cut." On the other hand, common sense declares that when we see the razor we get an idea of *objective* thinness and hardness of edge, glitter, form, and relation of parts, and that this same idea of the objective razor may be had by a frightened negro shrinking from the razor as a weapon, by a barber reaching for it as a tool, or by a hardware merchant bargaining for it to sell at profit.

In response to this the pragmatist demands: "Since all that is in consciousness is consciousness, how do you get any hold upon such qualities as glitter and form as facts existing objectively—that is, outside of consciousness?" And common sense replies: "We do not understand how any more than we understand the ultimate nature of causation in any of its other manifestations. We are so constituted by nature that we are unable to explain how we get ideas of objective qualities. But we are so constituted that we do get these ideas. And we will not throw away what nature has given us because she has not given us more."

The pragmatist is forced to say, and he does say with emphasis, that the razor which the frightened negro gets is "will cut," the razor which the barber gets is "can shave with it," and the razor which the merchant gets is "can sell it with a profit," and that the fly crawling over it doubtless gets still another razor, and if the merchant first looked at the razor with clouded spectacles and then wiped his glasses, he thereupon got another razor still, for the *razor "functioned" differently* after the lenses were clear. But common sense says that it was one razor all the time, and the negro, barber, merchant, and fly functioned differently with reference to the razor,

received from it different stimulations to conduct, and may have received somewhat different ideas of its qualities according to the character of their own organisms and whether their lenses were clear or not.

There are three important conceptions of the problem of relationship between ideas and objects: First, the idealist says there is no such problem, for no objects exist as distinguishable from ideas. Second, the pragmatist says there is no such problem, for there are no ideas of perception distinguishable from the functioning of objects. In looking at the razor I do not have an idea of the razor, I have the razor functioning as a stimulus to behavior. The consciousness is no more mine than it is the razor's. When my back is toward a tree I can have an idea of the tree, but when I turn and look at the tree the idea of the tree becomes nonexistent and I have the tree, or rather I have one side of the tree, I may still have an idea of the other side of it. But there shall be no idea when I am looking at the tree, for I cannot prove correspondence between idea and object and I must trust my knowledge. Third, common sense admits that there is a problem. It regards the idea as an item in the life process of the observer. Just how or how far it corresponds to the object common sense does not know. But it regards as real both the observer in whose life the idea is an event, and the object by which the organism of the observer is so affected that this event occurs.

Whether in perception, or in memory, imagination and dreams, we do not usually think of the *idea* of a tree *and* of a tree, but only of a tree, either vividly as in perception or usually less vividly in memory, imagination or dreams. But since in memory, imagination and dreams

we can see a tree when there is no tree, and since in perception we may see it either dimly and distantly or clear and close, and since experience convinces us that the tree exists both before we begin to see it and afterward, therefore common sense is everywhere forced to the conclusion that the existence of the tree and the seeing of the tree are two facts, not one. A fact unmistakable to common sense is the presence of subject and predicate: "I see the tree." Every language of "nature men" or "culture men" proclaims this fundamental dualism. The "nature man" may have a crude notion of the relation between himself and the objects which he perceives but he is sure of both. His sophisticated offspring may say: "My life is a series of events including ideas and feelings, and it is part of a vaster process of nature all the rest of which I call my environment. My survival depends upon correlation between the process which I am and the vaster process of nature." Like the nature man, he still speaks, and he still acts—or he could not survive—upon the simple formula: "I see the tree, I chop down the tree. I build a house of the tree. I go in at the door."

The pragmatist does not doubt that trees and razors are as real as human organisms. "The object with its power to produce effects is assumed." [11] "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object" (James) is the purpose. "The start is from *objects* (italics Dewey's) already empirically given as presented, existentially vouched for." If it is thus assumed that objects exist and can "produce effects" in the life of an organism which are "pointings" toward future activity of that

[11] John Dewey, *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, v. 88.

organism, why is it less justifiable to assume, as common sense does, that objects can produce effects in the life of the organism which are pointings toward the objects which produce those effects. There is no less of assumption and ultimately no less of metaphysical difficulty in the statement of the pragmatist than in the frank statement that ideas and feelings exist as a highly peculiar type of events in the life of highly constituted organisms, which are occasioned by and have a certain correspondence to objects external to the life of the organism.

The fact that consciousness is a functioning of the living organism and not of the object nor even a joint functioning of the organism and the object, is well illustrated by the countless instances, of fancy, memory, hope and the like, in which there is no actual object.

The pragmatist's definition of consciousness does not apply to ideas of our own behavior and the behavior of other persons, unless we admit that an idea of past behavior is nothing but "a pointing" toward other and future behavior. It does not apply to feelings unless we admit that feelings have no value save as incitants or deterrents to behavior. It does not apply to ideas of objects unless we admit that there is no consent of the competent but that objects can actually vary for each different observer and because of a change in the same observer. In place of the description of the facts which experience renders familiar to every normal human being the pragmatist's definition of consciousness offers a description which omits part of the facts and presents the others in a fantastic and unrecognizable form. Its aim is to give us a firm grasp upon objects, and it offers us objects that "function" differently for different observers and

for the same observer with clear and clouded spectacles, our knowledge of which is only a pointing to our own future behavior, future objects which have a quality of pastness, and future possibilities which function as present actualities. This is different from subjective idealism but wherein is it more consistent with itself, more congruous with the facts of experience or more congenial to the nature of the human mind?

While common sense simply states the facts of experience and admits that there is a metaphysical problem involved which we cannot solve, pragmatism of the kind referred to tries to get rid of the metaphysical problem by distorting the facts of experience. It strains toward a definition of consciousness which is a denial of consciousness as a particular kind of event in the life of the organism distinguishable from all of its other functional on-going by qualities which involve metaphysical difficulty. It practically omits the fact of consciousness from its definition of consciousness. It emphasizes the object which it *assumes* to exist while denying that we have any perceptual idea of the object. And it emphasizes the future functioning of the beholder's organism, but thins down the present event in the life of the organism into a "functioning of possible future behavior as a present existence." That present event in the life of the organism cannot be so got rid of. It is *feeling* (which the definition of the pragmatist slurs over or omits entirely) and it is *idea of*. It may be idea of the future functioning of the organism, or of its past functioning, or of the activity of other organisms, or of objects that have no part in biological functioning, like a stone, a chair, or

a razor, and which are in that sense external to the event of consciousness but causes of it.

The common sense view makes no assumption as to any "mind-stuff" which has "states." It says nothing about what "has" ideas and feelings. It no more adopts the theory of mental states than the child or the savage who says, "I see," adopts the wave theory of light or any other theory of the physics of vision. It says nothing about what is behind ideas and feelings. It simply acknowledges that ideas and feelings are and gives them a generic name. All there is *in* consciousness is ideas and feelings; all there is *of* consciousness is ideas and feelings. And often there is no idea of future reference. There is, however, in every idea, as in every item of the life process, at least in an incipient degree the *kind* of adjustment the completed function purpose or *raison d'être* of which is the control of conduct. The function of all consciousness is to eventuate in will. And yet there is a great deal of consciousness that does not eventuate in will. Consciousness always is the kind of thing that might cumulate and culminate into action with reference to future results. But it does not always do so, any more than the watering of the mouth at sight of food always culminates in swallowing and digestion.

To say that my idea of a razor's edge is not an idea of objective thinness and firmness, but that *as consciousness* my idea is incipient preparation to cut or to prevent being cut, is to contradict my consciousness. Yet the physical activity underlying consciousness is always of the kind which may eventuate in overt action. What we have to do is to keep in mind the truth that consciousness, like every part of the process of life, is functional, with-

out excluding from our minds the truth that consciousness is specifically different from every other part of the process of life in that it is feelings and ideas, that it has an actual present existence as an event in the process of life, and that in it all the meaning of life inheres. It cannot be too clearly recalled to mind that aside from its biological function as a guide to future behavior, consciousness, *as a present event,* contains all the values of human existence. To say that consciousness has all its meaning with reference to future behavior is an effort to get rid of consciousness. That would be race suicide indeed.

The pragmatist's effort to eliminate ideas of objects, as concomitant with but distinct from the objects themselves, compels him to deny the existence of the urge to know as a distinct propensity. But common sense and all observation insist that eyes and ears are instruments of a distinct predisposition with a definite psychophysical mechanism and a specific emotional value, as interest and curiosity. Moreover, this is the one psychophysical predisposition upon which in the evolution of man nature has chiefly specialized. In him it has become complicated by the development of a mass of free nerve cells in the brain ready to be connected up with new stimulations and to record old ones so that look-and-listen becomes look-listen-and-explain. In discussing instinct in an earlier chapter we had occasion to observe that feeling, satisfaction, or the conscious phase of an instinct, such as eating or sex, is a totally different thing from the biological function or purpose of the instinct, although the satisfaction is promotive of the function. The like is as true of ideas as of instinctive feelings. It is true of the idea-

getting predisposition as of every instinct that it has both a biological and a psychological aspect, both a biological function as behavior and a psychological value. To define consciousness in the terms of the former is to omit consciousness. It denies the essential character of consciousness in order to get rid of the metaphysical difficulties involved. It is better to accept the facts, and if we are unable to go behind them with metaphysical explanation, then it is better to stop with them.

We have been insisting in the same breath that consciousness cannot *be defined* by its relation to behavior and that it *has* a relation to behavior. It seems, to say the least, highly improbable that so elaborately developed and prominent a fact of the life of the higher animals should be a mere epiphenomenon, riding upon a succession of mechanistically determined behavioristic adjustments and having no practical importance as affecting behavior. How ideas and feelings can influence the process no man knows any more than any one knows the nature of causation in general. He can say neither more nor less than that, for observation, ideas, and feelings—the facts of consciousness—are events which are true links in the causal chain, caused by the stimulating environment and causing reaction upon the environment. Hitherto we are absolutely incompetent to solve the metaphysical question of the nature of reality, material or psychic, or of the nature of causation. We are as far from materialism on the one hand as from idealism or the doctrine of mental states on the other, and as to *how* acts of consciousness and neuroses and mountains and skies can causally affect each other we need not profess to know.

The Real and the True

It is indeed conceivable that consciousness is as bloom is to the peach or fragrance to the flower—a kind of efflorescence upon the chemico-physical processes of neuroses and glandular perturbation, and that it has no causal significance. This seems likely enough when we consider that there are many responses that may go on either with or without this accompaniment of consciousness, and that even difficult processes of reasoning sometimes appear to have been carried on in sleep. If this be the true view then this bloom upon the process of organic life is all that gives life value to the living being. Then "reasonable" ideas are responses adjusted to the entire situation in so far as it effectively relates itself to the organism; and free action is muscular completion of such response—a resultant of all the component stimulations, and not a distorted and fractional response. And then when we say that ideas are causal links between the tree and my chopping the tree, we practice a kind of metonomy, naming the intervening organic process by its efflorescence as consciousness.

But if consciousness, as feeling, may roughly be described as an organic response blossoming into self-knowledge, *ideas,* strangely enough, are not organic response blossoming into *self*-knowledge, but into knowledge of its supposed cause. Perhaps after all this is hardly more wonderful, and no more inexplicable, than that the chemico-physical process that underlies feeling should blossom into self-consciousness. But it is different—so different that it is in consciousness *as ideas* that problems inhere which prompt some of the cleverest of

men to plan a way of escape by inventing a definition of consciousness which leaves feeling out of the perspective.

Whether ideas are a causally effective part of the process "I see the tree and cut it down," or only a functionally meaningless obbligato to the biological process, ideas are at least phenomena, or nothing is. And different as they are from all material things, they proclaim themselves to be related to material things, so that common sense assures us that we have an *idea of* the tree. The difficulty, to escape from which is the chief motive of the pragmatist's fantastic definition of consciousness, lies in the question, If all there is *in* consciousness *is* consciousness, how can I get or prove that I have any knowledge of trees and other material objects?

A common sense view of life, or a natural science view, which is the same thing, aims to see "the facts," "reality," "the truth." These phrases imply the distinction between "subjective" ideas which may or may not be true, and "external" or "objective" realities or facts. And by truth is meant some sort of dependable correspondence between ideas and facts. Of course, there is a sense in which every idea is a fact, but it is to some one a "subjective" fact, and "truth," we say, is correspondence between subjective facts (ideas) and objective facts.

Now it is obvious that our ideas do not correspond entirely with objective facts. My idea of an idea that I had yesterday or of my neighbor's idea may approach to such complete correspondence, but there is no other kind of objective fact that corresponds with any completeness to an idea of it. An idea of a table is a very different thing from a table. You cannot put a book on the idea of a table, any more than you can make pur-

chases with an idea of a million dollars, or mount the idea of a horse and ride away on it.

There is, nevertheless, a practical correspondence between ideas and objective facts, and this practical correspondence is what we call truth. What is meant by such practical correspondence is this: First, true ideas are conditioned by objective facts. My idea of a horse outside the window is conditioned by something that is not a part of my idea. When we say an idea is true, we mean in the first place then that the idea is so conditioned either directly as in perception, or indirectly as in inference. The medium through which this conditioning takes place is my own neurosis. Second, very often, often enough to demonstrate the existence of this second phase of their correspondence with the external world, true ideas set going in us further responses of our organisms which result in other ideas, which at the time of action were anticipated. Thus, the idea of a horse makes me walk forward, seize his mane, leap on his back, and ride away, and the whole process is accompanied by a series of anticipated ideas, which fact leads me to say that the original idea of a horse standing there was true.

If the first of these two correspondences: *object-neurosis-idea* is symbolized by o n i, and the second *muscular response-changed objective situation-anticipated ideas* is symbolized by m o′ i′, the whole process may be represented thus: o n i′ m o′ i′. We have in consciousness only i and i′ and have no direct or immediate knowledge of the external world,[12] o o′, and therefore can have no

[12] Pragmatists like Professor Dewey and Professor Bode would object to this word "external." This externality of objects to consciousness is precisely what they deny. For this purpose they teach that consciousness is a process participated in by both the

direct assurance of any correspondence between o and i, or between o′ and i′. But the original idea (i) included the notion that it corresponded to an external object (o) and passed directly into an anticipation of (i′), that is, it passed into an anticipation of changes in ideas corresponding to supposed changes in the external condition as altered by the muscular movements which were prompted by the original idea. The correspondence between the anticipation and the realization establishes in consciousness a confidence in the trustworthiness of the process. If the anticipation, which was based upon a supposed knowledge of the objective situation, is fulfilled by the ideas which come to us in the changed situation after we have acted upon it, we conclude that the original idea (i) possessed that correspondence with the original situation (o) and that the new ideas (i′) which came with the changing of the situation by our action, possessed that correspondence with the new situation (o′) which we call the truth of those ideas. If we are not justified in this confidence, then our faculties are so deceptive that we are not justified in any confidence whatever and may as well give up the use of our faculties on the ground that they are incapable of anything but deception. Our daily experience carries the proportion o : i :: o′ : i′ through every conceivable permutation and it continually works out as if the proportion were true. Our life is a continual repetition of this experiment, and

functioning object, say a chair, and the "functioning" organism. But common sense regards consciousness as an event in the life of the organism and not as an event in the "functioning" of the chair. To common sense the chair only occasions the functioning of the organism, and is external to this functioning, that is, to consciousness, as it is external to the organism.

a constant renewal and corroboration of our confidence in the trustworthiness of its result. Everything works out as if this notion of correspondence between ideas and objects were justified. Acting on that confidence, we survive and prosper; ignoring it, we should perish. The idea of such correspondence is the idea of truth.

There is, however, no basis for a claim that this correspondence between objects and ideas is complete. It may be that an organism of quite different constitution from ours, under the same conditions, might get an idea of the horse quite different from ours, yet for the purposes of such an organism, equally true. Even some individuals of our own species, by a long process of observation and inference, have concluded that what I call the brownness of the horse is in reality an effect produced by reaction between the vibrations of ether and my organism, and *represents* nothing that exists outside of me, though it does *correspond* to the external reality in the practical way described. I was enabled to pick out my horse by this idea of brownness. It may be that to a being of another order what I call mane, tail, and legs would appear as a system of active ions. It may be that metaphysical concepts utterly beyond us and for which it is folly for us to look, would be the percepts of some higher being. As a monarch butterfly, flitting over a pasture, sees the milkweeds and settles upon one and lays its eggs and its larvæ find their congenial food, while the hawk, flying over the same pasture, does not distinguish the milkweed, but sees the field mouse running between the stalks, and the field mouse sees what neither the hawk nor the butterfly perceives, and no one of the three has an idea of that pasture which begins to rep-

resent the total actuality, so we, in the presence of objective stimulations, get an experience, and are not sure of any actual correspondence between our experience and the objective fact, save the practical correspondence which alone is our concern.

This, however, does not mean *solipsism*, the doctrine that we are shut up in our own minds and have no reliable relations with the general process of nature. It is the very nature of an idea to be the idea *of* something. Solipsism means that this general declaration of consciousness is an illusion, and that all our ideas are false except perhaps our ideas of our own ideas. If we reject the idea that consciousness is as much a function of the object perceived (say a chair) as of the brain, that consciousness is the chair functioning, and that in consciousness we have the object and not an idea of the object, then we have to choose either solipsism, that is the notion that our consciousness in assuring us that we have knowledge of external things is a cheat, or else fall back upon the common sense view that a correspondence between our ideas of objects and the objects themselves exists. For the solipsistic notion there is not a scintilla of proof. For the view of common sense—the notion that the supposed correspondence is real—we have, to begin with, this support: That our ideas succeed each other just as they would if the supposed correspondence were real; that when we go to mount a horse we have the experience of mounting him; that when we strike at the wall as if our experience of sight reported an actual wall we get the experience of a bruised hand; that when we shoot a rabbit as if our idea corresponded to a real rabbit, we then and not before can get the experience of eating

the rabbit; that when we act upon our ideas as if they were reliable evidence of an external world, our anticipations are fulfilled. If this does not exactly prove the truth of our notion that ideas correspond with objectivity, it justifies us in acting precisely as we should if we knew they did. If those items in our life process which we call ideas occasion motor responses which fit into the system of existence, so as to secure the survival of our organisms and the realization of anticipated ideas and feelings, then they are true in the only sense in which we have any concern to seek for truth.

In the second place, the fact that the qualities of sensation, color, sound, taste, smell, or feeling exist only for consciousness and correspond to external causes without copying those causes, does not of necessity cast the same kind of doubt upon the correctness of our ideas of the fundamental relations of time, space, and causation. These ideas may not copy the realities; they may not tell us all about the realities,—they certainly do not tell us all about the realities of causation,—but the correspondence between the ideas and the realities is of a very real and intimate kind. If my arrow hits the rabbit, I am justified in believing that my ideas of direction and distance—that is, of space—correspond accurately with the facts. Common sense does not doubt that the relations of time, space, and causation exist whether they are observed or not, and the ideas of these relations are probably the same to a man, a hawk, or a rattlesnake. This is not true of sensations. Very likely the rabbit does not taste to me as it would to a rattlesnake, and there is no such thing as taste independent of a sensitive organism but only that which will cause the experience of

taste in a sensitive organism. It is necessary for the practical success of our conduct that our ideas of time, space, and causation should correspond to the objective facts, and the fact of our success is the only kind of evidence we need or are capable of receiving in support of the actual existence of such correspondence. But that such ideas as those of color and taste should *copy* anything objective, our success neither requires nor proves. Of the true correspondence between our ideas and the essential relations of time, space, and causation we have all the evidence conceivable and no evidence to the contrary. All the alleged contrary evidence amounts only to showing that we are not infallible. A sphere may look in perspective like a disk and a cube like a figure of oblique lines. But this merely means that a single observation by a single sense may not give us adequate experience. Adequate observation organizes the facts of perspective into an intelligible system and a corroboration of the accuracy of our ideas of space.

If, in accordance with the theory of relativity, the spacial, temporal, and even causal relations that we know are only the simpler aspect of a more complex system of interrelationships, that need not affect the truth of common sense knowledge so far as it goes. Our knowledge may sometime exceed its present bounds. We need not be, cannot be, dogmatic agnostics, in the sense of setting definite limits to the possibility of human knowledge. Next to the unspeakable assumption that this physiological apparatus of nerve cells enables us to fathom the ultimate is the other assumption that we can already set definite boundaries to the possibility of progress in human knowledge.

Pragmatism

This acceptance of the practical test as the basis of confidence in our knowledge and as the method of increasing our knowledge, and acceptance of the idea that adjustment of our organism to practical behavior is the physiological basis and primary function of consciousness may well be called "pragmatism."

This is obviously as far as possible from the notion that an idea is true if the emotions which it awakens are agreeable. True pragmatism [13] is testing our ideas by their power to elicit behavior which fits into the world so as to elicit from the world an anticipated result.

Common sense never doubts its grip upon the external world. However much we have to alter our notions about the external world, common sense and science, which is only an extensive and patient application of the method of common sense, never doubt that our notions about the external world are derived from the external world by means of the activity of an apparatus for knowing with which nature has endowed us. The doubt arises only when we realize that we cannot prove or explain the actuality of our grip upon the external world.

And science and common sense go right on admitting our inability to prove the reality of our knowledge of the external world, but go on using this knowledge just the same. We must use it or perish. It is the only way we can live, and using this supposed knowledge of the exter-

[13] This, of course, is venturing an opinion as to what the word "pragmatism" should mean, not an historical statement of what it has meant as employed by some.

nal world as if it were real knowledge, we find that it works as if it were real knowledge.

May one not be pardoned for doubting whether the fantastic definition of consciousness which obscures or denies its essential character, as that character is familiarly known to every conscious being, is any permanent or essential part of true pragmatism? Is not pragmatism ultimately to be the frank adoption of the verdict of common sense and the equally frank abandonment of the fruitless search for a philosophical omniscience that is not possible to intelligences which function only within the limit set by a network of nerve cells in a bony box, evolved so far, and only so far as their functioning contributes to the survival of the organism of which this box of brains is a part?

The limited knowledge which we now have leaves open a possible doubt whether ideas are causal factors necessary to the biological process of behavior, or whether all behavior might just as well proceed as that of a sleepwalker does, with no consciousness whatever, so that consciousness is a mere work of supererogation, a surplus dividend, a gift of the gods, making the process of life a thing of interest and value to the living being. As has been remarked above, we practice metonomy when we say an idea causes our action, naming a complex process which includes the neuroses by that aspect of the process which we call our consciousness. We may prefer to think that the idea is an essential link in the causal process. We may believe ourselves justified in refusing to believe that consciousness is a glaring exception to what appears to be an otherwise universal law of nature—that nothing is evolved in nature which is not thereafter a causal factor

in nature's process. But we are not prepared to dogmatize. And, after all, what practical difference does it make?

Scientific determinism is not materialistic. It is only by adding a certain type of metaphysics to observation that we arrive at materialism. Sociology, as well as all science and practical life, has nothing to do with any metaphysical theory of causation or of being. It is *naïve* in the sense in which all common sense and all science are *naïve;* namely, that it trusts human faculties to tell the truth as truth was just defined.

Indeed common sense is infinitely far from being materialistic. It not only admits the equal reality of the physical and the psychic, but it goes further and admits that all of the ultimate values discoverable by human intelligence inhere in the psychic realities, that from the point of view of human interest all material things whatsoever have only derivative and secondary value because, and in so far as, they condition the realization of good human experiences.

Most of the difficulties of metaphysics are bred by metaphysics. They are inseparable from any attempt to leap or fly across gulfs of ignorance which common sense has done nothing to bridge. Though it is impossible to define the limits of our possible knowledge, it is reasonably certain that there are limits beyond which we cannot go. The struggle to go beyond the boundaries of possible knowledge confuses our knowledge within those boundaries. As in practical activity the feeling that this ought to be a perfect world for human beings, exactly adapted to our own nature, makes men repine instead of throwing themselves with zest into the struggle to wrest from

nature such service to man as we can compel, so also in intellectual activity the feeling that we ought to be able to know that which lies beyond the compass of our powers and our concerns makes us mystified and uncertain about those aspects of the world which our faculties present.

The wallowing of epistemology never arrived at any positive conclusion, but it seems able to negative any conclusion whatsoever. Of all the futile exercises of great intelligence, the most preposterous is that by which men have tried to use their faculties to test their faculties. It assumes that our mental processes are valid enough to prove or disprove their own validity. They are valid enough to disprove their own omniscience. But these limited faculties of ours present a workable view of so much of reality as it concerns us to know. And our business is to work it, not to try to substitute for it another devised more to our liking.

All of the foregoing chapters, and all of science, rest upon the assumption that within limits we can know. We cannot prove that we know, for all our proof depends upon the validity of that very reason, the validity of which was to be proved. If our reason is not valid, then all that seems to us proof of its validity is in fact an instance of its deceitfulness. To accept any proof of anything, even of our reason, we must assume the validity of our reason. The epistemological question is one that must be begged. The very attempt to construct an epistemology begs the epistemological question. It would seem, then, that epistemological discussion might as well be laid aside once for all, for in the very nature

of things, it is an attempt to lift ourselves by our own boot straps, and cannot get us anywhere.

There are two things which to common sense are plain: First, that if we assume that our ideas correspond to objective reality in the practical sense above defined, we do not become involved in any inconsistencies that are apparent to our faculties; and second, that unless we act as if our faculties gave us true knowledge, we cannot survive.

Our philosophical difficulties arise because, being dissatisfied with the facts of life and the world, as they appear to common sense, we have assumed our own ability by speculation to get out of the world which our faculties present. But cutting off the vast shadowland of conflicting speculative uncertainties and betaking ourselves to minding our own business of living in the world as presented by our faculties we escape our artificial perplexities.

Human thought has been an alternation of two processes:[14] one by which man constructs a thought world in which he can live, the other by which he tears it down again. Speculation and faith build man a home, criticism tears it down and leaves him shelterless. Practical necessity prompts the construction, demand for truth prompts the demolition. Ideas being man's prime necessity and necessity being the mother of invention, men and women have conceived beliefs which answer their sense of need, and have then insisted that the fact that these beliefs do answer their sense of need is sufficient

[14] Compare W. Durant, *Philosophy and the Social Problem*, ch. 1. New York, 1917. H. M. Kallen, *William James and Henri Bergson*, ch. 1. Chicago, 1914.

evidence that they are true, and have proclaimed that faith in them is the supreme virtue. Comparative study of social evolution makes it clear that there is hardly any length to which faith so formed cannot go in disregarding facts. Practical need has been so much more urgent than the critical need for truth that we have built our structure of opinion and comfortably settled ourselves in it before the voice of criticism was clearly heard. Thereafter it was a strife between faith and truth. In this strife faith and practical necessity have in general had the advantage. But the occasional triumph of criticism has at times resulted in brief periods of intellectual and artistic greatness, followed by moral and social ruin. Thus for a little while, in Greece, the mind of man was free. It was not imbedded in any stereotyped tradition. This gave to Greece the age of Pericles, and straightway it plunged Greece into the age of Alcibiades. What we need is a criticism that dispels the bugaboos by which man has been scared into decency, and at the same time lays bare the foundations of natural necessity upon which the claims of decency are based. After each triumph of critical truth, and each partial demolition of our comfortable abode of faith, practical faith has set itself to make repairs. Instead of starting from the cleared foundation of solid rock with criticism as a fellow worker, it has frantically gathered the shattered fragments and rebuilt upon the old foundation. The savage in his *naïveté* may dwell permanently in his ill-designed beliefs, but the "culture man," trained to critical reflection, tears down with one hand what he fain would build up with the other, and the habitable structure of thought, like Penelope's web, refuses to grow.

Is it then true that the brain is a biological monstrosity so fashioned that it secures physical survival only as a foundation for mental misery, and are the facts apprehensible by human intelligence so unfit for man's needs, and the world so unsuited to the welfare of conscious beings, or else man's own faculties so inadequate and misleading, that we must choose between self-deception or misery, between illusions or pessimism and despair? Or does the whole difficulty lie in the fact that we have never seriously tried to live in the world of common sense?

We shall never cease to be distracted and life will never proceed with clear guidance and full power till we become content to be human beings, not divinities, and to live as life is defined for us by the nature of our powers. But when once we accept in speculation limitations corresponding to those which we are forced to accept in practice, we shall find that every value of human experience is unabated, that the values of both good and evil which are at stake in the earthly experience of human society transcend our powers of estimate and call us with a summons the urgency and inspiration of which is all that we can endure. We have only to throw ourselves into the current of intelligent coöperative endeavor for the diminution of evil and for the realization of good, in order to discover the true dignity and the poignant zest of life. We shall find our serenity in common sense.

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